Security relies heavily on secret keys. And security is completely lost if the keys are copied or stolen. In the passport example, the passport document is the rough equivalent of a key. It is not used for encryption or any such functions, but the assumption is that it cannot be copied (in other words, forged) and it will not be stolen or willingly given up. If either of these events occurs, the whole system breaks down.
In RSN the security context is defined by the possession of limited-life keys. Unlike with WEP, in RSN there are many different keys forming part of a key hierarchy, and most of these keys are not known before the authentication process completes. In fact, the creation of the keys is done in real time as the security context is established after authentication. Because they are created in real time, they are referred to as temporal keys. These temporal keys may be updated from time to time, but they are always destroyed when the security context is closed.
A key is basically a shared secret between two or more parties. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that a key is any shared data that is useful only if it is kept secret. The magic word abracadabra is not very magical because everyone knows it and, by saying it, you're not actually doing anything. A real magic word is one that only a special group knows and that gives the group privileges or power. So it is with keys.
Keys can be used in two distinct ways. They can provide proof of your identity (such as a passport) and they can give access to services (such as the key to your car). Purists will point out that this is really the same thing because you get access to the service by proving that you are the person who has permission. However, the distinction is useful when looking at the way keys are used.
During the authentication phase, you have to prove your identity by demonstrating that you have knowledge of a secret. Passing this test entitles you to receive the other keys those that open doors and start engines, for example. In the case of RSN, correctly authenticating enables you to receive or create the keys that are used for encryption and data protection. These useful keys are sometimes called the temporal or session keys because they work only so long as the security context is in place.
In principle, temporal keys can be created out of thin air. For example, when encrypting messages between two parties, you simply require that both parties (and only these parties) have the same key value. You don't care what that value is, so if you have a way that two parties can separately generate the same "random" number at roughly the same time, you can use that as the key. When you have finished communicating, you can just throw away the key.
Authentication is based on some shared secret information that cannot be created automatically. An authentication key must be created by someone trusted and attached to the holder in such a way that it can't easily be copied or stolen. And, of course, the trusted key giver has to be certain of the identity of the key receiver. The basis of all authentication methods, therefore, is that the entity that is to be authenticated possesses some special information in advance, which is called the master key. Using the master key in a way that protects it from discovery is very important. As a general rule, the master key is rarely, if ever, used directly; instead, it is used to create temporal keys. (WEP, of course, rode through this rule by using the master key both in authentication and encryption.)
In summary, there are two types of keys: a fixed or master key that provides proof of identity, and any number of temporal keys that are created or derived from the master key for use in the security protocol. Understanding this distinction helps to understand the way in which RSN is designed.