Postfix Security

Email systems are necessarily exposed to possible attacks because their function requires that they accept data from untrusted systems. The challenge is to build systems that are resistant to attack, and any good security strategy includes multiple layers of protection. This is particularly true for public systems in a potentially hostile environment. Postfix takes a proactive and multilayered approach to security. The Postfix architecture limits the severity of vulnerabilities, even if there are design or coding errors that might otherwise create major vulnerabilities in a monolithic privileged program.

1.4.1 Modular Design

The modular architecture of Postfix forms the basis for much of its security. Each Postfix process runs with the least amount of privilege necessary to get its particular job done. Many of Sendmail's security problems were exacerbated because Sendmail ran as a privileged process most of the time. Postfix operates with the minimum privilege necessary to accomplish a particular task. Postfix processes that are not needed on a system can be turned off, making it impossible to exploit them. For example, a network firewall system that only relays mail and does not need local delivery can have all the Postfix components for local delivery turned off. Postfix processes are insulated from each other and depend very little on any interprocess communication. Each process determines for itself what it needs to know.

1.4.2 Shells and Processes

In most cases, the delivery of mail does not require a Unix shell process, but when a configuration does make use of one, Postfix sanitizes information before placing it into environment variables. Postfix tries to eliminate any harmful characters that might have special meaning to a shell before making any data available to the shell.

Most Postfix processes are executed by a trusted master daemon. They do not run as user child processes, so they are immune to any of the security problems that rely on parent-child inheritance and communications. These attacks that use signals, shared memory, open files, and other types of interprocess communication are essentially useless against Postfix.

1.4.3 Security by Design

A buffer overflow is another common type of attack against applications. In this type of attack, crackers cause a program to write to memory where it is not supposed to. Doing so might allow them to change the path of execution in order to take control of the process. I've already mentioned that Postfix processes run with as little privilege as possible, so such an attack would not get very far; moreover, Postfix avoids using fixed-size buffers for dynamic data, making a successful buffer overflow attack highly unlikely.

An important security protection available on Unix systems is the ability to chroot applications. A chroot establishes a new root directory for a running application such as /var/spool/postfix. When that program runs, its view of the filesystem is limited to the subtree below /var/spool/postfix, and it cannot see anything else above that point. Your critical system directories and any other programs that might be exploited during an attack are not accessible. Postfix makes it very simple to cause its processes to run within a chroot (see more about chrooting in Chapter 4). By doing so, you cause Postfix to run in its own separate compartment. Even if Postfix is somehow subverted, it will not provide access to many of the methods an attacker typically employs to compromise a system.

Because Postfix is designed to run even under stressful conditions, denial-of-service (DOS) attacks are much less effective. If a system runs out of disk space or memory due to a DOS attack or another type of problem, Postfix is careful not to make the situation worse. It backs off from what it is trying to do to allow the system to recover. Postfix processes are configured to use a limited amount of memory, so they do not grow uncontrollably from an onslaught of messages.

The difficulty in planning for security is that you don't know what the next attack will be or how it will be carried out. Postfix is designed to deal with adverse conditions no matter what their cause. Its built-in robustness is a major factor in the degree of security that Postfix provides. Indeed, Dr. Venema has said that he is not so much interested in security as he is in creating software that works as intended, regardless of the circumstances. Security is just a beneficial side effect.

Introduction

Prerequisites

Postfix Architecture

General Configuration and Administration

Queue Management

Email and DNS

Local Delivery and POP/IMAP

Hosting Multiple Domains

Mail Relaying

Mailing Lists

Blocking Unsolicited Bulk Email

SASL Authentication

Transport Layer Security

Content Filtering

External Databases

Appendix A. Configuration Parameters

Appendix B. Postfix Commands

Appendix C. Compiling and Installing Postfix

Appendix D. Frequently Asked Questions

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Postfix(c) The Definitive Guide
Postfix: The Definitive Guide
ISBN: 0596002122
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2006
Pages: 130
Authors: Kyle Dent D.
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