PROBLEMS OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ETHICS AND MORALITY


We now know two ways of distinguishing between ethics and morality. Both find their justification in addressing a specific problem of moral philosophy. It is plain to see that morality and ethics in the German tradition are two fundamentally different concepts. In this tradition it is easy to admit the factual multiplicity and contingency of moralities. In the German tradition the contingency of norms does not pose a threat to ethics understood as the reflection or science of morality. In this way the German approach may help defuse discussions about morality. There are, however, problems linked to this distinction that are not easily solved . One is the question whether the two levels of moral philosophy implied here are in fact sufficient. Since there are many different ethical theories , one can suppose that there should be at least one more level, maybe a sort of meta-moral philosophy or meta-ethics. Another problem is the foundation of ethics on rationality. This heritage of enlightenment has been controversial ever since its introduction. It seems even harder to justify today than ever before. Modern sociological research indicates that there are better models for the explanation of human behaviour and adherence to norms and rules than rationality. One central problem of the German tradition is the question of how exactly the relationship between ethics and morality has to be imagined. If morality really is moral practice, consisting of norms and rules that people follow, what can ethics as a theory of this practice do, what can be its purpose? One possible answer is that ethics can generate the norms and thus produce morality. This, however, would make ethics an eminently practical discipline and therefore nothing but a somewhat more elaborate form of morality. The generation of moral norms always has to be part of morality anyway since the norms have to come from somewhere. If ethics cannot directly produce the norms of morality, then its aim must be more abstract and more general. This is what we have found in the discussion of the German tradition. For Kant, and more so for Habermas, ethics is in fact an abstract exercise. Kant wants to check the possibility of universalising the subject s maxims, whereas Habermas is trying to disburden the subject by invoking a discourse that should test validity claims. In both cases it is often hard to see how the ethical exercises can take effect on moral realities. We need at least one more theory that explains the connection between theoretical contemplation of norms and practical moral action. If this is so then the question remains why we even bother with ethics at all and why we do not simply follow Montaigne s footsteps and accept the given morality.

This leads us to the French tradition where the situation is similar to the German tradition. Here, too, the distinction of ethics and morality serves a purpose, and it is plain to see how it furthers moral philosophy. The two poles of moral philosophy, teleology and deontology, have been present in ethical discussion since the very beginning of systematic thought about the matter. Furthermore they are highly plausible to this day. One underlying thought is that ethics aims at the perfection of one s life and therefore strives for the good life. Teleology also reflects the intuition that the results of an action are relevant to its moral evaluation. Even the best intention cannot lead to somebody being called morally good if the consequences of his actions are disastrous. The opposite is just as true. If somebody tries to commit a grievous harm and this by accident leads to favourable results, most of us would have difficulties evaluating the action as morally good. Deontology also points towards the universal experience that ethics and morality have something to do with duties. These duties may be positive or negative. They restrict our freedom of choice in that they rule out some possibilities we might want to choose from a purely egotistical point of view.

So, while the French tradition can reflect some of our moral intuitions and explain some aspects of moral philosophy quite well, it also leads to problems. One of them would be the foundation of morality. While the French tradition does not try to offer a final foundation for morality along the lines of the German tradition, it does offer a reason for the introduction of morality, which is the avoidance of violence. While this may seem plausible to many of us, this idea has to contend with the problem that the avoidance of violence may not always be possible, even worse , that it may not always be desirable. Most people would probably be able to picture situations in which violence may be a moral obligation.

The problem of the French tradition that again leads us to the notion of responsibility is its specific relationship between ethics and morality. Similar to the German tradition, it is obvious that the two notions are related , but at the same time it is difficult to see how exactly this relationship has to be imagined. If the teleological aspect of moral philosophy takes precedence over the deontological aspect, as is the case in Ricoeur s theories, then it appears hard to see when and under what circumstances exactly duty and strict rules enter the picture. It would be equally unclear if deontology took precedence when teleology should take over. What, finally, is supposed to happen if the two aspects contradict each other. What are the criteria according to which it is to be decided which one should prevail?

The questions concerning the relationship of ethics and morality touch many issues of moral philosophy, which have been discussed from the earliest occurrences of philosophical discussion. We chose the approach of the two traditions for introducing ethical questions because it shows that there are different ways of defining the concepts and their relationships. Philosophical ethics, this should have become clear, allows different approaches and none of them can claim to be the one truth or to have solved all of the problems. We hope that this way of introducing ethics and morality has proved interesting to especially English-speaking readers because it tends to be disregarded by the classical Anglo-American approach.

The concept of responsibility on which we will concentrate from now on offers one way of addressing some of the problems indicated by the dichotomy of ethics and morality in both traditions. Responsibility is a concept that relies on practical consequences. It offers no final foundation of morality, but is compatible with many theories of final foundation. It is a teleological notion that relies to a high degree on deontology. Responsibility can mediate between ethics and morality; it can serve as an in-between of ethics and morality in the German as well as in the French tradition.




Responsible Management of Information Systems
Responsible Management of Information Systems
ISBN: 1591401720
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2004
Pages: 52
Authors: Bernd Stahl

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