Allies Before D-Day: Deception

In 1944 the Allies used deception to convince the German High Command that Pas de Calais, France ”not Normandy ”was the most likely location for the colossal D-day amphibious landing.

Code-named Operation Fortitude, the deception effort began with the construction of a force of dummy tanks, oil storage depots, airfields, and landing craft located in Dover, England, directly across the English Channel from Calais. The troops involved in the operation were all closely screened, highly trained, and constantly reminded of the need for secrecy . The tanks and boats, made of rubber balloons, and the aircraft and buildings , made of plywood, were all intentionally left on display for German reconnaissance aircraft. And Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower went so far as to place one of his top generals, George S. Patton, in charge of the fictitious landing force.

Figure 6.3: Allied Deception Before D-Day, 1944

The Allies used Patton s public actions, false radio traffic, double agents , and misleading bombing attacks to further the deception. First, conducting phony troop inspections and visiting Eisenhower s headquarters at times when the Germans were likely to observe such actions, Patton masterfully brought considerable attention to himself. Second, the Allies transmitted false radio traffic that mimicked the communications typical of a large army and created the illusion that the Allies were marshaling an invasion force at Dover. Third, to convey misinformation to the Germans, the Allies deployed a complicated and extensive network of double agents; one agent, Spaniard Juan Pujol-Garcia, even had direct access to Hitler and convinced the f ¼hrer that Normandy was nothing more than a diversion . Fourth, in preparation for the D-day attack, the Allied forces bombed the Calais region more severely than the Normandy area; for every bomb dropped in Normandy, two were dropped on Calais.

With the German main defensive effort firmly fixed on Calais and the German High Command duped into believing that the invasion force totaled ninety divisions, the Allies attacked Normandy on June 6, 1944, with thirty-nine divisions. While the defenses at Normandy were formidable, they were soft enough that the Allies were able to build a beachhead on the French coast and later push inland.

Even after the Allies invaded Normandy, the German High Command, still convinced that Patton and a more sizable force lay in wait at Dover, refused to ferry forces to Normandy. And, in an effort to reinforce the Germans erroneous beliefs, the Allies continued the deception efforts into mid-July. These measures were so effective that the Germans were not convinced that Normandy was the site of the main Allied attack until almost one month after the D-day landing, far too late to mount an effective counter to the invasion.

Leadership Lessons

The Allies deceptive efforts were effective because they were credible, mutually reinforcing , and ongoing. Eisenhower s willingness to commit one of his top generals to the fictitious landing force and the heavy expenditure of precious bombs at Calais made the threat of a landing there very real in the eyes of the German High Command. Moreover, the multiple sources that German intelligence cross-referenced ”the observations of their spies in England, the whispers of double agents close to the High Command, the results of German aerial reconnaissance, the interception of false radio traffic, and the bomb damage assessment reports at Calais ”reinforced one another beautifully. Finally, the deceptive efforts at Calais continued long after the attack on Normandy commenced and fixated the Germans attention on Dover even longer.