Per-Packet Key Mixing

The previous section explains that the basis of an FMS attack is an enemy trying to guess the key based on observing the first few bytes of the encrypted data. The attacker needs to analyze quite a few frames to make a reasonable guess. To defeat this attack (in its current known form), the encryption key is changed for every packet sent. After all, an enemy can't attack the key if it keeps changing.

This issue of "keys" is a little confusing. In the WEP scenario, it was simple. There was a WEP key and it was used for everything. If it was compromised, then all was lost. Such a simple approach is not good enough for TKIP, so there are multiple levels of keys derived from a single master key. Session keys are derived from the master key. These keys are then split into pieces for various uses, one of which is encryption (for more detail, see Chapter 10). What per-packet key mixing does is to further derive a key specifically for each and every packet sent. In other words, at the level of RC4, every packet uses a different, and apparently unrelated, key. The session keys and master key do not, of course, change every packet! In addition to making it harder to mount attacks, the generation of a key per packet allows the extended-length IV value to be incorporated.

The process of key derivation involves mixing together various bits of information in a hash function. The result produced bears no obvious relationship to the values you start with; however, if both ends of a link start off with the same information and use the same hash method, they will produce the same result in other words, matching keys.

The problem is that the computation to derive the key can be processing intensive. There is not a lot of computing power in the MAC chip of most WEP-based Wi-Fi cards. So, on the face of it, deriving a new key for every packet might seem infeasible. But there was another trick up the sleeve of Doug Whiting and Russ Housley, the inventors of the key-mixing scheme. The calculation was divided into two phases. Phase 1 involves all the data that is relatively static, such as the secret session key, the high order 32 bits of the IV, and the MAC address. Phase 2 is a quicker computation and includes the only item that changes every packet the low order 16 bits of the IV. Even in this case, the next IV value is known so the processor can go off and compute one or more mixed keys in advance, anticipating that a frame will arrive shortly and need decrypting.

We briefly mentioned that the MAC address is included in the computation of the mixed key. There is an excellent reason for this inclusion. Two devices are communicating using a shared session key, which means that the same session is used for messages in both directions. A uses the same session key to send messages to B as B does when sending to A. But if both A and B start with an IV of 0 and then increment the IV by 1 for each packet sent, you immediately get IV collisions. They both are using the same IV value with the same key. One way to avoid this problem is for A to use only even IV values and B to use only odd values, for example. However, this further reduces our IV number space and doesn't help for broadcasts and multicasts.

We do know that for A and B to work in the LAN, they must have different MAC addresses. So by mixing the MAC address into the per-packet key, we guarantee that even if both devices use the same IV and the same session key, the mixed key used by A in encrypting the packet will be different from that used by B. Problem solved.

The process of combining the MAC address session key and IV is shown in Figure 11.3. Notice how the lower bits of the IV are only incorporated into the phase 2 computation so the phase 1 computation only needs to be redone every 216 (that is, 65,536) packets. Only 16 bits of the new, long IV go into the old WEP IV position. The middle byte of the old IV d is computed by copying the first byte and setting certain bits to fixed values to avoid creating a class of weak keys.

Details of the mixing algorithm for the two phases of the key mixing are given later. However, at this point we have seen the essentials of all the mechanisms that have been added to TKIP to make it both secure and compatible with old WEP systems.

All the problems with WEP have been solved in TKIP. The list of weaknesses is completely covered. The solutions used allow backwards implementation on WEP hardware an example of excellent engineering: not just finding a good solution, but finding one within severe and sometimes perverse constraints. The following section revisits the concepts described so far in this chapter and looks at the details at implementation issues.

Real 802.11 Security(c) Wi-Fi Protected Access and 802.11i
Real 802.11 Security: Wi-Fi Protected Access and 802.11i
ISBN: 0321136209
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2005
Pages: 151 © 2008-2017.
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