The Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) feature is an integral part of the authentication mechanism for the Solaris 9 OE. PAM provides you with the flexibility to choose any authentication service available on a system to perform enduser authentication. Other PAM implementations are Linux-PAM and OpenPAM.
By using PAM, applications can perform authentication regardless of what authentication method is defined for a given client.
PAM enables you to deploy the appropriate authentication mechanism for each service throughout the network. You can also select one or multiple authentication technologies without modifying applications or utilities. PAM insulates application developers from evolutionary improvements to authentication technologies, while at the same time, allows deployed applications to use those improvements.
PAM employs run-time pluggable modules to provide authentication for system entry services. PAM offers a number of benefits, including:
Traditional Solaris OE Authentication and PAM
Traditional Solaris OE authentication is based on the method developed for early UNIX implementations. This method employs a one-way encryption hashing algorithm called crypt(3c) . The encrypted password is stored either in a file or in a Solaris OE naming service, from which it is retrieved during the user login process. The traditional UNIX method of the Solaris OE authentication, using crypt , is very popular and has been enhanced to use an LDAP directory as its data store.
Before proceeding with the details on authentication, you must have a good understanding of what crypt is. There is some confusion because of a naming conflict with an application named crypt . This is a standard tool that ships with the Solaris OE, and is a program for encrypting and decrypting the contents of a file. (This program is located in /usr/bin/crypt .)
However, when the term crypt is referred to in authentication, it is normally cited as crypt(3c) and refers to the standard UNIX password hashing algorithm ( crypt(3c) ), available to C programmers in the libc.so library.
A more sophisticated authentication method based on public key technology was introduced with the Network Information System (NIS+) naming service (now rebranded as the Sun OS 5.0 Network Information Service). The NIS+ naming service method does not replace crypt(3c) , but rather provides an additional security layer by introducing the concept of a network password. When users access network services through the secure remote procedure call (RPC) mechanism, the network password is required.
Originally developed by Sun Microsystems and adopted by the Open Software Foundation (OSF) for inclusion in Common Desktop Environment (CDE)/Motif, PAM provides a mechanism for dynamic system authentication and related services such as password, account, and session management. Realizing that new authentication models continue to be developed, Sun created the PAM architecture that allows additional methods to be added without disturbing existing ones. PAM was introduced in the Solaris 2.6 OE to overcome having to recode system entry services such as, login , passwd , dtlogin , telnet , and rlogin when a new authentication mechanism was introduced.
The PAM architecture and alternatives to traditional Solaris OE authentication are discussed in Appendix D, "Solaris OE 9 PAM Architecture ."
Passwords are created with the Solaris OE passwd command. This command prompts the user for a (new) password, which the user enters as a text string. In the Solaris OE, this text string is hashedor one-way encryptedusing the crypt(3c) algorithm. The result is stored either in /etc/shadow , or in the passwd.byname and passwd.byuid NIS maps. If the NIS+ naming service is used, the results are stored in the Passwd and Cred table type. The crypt(3c) algorithm is provided with a random seed, known technically as a salt string , so that the result is different each time the passwd command is run, even if the same text string is used.
When a user logs in, the Solaris OE login program challenges the user to provide a password. This password is hashed in the same manner as the passwd command. If the output from this process matches the output that is stored in the password database, the user is authenticated.
FIGURE 3-34 illustrates how the UNIX password process works.
Figure 3-34. Login Program Text String Converting to a Hashed String
Benefits and Drawbacks of crypt(3c)
The major benefit of crypt(3c) is that it is easy to implement in a closed environment. Authentication takes place on the host that the user logs in to, so an authentication server is not required. In the case of local logins, the clear text passwords are never stored or sent over the network, so there is no reason to be concerned about eavesdroppers intercepting the password. However, when authenticating over a network using telnet or rlogin , passwords are sent in clear text.
Because crypt(3c) uses a one-way encryption algorithm, it is difficult to decrypt passwords stored on the server. Only the user knows what the actual password is. This means that there is no way to convert passwords stored in crypt to another format required by a different authentication method.
When the crypt(3c) function is called, it takes the first eight characters and returns its computation. This computation is then injected with a randomly generated value called the salt . In conventional crypt, the salt is stored as the first two characters. This salt value is then added, resulting in a sequence of 13 characters. The result is that the salt is actually an important part of the password string that is stored in the specific naming service.
As CPUs and storage capabilities increase, the crypt(3c) algorithm becomes vulnerable to attack. The crypt(3c) mechanism shipping with the Solaris 9 OE, along with PAM authentication, is exactly the same implementation that has been in the Solaris OE for many years now, and could one day change.
Introduction to Flexible crypt(3c)
The Solaris OE crypt(3c) mechanisms work well for authenticating local Solaris OE clients , but they are not the only methods used by applications and services running in the Solaris OE. This can make it difficult for system developers and system administrators, who must work with multiple password systems, and for users who must remember multiple passwords.
In the Solaris 9 12/02 OE, Sun updated the crypt ( 3c ) API to allow different algorithms to be used for encrypting the users login password, this is known as flexible crypt(3c) for passwords.
The reason this feature was extended is because since the Solaris 2.6 OE, the Solaris OE has supported a getpassphrase() routine, which is identical to getpass (3C) routine, except it reads and returns a string of up to 256 characters in length. However, the crypt(3c) algorithm which it typically provides input to, is still limited to receiving only 8 ASCII characters.
The existing crypt(3c) API has been be preserved to provide applications that verify a user's password by calling crypt(3c) and using strcmp(3c) with the value returned by getpwnam(3c) so that they continue to work without any source code change or a recompile. This is obviously a very important aspect when adding any new or enhanced feature.
Functionally, a plug-in framework has been added to crypt(3c) to allow the changing of the underlying password hashing algorithm. Currently this ships with two new password hashing algorithms that use the Blowfish and MD5 hashes (for compatibility with BSD / Linux).
By default, the behavior of this new feature that provides extended crypt(3c) and adds crypt_gensalt(3c) is to use the old UNIX crypt(3c) on the password change, unless the user already has a new style password. This feature is turned on and used by changing the settings in the /etc/security/policy.conf file, which is the configuration file used for the security policy. For more information refer to policy.conf(4) .
The PAM interface in the Solaris 9 OE makes it easier for you to deploy different authentication technologies without modifying administrative commands such as login , telnet , and other administrative commands. Administrators are able to select one or multiple authentication technologies, without modifying applications or utilities. PAM can also be an integral part of a single sign-on system. The PAM APIs provide a flexible mechanism that increases overall system security. The PAM APIs are described in Appendix D, "Solaris OE 9 PAM Architecture."
Solaris 9 OE PAM Framework
The PAM framework enables new authentication technologies to be plugged in without the need to change commands such as login , dtlogin , rsh , su , ftp , and telnetd . PAM is also used to replace the UNIX login with other security mechanisms, such as Kerberos and LDAP authentication. Mechanisms for account, session, and password management can also be plugged in through this framework.
This framework consists of four specific components :
PAM allows you to choose any combination of services to provide authentication. These include a flexible configuration policy that enables a per-application authentication policy, choice of a default authentication mechanism for non-specified applications, and multiple passwords on high security systems. Another valuable service is the ease of use for the end user that enables no retyping of user passwords if the passwords are the same, and optional parameters passed to the services.
With the introduction of the new PAM framework in the Solaris 9 OE, the LDAP service module for PAM has been extended to support the account service, which checks a user's password and account status by binding to the directory (LDAP) server. The directory server returns the password status to pam_ldap , which in turn maps the status to the PAM error codes. A user might be rejected when logging in with an expired password, or might see a warning message after logging in when the password is about to expire.
The pam_ldap module has also been updated to support password syntax checking, which is performed through the Sun Open Net Environment (Sun ONE) Directory Server 5.1 and greater (formerly known as the iPlanet Directory Server software) password policy engine. When changing the password (using the passwd command), the user might see error messages such as password too short , password in history , and so forth. In addition, it adds mechanisms for account lockout after too many failed attempts, forced password change after reset (if reset by root DN in the directory server), minimum password ages, and different password policies for different groups of users.
The pam_ldap account management feature is not supported with iPlanet Directory Server software version 5.0.
The PAM framework currently provides four different types of service modules, which are implemented by dynamic loadable module types to provide authentication related services. These modules are categorized based on the function they perform:
PAM enables authentication by multiple methods through stacking. When a user is authenticated through PAM, multiple methods can be selected to fully identify the user. Depending on the configuration, the user can be prompted for passwords for each authentication method. This means that the user need not execute another command to be fully authenticated. The order in which the methods are used is determined through the configuration file, /etc/pam.conf .
Stacking has the potential of increased security risk because the security of each mechanism could be subject to the least secure password method used in the stack.
The PAM software consists of a library, several modules, and a configuration file. The PAM library, /usr/lib/libpam.so , provides the framework to load the appropriate modules and manage stacking. It provides a generic structure for all of the modules to plug into.
FIGURE 3-35 illustrates the PAM framework.
Figure 3-35. PAM Framework Architecture
FIGURE 3-36 illustrates the relationship between the applications, the library, and the modules. The login , passwd , and su applications use the PAM library to access the appropriate module. The pam.conf file defines which modules are used with each application. Responses from the modules are passed back through the library to the application.
Figure 3-36. PAM and the Relationship Between Applications, Library, and Modules
Pluggable Authentication Service Modules
Each module provides the implementation of a specific mechanism. More than one module type ( auth , account , session , or password ) can be associated with each module, but each module needs to manage at least one module type. The following is a description of the modules that are part of the Solaris 9 OE.
In addition to the above pam_ldap service module, a new server_policy option can be specified with the pam_unix_auth , pam_unix_account , pam_passwd_auth , and pam_authtok.store modules. This option instructs these modules to ignore a user if the user is only found in the directory server (LDAP) repository, and let the stacked below pam_ldap module to process the user according to the password policy set in the Sun ONE Directory Server software.
For security, these files must be owned by root and have their permissions set so that the files are not writable through group or other permissions. If the file is not owned by root , PAM will not load the module. This requirement on permissions and owner for the modules is not documented anywhere , and might change in future releases.
In FIGURE 3-36, pam_unix is not layered entirely on the LDAP server. The pam_unix module sits on the Name Service Switch (NSS) layer and the NSS back ends that could be files, NIS, NIS+, or LDAP.
PAM Configuration File Update
The PAM configuration file, /etc/pam.conf , determines what authentication services are used and in what order. Edit this file to select the desired authentication mechanisms for each system entry application.
Configuration File Syntax
The PAM configuration file consists of entries with the following syntax:
TABLE 3-9 explains the functions of the syntax.
Table 3-9. Configuration File Syntax
Comments can be added to the pam.conf file by starting the line with a pound sign ( # ). Use white space to delimit the fields.
An entry in the PAM configuration file is ignored if one of the following conditions exists: the line has fewer than four fields, an invalid value is given for module_type or control_flag , or the named module is not found.
TABLE 3-10 summarizes PAM configurations.
Table 3-10. PAM Configurations
To determine continuation or failure behavior from a module during the authentication process, you must select one of four control flags for each entry. Successful or failed attempts are indicated through control flags. Even though these flags apply to all module types, the following explanation assumes that the flags are being used for authentication modules. The control flags are as follows :
required This module must return success in order to have an overall successful result. If all of the modules are labeled as required , authentication through all modules must succeed for the user to be authenticated. If some of the modules fail, an error value from the first failed module is reported . If a failure occurs for a module flagged required , all modules in the stack are still tried but failure is returned. If none of the modules are flagged required , at least one of the entries for that service must succeed for the user to be authenticated.
requisite This module must return success for additional authentication to occur. If a failure occurs for a module flagged requisite , an error is immediately returned to the application and no additional authentication is done. If the stack does not include prior modules labeled required that failed, the error from this module is returned. If a earlier module labeled required has failed, the error message from the required module is returned.
optional If this module fails, the overall result can be successful if another module in this stack returns success . The optional flag should be used when one success in the stack is enough for a user to be authenticated. This flag should only be used if it is not important for this particular mechanism to succeed. If your users need to have permission associated with a specific mechanism to get their work done, you should not label it optional .
sufficient If this module is successful, skip the remaining modules in the stack, even if they are labeled required . The sufficient flag indicates that one successful authentication is enough for the user to be granted access. More information about these flags is provided in the next section, which describes the default /etc/pam.conf file.
binding This is a new control flag that has been added to the PAM framework in Solaris 9 12/02 OE. The control flag binding has a meaning of terminate processing upon success, and report the failure if unsuccessful . This option effectively provides a local account overriding remote (LDAP) account functionality.
Generic pam.conf File
The following is an example of a generic pam.conf file:
# PAM configuration # Authentication management # login auth requisite pam_authtok_get.so.1 login auth sufficient pam_unix_auth.so.1 login auth required pam_ldap.so.1 # rlogin auth sufficient pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 rlogin auth required pam_authtok_get.so.1 rlogin auth sufficient pam_unix_auth.so.1 # dtlogin auth required pam_authtok_get.so.1 dtlogin auth required pam_unix_auth.so.1 # rsh auth sufficient pam_rhosts_auth.so.1 rsh auth required pam_unix_auth.so.1 # dtsession auth required pam_authtok_get.so.1 dtsession auth required pam_unix_auth.so.1 # other auth required pam_authtok_get.so.1 other auth required pam_unix_auth.so.1 # # Account management # login account requisite pam_roles.so.1 login account required pam_projects.so.1 login account required pam_unix_account.so.1 # dtlogin account requisite pam_roles.so.1 dtlogin account required pam_projects.so.1 dtlogin account required pam_unix_account.so.1 # cron account required pam_projects.so.1 # cron account required pam_unix_account.so.1 # other account requisite pam_roles.so.1 other account required pam_projects.so.1 other account required pam_unix_account.so.1 # Session management # other session required pam_unix_session.so.1 # # Password management # other password requisite pam_authtok_get.so.1 other password requisite pam_authtok_check.so.1 other password sufficient pam_authtok_store.so.1 other password required pam_ldap.so.1
This generic pam.conf file specifies the following behavior:
With the above configuration, pam_unix is tried first, and if the userPassword attribute is readable, and the password is correct, then the pam_ldap module is not called. As a result, the pam_ldap password management is not used.
The other service name allows a default to be set for any other commands requiring authentication that are not included in the file. The other option makes it easier to administer the file because many commands that use the same module can be covered by only one entry. Also, the other service name, when used as a catchall , can ensure that each access is covered by one module. By convention, the other entry is included at the bottom of the section for each module type. The rest of the entries are in the file control account management, session management, and password management.
Normally, the entry for the module_path is root relative. If the file name entered for module_path does not begin with a slash ( / ), the path /usr/lib/security/$ISA is added to the file name, where $ISA is expanded by the framework to contain the instruction set architecture of the executing machine (refer to the isainfo(1) man page for additional information).
A full path name must be used for modules located in directories other than the default. The values for the module_options can be found in the man pages for the module (for example, pam_unix_auth(5) ).
If login specifies authentication through both pam_unix_auth and pam_ldap , the user is prompted to enter a password for each module. Example:
# Authentication management # login auth required pam_authtok_get.so.1 login auth sufficient pam_unix_auth.so.1 login auth required pam_ldap.so.1
PAM and LDAP Password Management Extensions
It is important to provide a quick overview to clarify the difference between PAM Password Management Extensions and the new pam_ldap password management.
PAM Password Management Extensions provide the same functionality as the existing pam_unix module. The only difference is how the module is packaged. What used to be a single module is now split up into multiple components, known as service modules , each performing a separate function. This modular construction makes implementing custom password management policies easier.
The new pam_ldap password management facility includes two new account management features: password aging and account expiration . Because the directory server provides its own mechanism for account management, a conflict can occur if you want pam_ldap to implement a different password policy than what is set for the directory-wide policy. For example, the directory might force all users to change passwords after 60 days, but you might want some special user accounts to be able to keep their current password for a longer period of time.
To support this flexibility, the PAM framework has been enhanced by the addition of a new control flag called binding . The primary reason this control flag was introduced was the fact that prior to Solaris 9 12/02 OE, the PAM framework lacked sufficient control flags to provide functionality needed to return the appropriate failure semantics for service modules which should return immediately upon success, but report its error upon failure. In particular, pam_ldap depends on this change to correctly provide failure semantics for a mixture of local and server controlled accounts on the same machine. Effectively, this control flag allows you to override the password policy that the directory server enforces.
A server_policy option has been added to instruct pam_unix to allow users that only have LDAP accounts to be processed by the password policy set on the directory server. This option can be used to instruct the pam_unix_account , pam_unix_auth , and pam_passwd_auth service modules to ignore the user being authenticated and let the pam_ldap module stacked below them process the user according to the password policy established in the directory server. This effectively allows you to override the local pam_unix password policy.
The pam_authtok_store module handles this option differently.
The server_policy option was introduced to solve a problem found when stacking the pam_unix_account and pam_ldap modules together. When used, it tells the module to rely on the policy specified on the LDAP server and not to apply a local policy.
Because the pam_unix_account receives incomplete information from the LDAP server, it might inadvertently decide that an active account has expired, or that an expired account is still active. Specifying server_policy in /etc/pam.conf tells pam_unix_account not to guess an account's status but to leave the decision to the LDAP server. The LDAP server keeps accurate current status of each account and can draw the correct conclusion about its expiration status.
Because this feature enables the pam_ldap module to fully support the account management, it is reasonable to use the following PAM configuration for account management.
other account requisite pam_roles.so.1 other account required pam_projects.so.1 other account binding pam_unix_account.so.1 server_policy other account required pam_ldap.so.1
In this configuration, note the binding control flag for pam_unix_account.so.1 .
This configuration specifies that the pam_unix_account should check the user's local account first. Because of the binding control flag, the stack succeeds or fails depending on the values returned by the pam_unix_account . If only the LDAP account exists for the user, the pam_unix_account does nothing and allows pam_ldap to determine the stack's success or failure.
Customer feedback indicated that the PAM functionality in the Solaris OE needed some enhancements. The requested changes included improving the mechanism used to validate password structures, adding the ability to change numbers of characters, total password length, and so forth.
In previous versions of the Solaris OE, this functionality was tightly coupled in a single monolithic module ( pam_unix ) and local extensions could not be incorporated in the module.
Only with a great deal of effort could you extend part of the operations performed by this module. Because of this, the pam_unix(5) functionality has been replaced with a new set of modular PAM service modules that are listed in this section. The functionality of pam_unix has been entirely replaced in the Solaris 9 OE. New PAM modules are now provided that replace a specific piece of pam_unix . This makes it easier to customize the PAM behavior by inserting or replacing individual modules. The Solaris 9 OE no longer uses pam_unix by default. During upgrades, any existing instances of pam_unix in pam.conf are replaced by the new modules.
In the Solaris 9 OE, the functionality provided by the old pam_unix module has been split over a number of small modules, each performing a well-defined task, that can be easily extended or replaced by modifying the pam.conf file.
These new modules are:
You no longer have to replace the pam_authtok_check module to extend or replace the standard password strength checks. Just list the module in the /etc/pam.conf file right before, after, or instead of the pam_authtok_check file.
To Add a PAM Module
To Verify the Configuration
It is essential to do some testing before logging out, in case the configuration file is misconfigured.
To Disable .rhosts Access With PAM From Remote Systems
A common use of the .rhosts file is to simplify remote logins between multiple accounts owned by the same user. For example, if you have multiple accounts on more than one system, you might need to perform specific tasks , and using the .rhosts file is ideal.
However, using the .rhosts file as an authentication mechanism is a weak form of security and should be avoided.
To prevent other unauthenticated access to the ~/.rhosts file, remember to disable the rsh service. The best way to disable a service is to remove the service entry from /etc/inetd.conf . The remote shell server, rshd , and the remote login server, rlogind , only use PAM; they do not call the ruserok() function themselves .
PAM Error Reporting
Diagnostic messages generated by the PAM modules or the PAM framework are output using syslog(3c) . They are logged to the facility that was specified at the time the application ( login , telnet , sshd ) called openlog(3c) , so the exact location of these messages depends upon whether the application uses PAM. The facility indicates the application or system component generating the message. As an example, here are a few possible facility values:
For example, login sends its messages to the LOG_AUTH facility, while rlogind sends its messages to the LOG_DAEMON facility. Other daemons might use a configurable facility ( sshd , ftpd , and so forth) which can be set in the configuration file of the particular service.
Depending on the severity of the diagnostic message, the PAM module directs the message to one of the eight available log priorities.
For additional details on the syslog() function and priorities, refer to the syslog(3c) and syslog.conf(4) man pages.
Debug messages are logged with:
Critical messages are logged with:
For example, a general error message ( LOG_ERR ) from PAM, used by login , is directed to auth.crit and ends up in a log file as:
Jul 22 22:11:43 host login: [ID 887986 auth.error] ACCOUNT:pam_sm_acct_mgmt: illegal option debuf
To Initiate Diagnostics Reporting for PAM
To Initiate PAM Error Reporting
The following example displays all alert messages on the console. Critical messages are mailed to root . Debug messages are added to /var/log/pamlog .
auth.alert /dev/console auth.crit root auth.debug /var/log/pamlog
Each line in the log file contains a timestamp, the name of the system that generated the message, and the message itself. Be aware that a large amount of information may be written to the pamlog file.
The log format was changed in the Solaris 8 OE and subsequent releases, and now includes a hash-value of the message generating string for example user %s not found . It now contains the message facility and severity.
PAM LDAP Module
The PAM LDAP module ( pam_ldap ) was introduced in the Solaris 8 OE for use in conjunction with pam_unix for authentication and password management with an LDAP server. This module was written to support stronger authentication methods such as CRAM-MD5, in addition to the other UNIX authentication capabilities provided by pam_unix .
The pam_ldap module must be used in conjunction with the modules supporting the UNIX authentication, password and account management, because pam_ldap is designed to be stacked directly below these modules.
With the release of Solaris 9 12/02 OE, pam_ldap provides support for authentication, account management, and password management.
The pam_ldap module should be stacked directly below the pam_unix module in the configuration file /etc/pam.conf . If there are other modules that are designed to be stacked in this manner, they could be stacked under the pam_ldap module. This design must be followed in order for authentication and password management to work when pam_ldap is used. The following is a sample of /etc/pam.conf file with pam_ldap stacked under pam_unix :
# Authentication management for login service is stacked. # If pam_unix succeeds, pam_ldap is not invoked. login auth sufficient /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_ldap.so.1 # Password management other password sufficient /usr/lib/security/pam_unix.so.1 other password required /usr/lib/security/pam_ldap.so.1
It is important to note that the control flag for pam_unix is sufficient . This flag means that if authentication through pam_unix succeeds, then pam_ldap is not invoked. Also, other service types, such as dtlogin , su , telnet , and so forth can substitute for login . See FIGURE 3-37.
Figure 3-37. pam_ldap Structure
The options supported by pam_ldap are:
How PAM and LDAP Work
Before discussing the details of how PAM and LDAP work, it is important to provide a quick overview to distinguish between how the password is stored and how the authentication mechanism is used to authenticate to the LDAP server. The password can be stored in a variety of formats in the directory server, such as salted secure hash algorithm (SSHA), secure hash algorithm (SHA), CRYPT, and so forth.
The authentication mechanisms currently used and supported in the Solaris 8 OE LDAP Client, are NONE, SIMPLE, and CRAM-MD5 authentication. Simple authentication requires the client to pass a distinguished name (DN) and password to the server in clear text. Currently, the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.x software does not support the authentication mechanism CRAM-MD5, which sends only the digest over the wire. CRAM-MD5 is implemented as a Simple authentication and security layer (SASL) mechanism, and both the client and server must use it. What happens is the client request authentication is based on SASL/CRAM-MD5 and the server must support this to complete the authentication. In general, very few clients use CRAM-MD5, now that RFC 2829 mandates the use of DIGEST-MD5, which is intended to be an improvement over CRAM-MD5.
DIGEST-MD5 as an authentication mechanism for LDAPv3 directory servers is mandated in RFC 2829. RFC 2831 provides information about DIGEST-MD5 as a SASL mechanism, but is not LDAP specific.
With the introduction of the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.2 software, support for SASL/DIGEST-MD5 has also been added as an authentication mechanism. This feature was initially introduced in the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.1 software release.
With SASL/DIGEST-MD5, a digest is created and sent across the wire to authenticate to the directory server. The directory server then compares the digest that was sent with the digest created by itself with the stored password and returns success if it matches. In this case, the password is not sent in clear text. To address the absence of a security model in the Solaris 8 OE LDAP Client, the Solaris 9 OE now incorporates the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.1 software and Solaris 9 OE Secured LDAP Client, addressing the security issues found in the LDAP Client.
To use SASL/DIGEST-MD5, the Sun ONE Directory Server software requires that the password is stored in the directory in the clear. In the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.2 software, you need to make sure that you enable the SASL mechanism that you wish to use. Also there is support for identity mapping which was covered previously. The identity mapping allows for quite a bit of flexibility. For the Sun ONE Directory Server 5.1 release, two forms are supported, which are dn: and u: as specified in the RFC. This has built-in rules to handle the identity mapping.
With identity mapping, you must map to one, and only one, identity.
In the current release of the Solaris 9 OE, the extended Start TLS operation is not supported.
Authentication With pam_unix
In authentication with pam_unix , depending on how the client is configured, the client retrieves the password that is stored in the server by making a call to the getspnam function. This function binds to the LDAP server with the proxy agent account (the reason the proxy passwd is sent across the wire in clear text). The proxy agent password is stored in the userPassword attribute in the directory server. This proxy agent account can reside anywhere in the directory server, but must contain the userPassword attribute.
Note that the ACIs of the proxy agent allow this account to have read access to all user passwords, which you may not want to do if you are using pam_ldap . ACIs are instructions that are stored in the directory server itself. Every entry can have a set of rules that define an ACI for that entry. An ACI appears as an attribute in the entry so it can be retrieved by using LDAP search, or it can be added, updated, or deleted with an LDAP modify operation.
An entry may have one ACI, many ACIs, or none. ACIs allow or deny permissions to entries. When the directory server processes an incoming request for that entry, the server uses the ACIs specific to that entry to determine whether or not the LDAP client has permission to perform the requested operation.
LDAP stores data as entries. An entry has a distinguished name (DN) to uniquely identify it within the directory server
The encrypted password is sent to the client side and compared with the encrypted password supplied by the user at the password prompt. If there is a match, pam_unix returns success . The following tables illustrate the authentication mechanisms currently used.
TABLE 3-11 lists the PAM abbreviations used in this section.
Table 3-11. PAM Abbreviations
TABLE 3-12 illustrates if the user password and proxy password are transmitted in the clear during PAM authentications.
Table 3-12. PAM Authentication
In TABLE 3-11 and TABLE 3-12 the reason for "NO*" as the value of the DIGEST-MD5 UP column is because the Sun ONE Directory Server version 5.1 software requires that passwords be stored in the server in clear text for DIGEST-MD5 to work.
For updating passwords in pam_unix , the same comparison as for authentication takes place (because the user has to bind as the dn ); then the new password is encrypted and not passed over the wire in clear text (TABLE 3-13).
Table 3-13. PAM Update of Password
The matrices are easier to understand when you distinguish between how the password is stored and how the authentication mechanism is used to authenticate to the LDAP server. The password can be stored in a variety of formats, such as SSHA, SHA, crypt, clear text, and so forth. The authentication mechanisms that are currently supported are NONE, SIMPLE, SASL/CRAM-MD5, SASL/DIGEST-MD5, TLS:NONE, TLS:SIMPLE, TLS:SASL/CRAM-MD5, and TLS:SASL/DIGEST-MD5.
In authentication that uses pam_ldap , the user password is passed to the server in an auth structure in clear text because authentication is being attempted with the user dn and password . If Simple authentication is used, and the password matches, then success is returned. Using pam_ldap in the Solaris 9 OE Secured LDAP Client now provides SASL/DIGEST-MD5 authentication, privacy, and data integrity with SSL/TLS. If you require stronger authentication mechanisms such as DIGEST-MD5; then you must use pam_ldap . In addition, pam_ldap is designed to be extended for future authentication mechanisms that will be supported in future Solaris OE releases. One of the benefits of using pam_ldap , is that it does not require passwords to be stored in any specific format, so you can store passwords using SSHA, SHA, or CRYPT formats.
For additional information, see the pam_ldap man page for the correct way to stack the authentication management for login service, and password management modules in the /etc/pam.conf configuration file.
CRAM-MD5 is supported by the Secured LDAP Client, but not by the Sun ONE Directory Server software. However, DIGEST-MD5 is supported by both.