The Attacker s Advantage and the Defender s Dilemma

The Attacker's Advantage and the Defender's Dilemma

I've outlined the requirement to build more secure applications, and I've suggested some simple ways to help build a security culture. However, we should not overlook the fact that as software developers we are always on the back foot. Simply put, we, as the defenders, must build better quality systems because the attacker almost certainly has the advantage.

Once software is installed on a computer, especially an Internet-facing system, it is in a state of defense. I mean that the code is open to potential attack 24 hours a day and 7 days a week from any corner of the globe, and it must therefore resist assault such that resources protected by the system are not compromised, corrupted, deleted, or viewed in a malicious manner. This situation is incredibly problematic for all users of computer systems. It's also challenging for software manufacturers because they produce software that is potentially a point of attack.

Let's look at some of the reasons why the attackers can have fun at the defender's expense. You'll notice as you review these principles that many are related.

Principle #1: The defender must defend all points; the attacker can choose the weakest point.

Imagine you are the lord of a castle. You have many defenses at your disposal: archers on the battlements, a deep moat full of stagnant water, a drawbridge, and 5-foot-thick walls of stone. As the defender, you must have guards constantly patrolling the castle walls, you must keep the drawbridge up most of the time and guard the gate when the drawbridge is down, and you must make sure the archers are well-armed. You must be prepared to fight fires started by flaming arrows, and you must also make sure the castle is well-stocked with supplies in case of a siege. The attacker, on the other hand, need only spy on the castle to look for one weak point, one point that is not well-defended.

The same applies to software: the attacker can take your software and look for just one weak point, while we, the defenders, need to make sure that all entry points into the code are protected. Of course, if a feature is not there that is, not installed then it cannot be attacked.

Principle #2: The defender can defend only against known attacks; the attacker can probe for unknown vulnerabilities.

Now imagine that the castle you defend includes a well that is fed by an underground river. Have you considered that an attacker could attack the castle by accessing the underground river and climbing up the well? Remember the original Trojan horse? The residents of Troy did not consider a gift from the Greeks as a point of attack, and many Trojan lives were lost.

Software can be shipped with defenses only for pretheorized or preunderstood points of attack. For example, the developers of IIS 5 knew how to correctly defend against attacks involving escaped characters in a URL, but they did not prepare a defense to handle an attack taking advantage of a malformed UTF-8 sequence because they did not know the vulnerability existed. The attacker, however, spent much time looking for incorrect character handling and found that IIS 5 did not handle certain kinds of malformed UTF-8 escaping correctly, which led to a security vulnerability. More information is at

The only way to defend against unknown attacks is to disenable features unless expressly required by the user. In the case of the Greeks, the Trojan horse would have been a nonevent if there was no way to get the gift into the city walls.

Principle #3: The defender must be constantly vigilant; the attacker can strike at will.

The defender's guard must always be up. The attacker's life, on the other hand, is much easier. She can remain unnoticed and attack whenever she likes. In some instances, the attacker might wait for just the right moment before attacking, while the defender must consider every moment as one in which an attack might occur. This can be a problem for sysadmins, who must always monitor their systems, review log files, and look for and defend against attack. Hence, software developers must provide software that can constantly defend against attack and monitoring tools to aid the user in determining whether the system is under attack.

Principle #4: The defender must play by the rules; the attacker can play dirty.

This is not always true in the world of software, but it's more true than false. The defender has various well-understood white-hat tools (for example, firewalls, intrusion-detection systems, audit logs, and honeypots) to protect her system and to determine whether the system is under attack. The attacker can use any intrusive tool he can find to determine the weaknesses in the system. Once again, this swings the advantage in favor of the attacker.

Writing Secure Code
Writing Secure Code, Second Edition
ISBN: 0735617228
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2001
Pages: 286

Similar book on Amazon © 2008-2017.
If you may any questions please contact us: