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In many books and articles, David Lyon is known for his ceaseless critique of technological surveillance systems (Lyon, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). What perhaps concerns him most is that these technologies have the capabilities of sorting people out according to various criteria (Lyon, 2002). When a person uses a credit card, for example, or accesses the Web, the person s movement and patterns of purchase are recorded in a database, and the information obtained becomes a valuable commodity for marketing purposes. The person s preferences in shopping ” which brands of clothes or cosmetics he or she likes to buy, personal details such as age, income range, and various lifestyles ” are carefully recorded. The person is then grouped into one or more categories existing solely for effectiveness in selling things to him or her. If the person happens to be classified in the upscale category, for example, then the right advertisements for expensive cars , jewelry , and what not will be pushed , and so on. If he or she were classified as belonging to the opposite , low-income group , then another type of advertisements will be given. This classification of data does not work only in marketing, but as data surveillance or dataveillance, as has become more common. The use of such data has become a powerful tool for the authorities to try to detect and prevent possible crimes. According to Lyon, this classification according to data obtained through electronic means has the potential of increasing differences and reinforcing existing inequalities (Lyon, 2001a). As social sorting, surveillance engages many kinds of power, and is both productive and, sometimes, pernicious (Lyon, 2001a,p. 173). This is so because the efficiency and accuracy with which data can be obtained through electronic means makes it possible for persons to be reduced to a mere collection of information, and as the logic of capitalism dictates, such collection has its price in the market. Thus, this exacerbates existing inequalities simply by categorizing the people, or more precisely their electronic data.

In the context of surveillance in the workplace, Lyon s remarks here are also pertinent. Surveillance in the workplace is aimed at allowing employers to observe the behaviours of their employees, to see that they actually do their allotted work and to ensure that the money paid to them as salary is well spent. However, surveillance in the workplace also has a potential to become a sorting tool. This can be the case when employers use the data to predict future performances of their employees . Just as insurance companies may refuse to grant a policy to someone whose genetic data show that he or she is predisposed to a certain disease, employers could infer from the data obtained through their workplace surveillance system that certain employees deserve different treatment from their fellow workers. This can happen not only in the case where an employee may be found not to be working to the best of his or her ability on the job, as when it is found that he or she is actually using too much company time for chatting with friends , for example, but the sorting that results from surveillance could be much more pernicious. If the data show that the employee only seems to be predisposed to neglecting to work diligently, then this could be a cause for discrimination, even though there is no direct evidence that the employee in question has really neglected the work. The employee might be a competent worker who works fast, but is fond of relaxing in a chat forum. There might be no real indication that the employee is an irresponsible worker, but the data obtained might be interpreted differently by the employer. If this could indeed be the case, then it is really a cause for concern.

In one of his papers, Lyon (2001a) suggests that the concept of personhood should be amended in order that a wider conceptual array be formulated that better captures the complexities of the new surveillance systems. Instead of the traditional Cartesian concept of the person as atomistic and based on a radical separation between mind and body, Lyon suggests, based on the works by Zygmunt Bauman and Emmanuel Levinas, a new conception of the person which is irreducibly social. This means that the person is conceived of, not in the Kantian sense of an autonomous individual capable of deciding for oneself and making rules for oneself, but as a node in an intricate web of relations that altogether constitute a community (Lyon, 2001a). An advantage of this view of personhood is that the social is not neglected, which Lyon argues to be indispensable if the increasing complexities of the new technologies are to be adequately taken account of.

Talks about privacy, according to Lyon, are quite inadequate in that they presuppose the concept of the individual as separate and autonomous. On the contrary, he states, In the world where searchable databases are used in the processes of risk communication to categorize persons and populations for particular purposes, the social aspects are central (Lyon, 2001a,p . 176). Privacy talks do not address the issues of fairness and equality effectively enough, and Lyon clearly sees this to be a crucial point in the deliberation concerning surveillance. Since privacy presupposes the autonomous, atomistic individual, there is a lacuna when one finds that it is actually equality and social classification that is at issue. Talks about privacy then have to be expanded. Lyon then proposes a system that is quite akin to Gilligan s ethics of care as remedy: if the social, embodied person is seen in a web of relationships in which, at best, care is paramount, then this stance provides a truly critical ethical starting point for situating and assessing surveillance (Lyon, 2001a,p. 179), a point also supported by Jason Patton (2000). In Carol Gilligan s work, In A Different Voice (1982), she argued that the traditional ethical theories are based on the concept that ethics is akin to the legal system in that the emphasis is laid on universal and impartial rules. Here, Kant with his theory of ethics based on the unyielding categorical imperatives stemming from the dictate of pure reason, stands as the chief representative of this traditional view. According to Gilligan, this emphasis on rules and impartiality does not pay enough attention to the facts of interdependency among human beings, as well as their care and feelings toward one another. For her, these feelings and mutual interrelations should form a basis of an ethical theory rather than merely espouse the universal rules. (However, this should not be taken to mean that there is a simple dichotomy where one has to choose simply between Kantian ethics and ethics of care. What Lyon and Gilligan are saying is only that one should emphasize the role of mutual relations among individuals and their emotional ties, which they feel are rather neglected in the traditional ethical theories.) The keywords for this new approach are to take care of others. This approach appears to fit well with Lyon s suggestion and his critique of the traditional conception of personhood. Lyon s proposal is that a surveillance system should be made accountable, and that accountability should start with the reminder that personal data, however abstract, has effects that are felt by persons. Therefore care should be highlighted as a countervail against mere control (Lyon, 2001a,p . 180). It is his emphasis on the actuality and the concreteness of persons that finds a resonance with the Buddhist view I am advocating here.

Lyon s paper makes a number of references to Gary Marx who, in his Ethics for the New Surveillance (1998) proposes a set of 29 questions that need to be answered in order to ensure a fair information policy broad enough to take account of the new surveillance technologies. Basically, the difference between the two is that while Marx is loyal to the Kantian ideal of respect for the person and the individual, Lyon tries at least to expand on that and to include interrelations among individuals in a web of community and caring as also a basis for ethical theory. Marx s rationale for his set of questions called Questions to Help Determine the Ethics of Surveillance is that they are designed to safeguard an individual s autonomy and privacy vis- -vis the potentially intrusive eyes of the new surveillance technologies. For example, Marx s first question in his list concerns harm: Does the technique cause unwarranted physical or psychological harm? (Marx, 1998,p . 174). The second concerns personal boundary: Does the technique cross a personal boundary without permission (whether involving coercion or deception or a body, relational, or spatial border)? These two questions concern the means by which data are obtained; the first is attached to the concept of harm and the second to that of boundary. He has two other categories: the data collection context and uses of the data. Questions in the data collection context category concern such key concepts as awareness ( Are individuals aware that personal information is being collected, who seeks it, and why? ), consent ( Do individuals consent to the data collection? ), Golden Rule ( Would those responsible for the surveillance [both the decision to apply it and its actual application] agree to be its subjects under the conditions in which they apply it to others? ), equality/inequality regarding availability and application ( Is the means widely available or restricted to only the most wealthy, powerful, or technological sophisticated? ), and so on. As for the uses context, some key concepts and their questions are beneficiary ( Does application of the tactic serve broad community goals, the goals of the object of surveillance, or the personal goals of the data collector? ), the goodness of fit between the means and the goal ( Is there a clear link between the information collected and the goal sought? ), information used for original vs. other unrelated purposes ( Is the personal information used for the reasons offered for its collection and for which consent may have been given, and do the data stay with the original collector, or do they migrate elsewhere? ), and so on (Marx, 1998,p. 174).

Marx argues that his list is derived from a common morality in the West. One is reminded here also that his list resembles that of a researcher who has to make sure that the research conforms to it so that the research clears the ethical review committee. The means are the same ” data collection, the context in which the data are collected, and the uses to which the data are put ” makes the parallel all the more striking. As a sociologist, Marx apparently accepts what is commonly taken to be the ethical norm in a society in which he lives and tries to spell that out in his 29 questions. Thus, he says that his list reflects more the contexts wherein the surveillance technology is used rather than the technology itself taken in isolation. In some contexts, the use of video surveillance systems can be allowed to protect property and to deter crime. Even installation of such devices in the bathroom would not violate his norms if they were approved by the owner of the premise for the purpose of safety and security (Marx, 1998,p. 175). However, the same device will violate the norm if it is used in such a way that intrudes upon the personal privacy of another individual.

Many philosophers , especially those who would like to see ethics based on universal reason, would feel uneasy with a kind of ethical deliberation that takes what is commonly accepted by a community or a culture as the starting point on which the justification of the norms is based. Without a system of justification that transcends particularity of cultures or local traditions, there lurks the danger that whatever is accepted by a community is right. Furthermore, to base justification of norms on community values or traditions would seem to be unsound, since it involves a move from what is there in fact to what should be taken as norm. Marx himself acknowledges this point and tries to present his own version of an argument, which acknowledges the Kantian heritage of respecting the autonomy of the individual (Marx, 1998,p. 183).

I think Marx is on the right track when he says that ethics has to arise from societal norms. One can hardly expect a sociologist to provide a detailed philosophical justification of his own first-order ethical pronouncements, any more than one can expect a philosopher to provide a sociological explanation of the phenomenon of the use of electronic surveillance systems in the workplace. There is just no other way around for ethics if it is to be workable and effective in a culture. However, to argue for this in detail would require a great deal of effort and space, which is not available here. My contention here is only that in order for a set of norms to be accepted and, more importantly, to be actually effective in a society of East and Southeast Asia, the set has to take root from the norms and the cultural traditions of that region itself.

While both Lyon and Marx try to protect the individual against the new surveillance technologies, each in his own way, Nick Taylor argues that the new technology is not only here to stay, but it also plays a significant role in deterring crimes and, more interestingly, does not necessarily violate privacy as the concept is commonly understood . In State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy (2002), Taylor, a law professor , argues that the right to respect for private life, as enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, need not trump attempts by the state to protect common good through use of closed circuit television systems. Intrusion of privacy in public places is justifiable in the interest of prevention of crimes and public safety. In other words, Taylor argues that use of surveillance technologies such as closed circuit television systems in public places does not necessarily violate the rights of citizens for their private life, which demands that their privacy be respected if such use is done for the purpose of deterring crimes and protecting the common good. Reasons for the use of video surveillance in public places by public authorities need to be clearly spelled out and must follow a legitimate aim (Taylor, 2002). A tacit assumption seems to be that once people step into a public place, in a way they relinquish their claim to privacy and cannot justifiably demand that their right to privacy be as respected as when they are in their own homes . This tacit assumption among those who champion the use of electronic surveillance in public places is disputed by Molly Smithsimon (2003), who argues that surveillance systems might lead to voyeurism or worse . According to Taylor, the right to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention should give way to the state s use of surveillance technologies when it comes to public safety. Here it is not an issue what the common good actually is. Taylor assumes that the common good is uncontroversial, and his argument is broadly utilitarian in that he takes the common good as the benefits to be incurred to the public in general, and those who participate in public life have to sacrifice their right to privacy to a certain extent. This sacrifice will be compensated by the apparently greater good of crime prevention and so on. Taking Taylor s argument as a lead, one might be tempted to argue that, for the case of surveillance in the workplace, the employer s right should trump the employees rights to privacy, or at least the employees privacy rights need not conflict with the employer s right to inspect how efficiently its employees are working. However, it is quite difficult to see what the common good actually is in the case of business organizations. One might think of the good to be incurred to the stockholders , but that is essentially a private one. Or one might think that corporations owe to the state in which they are a part since the latter provides an environment in which the former operate , and the former really cannot exist without support, such as manpower, legal protection, etc. from the latter. Hence, the common good of the state or the society becomes a good of the corporation also. Thus, public safety, which is common good for the state, becomes part of the common good of the corporations also. In this way, surveillance of the employees for the sake of public benefit, such as seeing whether there is a crime in the corporation, counts as common good. But it is uncertain how surveillance of employees to find out how they use company time to chat on the Internet could contribute to common good in this sense, and this is precisely the issue where the problem of electronic surveillance in the workplace is concerned . It might seem, then, that Taylor s argument does not work, at least in the context of the corporation.

It is reasonable to expect that an amount of surveillance in the workplace should indeed be allowed in order to protect the employer s right for return on its investment. However, if common good is defined here not solely as dividends to the stockholders but more inclusively as well being and flourishing, both material and otherwise , to all who take part in the corporation, then it becomes more acceptable if surveillance is performed for this purpose. The problem is that in many cases the common good for the corporation is defined rather narrowly as profits or dividends only, and inadequate attention seems to have been paid to this more inclusive sense. The Buddhist view, on the other hand, stresses that everything is interconnected . What this means in a practical context is that one should also pay attention to all the components of the organization, which naturally includes the employees. The key is not only that the employees get their fair salaries and other material fringe benefits, but they should also be taken as an integral part of the corporation. They should take part in the common good of the corporation, too. This social relation within the workplace is also emphasized by David Mason and others (Mason et al., 2002).

Taylor s paper also touches upon the vexing problem of the relation between privacy and publicity. According to him, entering public space seems to require that one accept the loss of one s privacy rights to a certain degree. Against this line of argument, Smithsimon (2003) introduces the concept of public privacy . This apparently oxymoronic construction refers to a kind of privacy we have in public places. Nobody is watching what we do in public; we can be anonymous; we go about doing our business as part of the community; we greet those whom we know, and we respectfully give way to those we do not. We can be private even though we are in public. Smithsimon claims that all this evaporates under the gaze of the surveillance system.

In the same vein, Helen Nissenbaum (1998), in a well-known article, argues that a degree of protection of privacy and its associated values should also be extended to public spaces. The advance of data gathering technologies means that the traditional notion of privacy ” that an individual in his or her private space should not have information about their lives and preferences made public ” does not seem to hold. In the traditional sense, surreptitiously entering one s home in search of private information about those living there would constitute breach of privacy, whereas recording the same type of information when one enters public places would not. But people are worried about their information being processed and commodified, a process that was made infinitely easier through the new information technology, even though that information is collected not in the traditionally private spheres. For example, people are worried that their information that occurs when they surf Web sites or use credit cards in supermarkets might be recorded and sold to marketing agencies without their consent. And if the Thai government s plan alluded to above comes to fruition, a plausible scenario would be that when a Thai citizens use their smart card electronically , information about them would be downloaded to a central processing machine, information which could be used in ways not intended by its source. To argue that engaging oneself in a public place implies that one gives an implicit consent to one s information being made public to a certain degree, would mean that one is still tied to the traditional norm of privacy, which is premised upon a strict separation between the private and public realms.

For Nissenbaum, however, that is not enough, and one needs what she calls contextual integrity so that consideration of a breach of privacy would also regard the contexts in which an action occurs (e.g., whether the action is normally regarded by the people as a breach of their own privacy since the taking of information and their own willingness to give that information may depend on where and when that action takes place, rather than basing the consideration solely on the traditional dichotomy between the public and the private). In this sense, Thai citizens who uses their smart cards as personal ID cards, such as when they buy new cellular phones and register the number under their name , would presumably object to the agency who collects information not only about them as the owner of the phone numbers , but also profiles them in a category that groups them with a lot of other consumers as being upscale, middle class, or the like. At any rate, to give each citizen of a country a card that collects all the information about that person would give the government an unprecedented control over its population, so much so that democracy could be endangered. In the context of the workplace, the organization in which one works is usually considered a public place. The traditional understanding is that the workplace is public, and the home is private. However, as many people nowadays are working more at home, turning homes into offices, and turning offices into homes, the distinction between workplace and home is beginning to blur. In Thailand, many offices are decorated in such a way that the people who work there are reminded of their homes, or in a way that the offices themselves become a second home. Many female office workers, for example, take off their high-heeled shoes when they enter their offices, put on slippers during their work, and put the high heels back on again when they go back home. Many workers who have to work long hours sometimes take showers and change their clothes right at their offices. It is well known that in Japan, office workers stay at their offices much longer on a work day than at their houses . The point is that if the distinction between home and office is blurring, then the traditional separation between what is public and private also needs to be reconsidered, as Nissenbaum and Smithsimon argue. Action that is once deemed appropriate in the public sphere, such as taking information that is supposedly available to the public, may arouse suspicion and objection, since those who are involved may perceive it as their private domain. For example, Thai office workers who put on slippers when they are at work and sometimes when they go out for lunch , neither consider this information to be in the public domain nor that it should be in the public domain. That is, they do not actually intend that the information that they are wearing slippers should be noticed by lots of people. In Thailand this is very often overlooked, and people seem to have an innate sense of what is appropriate in what kind of situation. To them, the fact that they are wearing slippers when they work or go out for lunch in nearby cafeterias is simply their private matter.

Consequently, attempts to undertake electronic monitoring in the workplace need to take this issue into consideration. Since one can no longer make a hard and fast distinction between the office and the home, intrusion of privacy can well take place in such public places as the workplace, too. Hence, a set of norms should be in place in order that electronic surveillance in the workplace does not violate privacy. The set needs to be premised on the acknowledgment that the line between the public and the private is a fuzzy one. This clearly requires that there can be no universal rules that can lay down once and for all what are the acceptable behaviours in this matter. When one cannot readily separate the public and the private realms, justification of taking surveillance data in supposedly public places such as the office can no longer be based on universal rules. Such attempts at justification thus needs to take different contexts into consideration, and this means that justification can vary from context to context. To take the Thai female office workers as an example, what is private to them is their wearing slippers in supposedly public places. Thus, a line of argument to the effect that surveillance of office workers should be all right since these people are in a public place does not pay attention to the fact that the line has become fuzzy. As one is not justified to take information out of one s own homes without prior consent and knowledge, so one does not seem justified in taking information in the same way from the workers in their offices.

According to the Buddhist perspective, the ethically ideal situation is that there should be no coercive rules directing the behaviours of people. This does not mean that Buddhism pays scant attention to directing one s behaviours. On the contrary, directing one s own behaviours lies at the core of the Buddhist teaching. However, in the ideal situation, rules are merely descriptive, since they are followed naturally without the subject having to struggle to follow them. Kant s distinction between what ought to be done and what is actually the case collapses here in the situation where what is and what should be are exactly the same. This is possible, however, only if all those involved are fully developed beings, and each knows exactly how to behave in any situation. Of course, it is not possible to expect everyone to become enlightened beings, but certainly a path toward such a situation can be laid down. In the case of electronic surveillance in the workplace, this means that a set of norms can be given, even though they are not as universal and unyielding as Kant s categorical imperatives. Nonetheless, the norms specify what kind of action one should take in order to arrive at the goal of realizing the perfect ethical situation that Buddhism teaches.

We have looked at the issue solely through the eyes of the employees, and deliberated how their privacy could be protected vis- -vis the threat of electronic monitoring. However, the employers certainly have their say in the matter, too. A respondent in the popular chat forum Web site www.pantip.com said that it is certainly in the interest of the employers to conduct surveillance practices, and employees who use the company s time to engage in chatting, surfing, and the like do so at their peril ( What Would You Think if the Employer ˜Eavesdropped on Your Computer Use? , 2003). This opinion is a little too harsh , but it points to the interests of the employers, who have a stake in seeing that work at the office is efficiently done by their employees. However, this by no means gives a license to the employers to do anything they please . The Buddhist perspective would be that the organization should be regarded as a common whole, with no hard and fast distinction between employers and employees. All are equally important for the well being of the organization. If employers take on the perspectives of their employees, to see how the employees would feel in such a situation, then the employers should know the limits of what they can do. And employees should do the same, too. It is simply wrong for them to enjoy their privacy, protected even in their workplaces, but to neglect to perform their duties as employees. The key is that with the right mental attitude and development, there is less need to rely on universal, normative rules. Rules can be there, of course, but they function less as providing normative and coercive force than as descriptive ones that state what the situation is like.