6.4 Administering User Passwords


Because passwords play a central role in overall system security, all user accounts should have passwords.[14] However, simply having a password is only the first step in making a user account secure. If the password is easy to figure out or guess, it will provide little real protection. In this section, we'll look at characteristics of good and bad passwords. The considerations discussed here apply both to choosing the root password (which the system administrator chooses) and to user passwords. In the latter case, your input usually takes the form of educating users about good and bad choices.

[14] The only possible exception I see is an isolated, non-networked system with no dial-in modems at a personal residence, but even then you might want to think about the potential risks from repair people, houseguests, neighborhood kids, and so on, before deciding not to use passwords. Every system in a commercial environment, even single-user systems in locked offices, should use passwords.

6.4.1 Selecting Effective Passwords

The purpose of passwords is to prevent unauthorized people from accessing user accounts and the system in general. The basic selection principle is this: Passwords should be easy to remember but hard to figure out, guess, or crack.

The first part of this principle argues against imposing automatically-generated random passwords (except when government or other mandated security policies require it). Many users have a very hard time remembering them, and in my experience, most users will keep a written record of their password for some period of time after they first receive it, even when this is explicitly prohibited.

If users are educated about easier ways to create good passwords, and you take advantage of features that Unix systems provide requiring passwords to be a reasonable length, users can select passwords that are just as good as system-generated ones. Allowing users to select their own passwords will make it much more likely that they will choose one that they can remember easily.

In practical terms, the second part of the principle means that passwords should be hard to guess even if someone is willing to go to a fair amount of effort and there are plenty of people who are. This means that the following items should be avoided as passwords or even as components of passwords:

  • Any part of your name or the name of any member of the your extended family (including significant others and pets) and circle of friends. Your maternal grandmother's maiden name is a lot easier to find out than you might think.

  • Significant numbers to you or someone close to you: social security numbers, car license plate, phone number, birth dates, etc.

  • The name of something that is or was important to you, like your favorite food, recording artist, movie, TV character, place, sports team, hobby, etc. Similarly, if your thesis was on benzene, don't pick benzene as a password. The same goes for people, places, and things you especially dislike.

  • Any names, numbers, people, places, or other items associated with your company or institution or its products.

We could obviously list more such items, but this should illustrate the basic idea.

Passwords should also be as immune as possible to attack by password-cracking programs, which means that the following items should not be selected as passwords:

  • English words spelled correctly (because lists of them are so readily available in online dictionaries). You can use the spell or similar command to see if a word appears in the standard dictionary:

    $ echo cerise xyzzy | spell -l xyzzy 

    In this case, spell knows the word cerise (a color) but not xyzzy (although xyzzy is a bad password on other grounds). Note that the standard dictionary is quite limited (although larger ones are available on the web), and with the widespread availability of dictionaries on CD-ROM, virtually all English words ought to be avoided.

  • Given the wide and easy accessibility of online dictionaries, this restriction is a good idea even at non-English-speaking sites. If two or more languages are in common use at your site, or in the area in which it's located, words in all of them should be avoided. Words in other kinds of published lists should also be avoided (for example,Klingon words).

  • Truncated words spelled correctly should similarly be avoided: "conseque" is just as bad as "consequence." Such strings are just as vulnerable to dictionary-based attacks as is the entire word, and most existing password-cracking programs look specifically for them.

  • The names of famous people, places, things, fictional characters, movies, TV shows, songs, slogans, and the like.

  • Published password examples.

Avoiding passwords like the items in the first list makes it harder for someone to figure out your password. Avoiding the items in the second list makes it harder for someone to successfully break into an account using a brute-force, trial-and-error method, like a computer program.

If it seems farfetched that someone would go to the trouble of finding out a lot about you just to break into your computer account, keep in mind that hackers roaming around on the Internet looking for a system to break into represent only one kind of security threat. Internal security threats are at least as important for many sites, and insiders have an easier time locating personal information about other users.

In any case, getting on a specific system via any account is often just the first step toward some ultimate destination (or in a random stroll across the Internet); the account that opens the door need not necessarily have any obvious connection to the true goal, which might be elsewhere on the same system or on a completely different computer or site.

Simple modifications of any of these bad passwords, created by adding a single additional character, spelling it backwards, or permuting the letters, are still bad passwords and ought to be avoided. For example, avoid not only "john" but also "nhoj" and "ohnj" and "john2." It doesn't take a password-guessing program very long to try all combinations of adding one character, reversing, and permuting.

Although they are risky themselves, items from the second list can serve as the base for creating a better password (I don't recommend using any personal items in passwords at all). Passwords that use two or more of the following modifications to ordinary words are much more likely to be good choices:

  • Embedding one or more extra characters, especially symbol and control characters.

  • Misspelling it.

  • Using unusual capitalization. All lowercase is not unusual; capitalization or inverse capitalization by word is not unusual (e.g., "StarTrek," "sTARtREK"); always capitalizing vowels is not unusual.

  • Concatenating two or more words or parts of words.

  • Embedding one word in the middle of another word ("kitdogten" embeds "dog" within "kitten").

  • Interleaving two or more words: for example, "cdaotg" interleaves "dog" and "cat." With a little practice, some people can do this easily in their heads; others can't. If you need any significant delay between characters as you type in such a password, don't use them.

Table 6-8 illustrates some of these recommendations, using "StarTrek" as a base (although I'd recommend avoiding altogether anything having to do with Star Trek in passwords).

Table 6-8. Creating good passwords from bad ones

Bad

Better

Better Still

StarTrek(predictable capitalization)

sTartRek(unusual capitalization)

sTarkErT(unusual capitalization and reversal)

startrak(misspelling)

starTraK(misspelling and unusual capitalization)

$taRTra#(misspelling, symbols and unusual capitalization)

StarDrek(slang)

jetrekdi(embedding)

jetr@kdi(embedding and symbols)

trekstar(word swapping)

sttraerk(interleaving)

sttr@erK(interleaving, unusual capitalization and symbols)

Of course, these would all be poor choices now. When selecting passwords and advising users about how to do so, keep in mind that the overall goal is that passwords be hard to guess, for humans and programs, but easy to remember and fast to type.

There are other ways of selecting passwords other than using real words as the base. Here are two popular examples:

  • Form a password from the initial letters of each word in a memorable phrase, often a song lyric. Such passwords are easy to remember despite being nonsense strings. Transforming the resulting string results in an even better password. Two examples are given in Table 6-9.

    Table 6-9. Forming passwords from memorable phrases

    Phrase[15]

    Password

    Better Password

    "Now it's a disco, but not for Lola"

    niadbnfl

    Ni1db!4L

    "I can well recall the first time I ever went to sea"

    icwrtftiepts

    @cWr1t@eP2c

    [15] The lines are from the songs "Copa Cabana" by BarryManilow and "Old Admirals" by Al Stewart. Naturally, you wouldn't want to use either of these passwords now.

    As the final example illustrates, Unix passwords can be longer than eight characters if you have so configured the system (discussed later in this chapter).

  • Form a password by keyboard shifting: select a word or phrase that you can type easily, and then shift your hands on the keyboard in some way before typing it (e.g., up one and over one).[16] You have to be fairly coordinated for this method to be practical for you, but it does generate hard-to-crack passwords since they are essentially random.

    [16] Some currentpassword-cracking programs can crack words shifted by one position to the left or right, so a more complex shift is required.

Even using these techniques, passwords containing any part of your user account name, your full name, or any other item appearing in your password file entry are fundamentally insecure. Password-cracking programs perform a truly staggering amount of transformations on this information in order to attempt to crack passwords (including simple keyboard shifting!).

Here are some additional general recommendations about passwords and system security:

  • There should be no unprotected accounts on the system. This includes accounts without passwords and accounts whose users have left the system but whose passwords remain unchanged. When auser leaves, always disable her account.

  • Specify a minimum password length. We recommend setting it to at least eight characters, the traditional Unix maximum password length, which isn't really long enough anyway. Most Unix systems have the ability to use very long passwords; see the section on the PAM facility later in this chapter for details.

  • Passwords must be changed under any of these (and similar) conditions:

    • Whenever someone other than the user it belongs to learns it, the password needs to be changed.

    • When a user leaves, all passwords that he knew must be changed.

    • When a system administrator leaves, the root password and all other site-wide passwords (e.g., dialup passwords) must be changed. Whether to force users to change their passwords is a matter of discretion, but keep in mind that the system administrator had full access to the shadow password file.

    • When a system administrator is fired, every password on the system should be changed since he had access to the list of encrypted passwords.

    • If you have even a suspicion that the shadow password file has been read via the network, the prudent thing is, again, to change every password on the system.

  • The rootpassword should be changed periodically in any case. Not every site needs to change it religiously once a month, but changing it once in a while when you don't think anyone has learned it errs on the side of caution, just in case you're wrong. Users can be sneaky; if you think someone was paying a bit too much attention to your fingers when you typed in the root password, change it.

  • Equally important considerations apply to formulating password guidelines for users who have accounts at multiple sites. When we give an account to a new user, we always stress the importance of choosing a brand-new password for our site and not falling back on one of his old favorites, and he is similarly instructed not to use any password in effect at our site in any other context, either concurrently or in the future. Such regulations strike some users as excessively paranoid, but they are really just common sense.

Unix offers options for enforcing password-selection policies; they are discussed later in this section. If you'd like to use a carrot as well as a stick in this regard, see the section on educating users about passwords later in this chapter.

6.4.1.1 Forcing a password change

Most Unix systems provide commands that allow you to force a user to change her password at the next login. You can use such commands in a script on those (hopefully rare) occasions when everyone must change their password right away.

These are the commands provided by the versions we are considering (they all take a username as their final argument):

AIX
pwdadm -f ADMCHG
FreeBSD
chpass (interactive, but see below)
HP-UX
passwd -f
Linux
chage -d 0 -M 999 (if not using aging)
Solaris
passwd -f
Tru64
usermod -x password_must_change=1

The Linux command works by setting the date of the last password change to January 1, 1970, and the maximum password lifetime to 999 days. This is a bit of akludge, but it gets the job done when password aging is not in effect (you can go back and later remove the maximum password lifetime if desired). However, if you are using password aging, you can omit the -M option and allow the normal setting to perform the same function.

On FreeBSD systems, the user account modification utility is interactive and places you into an editor session by default. However, you can use the following script to automate the process of forcing a password change (accomplished by placing a date in the past into the Change field of the form):

#!/bin/tcsh setenv EDITOR ed /usr/bin/chpass $1 <<END /Change/ s/:.*$/: 12 31 1999/ w q END

You can choose any past date that you like.

6.4.1.2 Managing dozens of passwords

When choosing successivepasswords and especially root passwords try to avoid falling into a simple recognizable pattern. For example, if you always capitalize all the vowels, and someone knows this, you effectively lose the value of the unusual capitalization. Similarly, successive passwords are often chosen in the same way; don't always choose names of planets for your passwords. It is especially important to break such patterns when someone with longtime access to the root account and hence well aware of past patterns in passwords leaves the system or loses root access.

That said, it is impossible for most people even system administrators to remember all of the root passwords that they may need to know across a large enterprise without some scheme for generating/predicting the password for each system.

One approach is to use the same root password on all the systems administered by the same person or group of people. This may be effective for some sites, but it has the disadvantage that if the root password is compromised on any system, the entire group of systems is then wide open to unauthorized root-level access. Sites that have experienced such a break-in tend to give up the convenience of a single root password in favor of enhanced security and the ability to contain an intruder should the worst happen.

The solution in this case is to have some scheme (algorithm) for generating rootpasswords based on some characteristics of the computer system in question. Here is a simple example that indicates how to generate each character of the password in turn:

  • First letter of the computer manufacturer

  • Number of characters in the hostname

  • Last letter of the hostname in uppercase

  • First letter of the operating system name

  • Operating system version number (first digit)

  • The symbol character that is on the same diagonal of the keyboard as the first letter of the hostname (moving up and to the right)

For a Sun system running Solaris 7 named dalton, this would yield a password of "s6Ns8r%"; similarly, for an IBM RS/6000 running AIX 4.3 named venus, the password would be "i5Sa4&". Although they are too short at only six characters, these are decent passwords in terms of character variety and capitalization, and they are easy to generate mentally as needed with just a little practice.

Another problem that occurs with rootpasswords that are changed on a regular schedule is coordination of changes and getting the new value to everyone involved. Again, this is a case where an algorithm can be of great use. Let's suppose the root password must be changed monthly. Successive passwords can be generated from a base component that everyone knows and a varying portion generated from the current month and year. We'll use "xxxx" a lousy choice, of course for our base component in a simple example. Each month, we append the month and year to it, adding an additional "x" for months less than 10. In 2000, this would yield the passwords: xxxxx100, xxxxx200, ..., xxxx1200.

A real scheme would need to be more complex, of course. This could be done by choosing a more obscure base component and generating the varying portion according to a more complex algorithm: something involving a simple mathematical computation using the month and year as variables, for example.

The advantage of such a system is that any administrator can change the monthly root password without inconveniencing other administrators. If someone attempts to use the old root password and is unsuccessful, she will realize that the monthly change has occurred and will already know the new password.

In fact, these two separate approaches could be combined. The remaining two (or more) characters of the system information-based password could be used for the varying portion based on the time period.

6.4.2 Educating Users About Selecting Effective Passwords

Helping users use the system more effectively is part of a system administrator's job. Sometimes, this means providing them with the information they need to do something, in this case, choose a good password. There are a variety of ways you might convey information and suggestions about password selection to the users on your systems or at your site:

  • A one-page handout (one- or two-sided as appropriate)

  • A mail message sent to all new users and, on occasion, to everyone with an account

  • A manual page that you create call it something like goodpass and put into the local manual-page directory

  • A script named passwd that (perhaps optionally) offers brief advice for selecting good passwords and then calls the real passwd command.

One or more of these suggestions may make sense at your site.

6.4.2.1 Password advice in the age of the Internet

The Internet and its myriad web sites, many of which now request or require user names and passwords for access, has made advising users on good password usage practices significantly more complicated. As we noted above, users should be prohibited from using their password(s) for the local site in any other context, and especially not on the Internet. But beyond that, users often need to have the risks associated with Internet access and transactions explicitly pointed out from time to time, accompanied by a reminder that the passwords they choose to protect such activities are their only defense against the bad guys.

It is not uncommon for a user to visit several to dozens of such web sites on a regular basis. In theory, the best practice is to use a different password for every one of them. Realistically, however, very few users are capable of remembering that many passwords, especially when some of the sites involved are visited rather infrequently (say, less than once a month). Clearly, we need to modify our usual password selection and usage advice to deal with the realities of the Internet and to be of more genuine help to users.

Treating equally every web site requesting an account name andpassword merely exacerbates the problem and its inherent combinatorics. Instead, we can divide such Web sites into classes based on the potential losses that might occur if the username and password associated with them was discovered by an unscrupulous person: in other words, by what we have to lose (if anything). There are several general types of such sites:

Information-only sites

These sites merely make information available to their users. They require a password to gain access to that information, but a username and password are available for the asking and have no associated cost. An example of a site would be the technical support area of vendor's web site. Such sites seem to collect user information strictly for marketing purposes and still provide their informational content free of charge. From the user's point of view, the password used at such a site is unimportant, because no loss or other negative consequences would occur even if someone were to discover it.

Fee-based informational sites

These sites make information available to their users upon payment of a fee (usually on a subscription basis, but sometimes on per-visit basis). An example of this kind of site is a magazine's online subscription site, which makes additional information available to its subscribers beyond what it places on its general public web site. The discovery of this kind of password would allow an unauthorized person to gain access to this information, but it would not usually bring any harm to the user himself, provided that the site exercised normal security precautions and did not reveal sensitive information (such as credit card numbers) even to the account holder.

Password-protected purchases, auction bids and other financial transactions

At these sites, a username and password is required to purchase something, but account information related to purchases is not stored. These kinds of sites will allow only registered users to make purchases, but they do not require a full account including billing and shipping addresses, credit card numbers, and so on to be set up and maintained. Rather, they force the user to enter this information for every order (or give the user the option of doing so), without permanently storing the results. Auction sites are similar (from the buyer's point of view): they require bidders to have a registered account, but the actual sale and the corresponding exchange of sensitive information takes place privately between the buyer and seller. The security implications associated with this type of password are more serious than those for information-based sites, but the potential loss from a discovered password is still fairly limited. The bad guy still needs additional information to actually make a purchase (in the case of an auction, he could make a bogus bid while masquerading as the legitimate account holder, but he could not force an actual purchase).

Sites with ongoing purchasing accounts

These sites assign a username and password to registered users and store their complete account information in order to facilitate future purchases, including their billing address, shipping addresses, and multiple credit card numbers. Most online merchants offer such facilities, and in fact you often do not have a choice as to whether an account is set up for you or not if you want to make even one purchase. The unauthorized discovery of the password for such a site can have significant financial consequences, because the bad guy can make purchases using the legitimate user's information and redirect their shipment to any desired location. The choice on the part of such sites to allow such complete access on the basis of a single password clearly favors convenience over security.

Note that sites that store important information about the user or something the user owns or administers also fall into this class. If, for example, the password associated with an account at a site where the official information associated with an Internet domain is stored were to be compromised, the bad guy could modify that information, and the consequences could range from significant inconvenience to all-out havoc.

Sites associated with user finances

These web sites allow account holders to access their bank accounts, stock portfolios, and similar financial instruments, and they obviously pose the greatest risk of immediate financial loss to the user. Some of these are protected only by a username and password; the passwords for such sites must be chosen very carefully indeed.

Note that even the most innocuous sites can change their character over time. For example, a site that now merely provides access to information might at some point in the future add other services; at such time, the password in use there would need to be rethought.

Obviously, the different security needs of the different kinds of sites make different demands on the rigor of password selection. Given that it is seldom practical to have a unique password for every Internet site, we can make the following recommendations:

  • Don't use any password from any of your regular computer accounts for any Internet sites, and vice versa. (I can't repeat this often enough).

  • Select all passwords for Internet sites using the same good password selection principles as for any other password.

  • There is no harm in using the same password for all of the unimportant sites, especially those requiring a (nuisance) password for access to otherwise free information.

  • You may also choose to use the same password for fee-based information sites (depending upon the extent to which you wish to protect against unauthorized access to such sites), or you may choose to use a different one, but again there is probably no harm in using the same one for more than one site.

  • Consider using a different password at each site where there is anything to lose. Doing so may still result in a large number of passwords to be remembered, and there are many strategies for dealing with this. The most obvious is to write them down. I tend not to prefer this approach; it may be that too many years of system administration have made the mere idea of writing down any password anathema to me, but keeping such a list in a secure location at home is probably an acceptable risk (I wouldn't keep such a list in my wallet or on my PDA).

    Another approach is to have a different password at each site but to use a consistent scheme for selecting them. As a simple example, one might generate each password by taking one's favorite woman's name that begins with the same letter as the most important word in the site name, transforming the spelling according to some rule, and appending a favorite number. By constructing passwords in the same way for each site, you can always reconstruct the password for a given site if it is forgotten. Ideally, you would devise a password scheme that generates a deterministic password for a given site and prevents frequent duplicates (the latter is probably not true of this simple example).

6.4.3 Setting Password Restrictions

Users don't like to change theirpasswords. However, Unix provides mechanisms by which you can force them to do so anyway. You can specify how long a user can keep the same password before being forced to change it (the maximum password lifetime), how long he must keep a new password before being allowed to change it again (the minimum password lifetime), the minimum password length, and some other related parameters. Setting the minimum and maximum password lifetimes is referred to as specifying password aging information.

Before you decide to turn on password aging on your system, you should consider carefully how much password fascism you really need. Forcing users to change their password when they don't want to is one of the least effective system security tactics. Certainly, there are times when passwords must be changed whether users like it or not, such as when an employee with high-level system access is terminated. However, random forced password changes don't ensure that good passwords will be chosen (in fact, the opposite effect is at least as likely). And using a minimum password lifetime to prevent a user from changing her new password right back to what it was before (a password she liked and could remember without writing it down) can also have some unexpected side effects.

One potential problem with aminimum password lifetime comes when a password really needs to be changed when someone who shouldn't know it does, for example. At such times, a user might be unable to change his password even though he needs to. Of course, the superuser can always change passwords, but then the user will have to hunt down the system administrator, admit what happened, and get it changed. Depending on the security policies and general atmosphere at your site, the user may decide just to wait until the minimum lifetime expires and change it himself, and live with the risk until then. You'll need to decide which is more likely on your system: users attempting to circumvent necessary password aging or users needing to be able to change their passwords at will; either one could be more important for system security in your particular situation.

Many Unix versions also offer other controls related to password selection and related items:

  • Minimum password length

  • Password selection controls, such as using more than one character class (lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers, and symbols) and avoiding personal information and dictionary words

  • Password history lists, preventing users from reselecting recent passwords

  • Automatic account locking after too many failed login attempts (discussed previously

  • Account expiration dates

6.4.3.1 Password aging

On most systems, password aging settings for user accounts are stored with the entries in theshadow password file. As we noted earlier, entries in the shadow password file have the following syntax:

username:coded password:last_change:minlife:maxlife:warn:inactive:expires:unused

where username is the name of the user account, and coded password is the encoded user password. The remaining fields within each entry control the conditions under which a user is allowed to and is forced to change his password, as well as an optional account expiration date:

last_change

Stores the date of the last password change, expressed as the number of days since January 1, 1970. Set to 0 to force a password change at the next login (works only when max_days is greater than 0 and less than the number of days since 1/1/1970).

maxlife

Specifies maximum number of days that a user is allowed to keep the same password (traditionally set to a high value such as 9999 to disable this feature).

minlife

Specifies how long a user must keep a newpassword before he is allowed to change it again; it is designed to prevent a user from circumventing a forced password change by changing his password and then changing it right back again to the old value (set to zero to disable this feature).

warn

Indicates how many days in advance the user will be notified of an upcoming password expiration (leave blank to disable this feature).

inactive

Specifies the number of days after the password expires that the account will be automatically disabled if the password has not changed (set to -1 to disable this feature).

expires

Specifies the date on which the account expires and will be automatically disabled (leave blank to disable this feature).

The settings provide a system administrator with considerable control over user password updating practices.

You can edit these fields directly in the shadow password file, or you may use the command provided by the system, usually passwd (Linux systems use the chage command). The options corresponding to each setting are listed in Table 6-9.

HP-UX and Tru64 systems running enhanced security and AIX provide the same functionality via different mechanisms: theprotected password database and the settings in the /etc/security/user configuration file, respectively. FreeBSD provides an account expiration date via a field in the master.passwd file. Table 6-10 also lists the commands for modifying this data.

Table 6-10. Specifying user account password aging settings

Setting

Command

Minimum lifetime

AIX

chuser minage= weeks

HP-UX

passwd -n days

Linux

chage -m days

Solaris

passwd -n days

Tru64

usermod -x password_min_change_time=days

Maximum lifetime

AIX

chuser maxage=weeks

HP-UX

passwd -x days

Linux

chage -M days

Solaris

passwd -x days

Tru64

usermod -x password_expire_time=days

Warning period

AIX

chuser pwdwarntime=days

HP-UX

passwd -w days

Linux

chage -W days

Solaris

passwd -w days

Inactivity period

AIX

chuser minage=weeks

Linux

chage -I days

Tru64

usermod -x account_inactive=days

Expiration date

AIX

chuser minage= weeks

FreeBSD

chpass -e date

Linux

chage -E days

Tru64

usermod -x account_expiration=date

Last change date

FreeBSD

chpass (interactive)

Linux

chage -d yyyy-mm-dd (or days-since-1/1/1970)

View settings

AIX

lsuser -f

HP-UX

passwd -s

Linux

chage -l

Solaris

passwd -s

Tru64

edauth -g

For example, the following commands set the minimum password age to seven days and the maximum password age to one year for user chavez:

# passwd -n 7 -x 365 chavez                   HP-UX and Solaris # chage -m 7 -M 365 chavez                    Linux # chuser maxage=52 minage=1 chavez            AIX # usermod -x password_min_change_time=7 \     Tru64    password_expire_time=365 chavez

Here is the display produced by passwd -s for listing a user's password aging settings:

# passwd -s chavez chavez PS 05/12/2000 0 183 7 -1

The second item in the display is the password status, one of PS or P (password defined), NP (no password), or LK or L (account is locked via a password modification). The third item is the date chavez last changed her password. The fourth and fifth items indicate the minimum and maximum password lifetimes (in days), and the sixth item shows the number of days prior to password expiration that chavez will begin to receive messages to that effect. The final column indicates the inactivity period. In our example, chavez must change her password about twice a year, and she will be warned seven days before her password expires; the minimum password age and inactivity periods are not used.

Here is the corresponding display produced by chage under Linux, which is much more informative and self-explanatory:

# chage -l harvey Minimum:        0 Maximum:        99999 Warning:        0 Inactive:       -1 Last Change:            Sep 05, 2002 Password Expires:       Never Password Inactive:      Never Account Expires:        Never      

These settings provide user harvey with complete freedom about when (or if) to change his password.

You can also set user account password aging settings with most of the graphical administrative tools we considered earlier. Figure 6-12 illustrates these features.

Figure 6-12. Specifying password aging settings
figs/esa3.0612.gif

Starting from the upper left and moving clockwise, the figure shows the forms provided by HP-UX's SAM, Solaris' SMC, AIX's SMIT, the Red Hat User Manager, and YaST2. The latter provides a convenient way of setting the system default password aging and length settings (it is reached via the Security figs/u2192.gif Local security configuration figs/u2192.gif Predefined security level figs/u2192.gif Custom settings path from the main panel). Note that three of the four dialogs also include other password-related controls in addition to aging settings. We'll consider them in the next few subsections of this chapter.

Fascist or Slave?

Sometimes, that would seem to be the choice that system administrators have. If you don't rule your system with an iron hand and keep users in their place, those same hordes of users will take advantage of you and bury you with their continuous demands. The Local Guru/Unix Wizard role isn't really an alternative to these two extremes; it is just a more benign version of the fascist the system administrator is still somehow fundamentally different than users and just as inflexible and unapproachable as the overt despot.

Of course, there are alternatives, but I'm not thinking of some sort of stereotypical, happy-medium type solution, as if it really were possible. The solution in this case isn't some shade of gray, but a different color altogether. It is time to think about what other metaphors might be used to describe the relationship of a system administrator to his user community. There are many possibilities resource, service provider, mentor, technical attache, regent, conductor (as in orchestra, not train or electricity), catalyst and obviously there's not just one right answer. What all of these suggested alternatives attempt to capture is some sense of the interdependence of system administrators and the users with whom they are connected.

Not that defining the system administrator/users role in some other way will be easy. Users, as least as much as system administrators, are comfortable with the familiar, stereotypical ways of thinking about the job, even if they are seldom entirely satisfied with what they yield in practice.

6.4.3.2 Password triviality checks

Security weaknesses arising from user passwords are of two main sorts: poorly chosen passwords are easy to guess or crack, and passwords of any quality may be discovered or inadvertently revealed in a variety of ways. Imposing password aging restrictions represents an attempt to deal with the second sort of risk by admitting up front that sometimes passwords are discovered and by reasoning that changing them periodically will deal with these exigencies.

Helping users to choose better, more secure passwords in the first place is the goal of password triviality checking systems (the process is also known as obscurity checking and checking for obviousness). This approach involves checking a new password proposed by a user for various characteristics that will make it easy to crack and rejecting the password if these characteristics are found. Obscurity-checking capabilities are usually integrated into the passwd command and may reject passwords of a variety of types, including the following:

  • Passwords shorter than some minimum length

  • All lowercase or all alphabetic passwords

  • Passwords that are the same as the account's username or any of the information in the GECOS field of its password file entry

  • Simple transformations of GECOS items: reversals, rotations, doubling

  • Passwords or partial passwords that appear in online dictionaries

  • Passwords that are simple keyboard patterns e.g., qwerty or 123456 and thus easily discerned by an observer

Many Unix systems check for the second and third items on the list automatically. Unfortunately, these tests still accept many poor passwords. Some versions allow you to optionally impose additional checks.

6.4.3.2.1 Tru64

Tru64 automatically checks that new passwords are not the same as any local username or group name, are not palindromes, and are not recognized by the spell utility (the final test means that the password may not appear in the online dictionary /usr/share/dict/words, nor be a simple transformation, such as a plural form, of a word within it). Triviality checks are imposed if the user's protected password database file contains the u_restrict field, which corresponds to the Triviality checks check box on the Modify Account form.

6.4.3.2.2 AIX

AIX provides a different subset of triviality-checking capabilities via these account attributes (stored in /etc/security/user), which may also be specified using the chuser command:

minalpha

Minimum number of alphabetic characters in the password.

minother

Minimum number of nonalphabetic characters in the new password.

mindiff

Minimum number of characters in the new password that are not present in the old password.

maxrepeats

Maximum number of times any single character can appear in the password.

minlen

Minimum password length. However, if the sum of minalpha and minother is less than minlen, the former is the minimum length that is actually imposed, up to the systemwide maximum of 8.

dictionlist

Comma-separated list of dictionary files containing unacceptable passwords

pwdchecks

List of site-specific loadable program modules for performing additional password preselection checking (see the pwdrestrict_method subroutine manual page).

By default, password triviality checking is not imposed. The dictionlist attribute allows site-specific word lists to be added to the standard online dictionary, and the pwdchecks attribute provides a hook for whatever checking a site deems appropriate, although developing such a module will take time.

Here are some sample settings that impose a reasonable set of password content restrictions:

minalpha=6 minother=2 maxrepeats=2 mindiff=2
6.4.3.2.3 Linux

Linux systems provide a very simple password obscurity checking facility. It is enabled via the OBSCURE_CHECK_ENAB entry in the /etc/login.defs configuration file. The facility performs some simple checks on its own and then calls the library provided with the Crack password-cracking package (described later in this chapter). The path to the associated dictionary files can be specified with the CRACKLIB_DICTPATH entry in the same file.

Note that the obscurity checks do not apply when the superuser changes any password, but you can specify whether root is warned when a specified password would not pass via the PASS_ALWAYS_WARN setting.

6.4.3.2.4 FreeBSD

FreeBSD provides password content controls via user classes; the settings are accordingly specified in /etc/login.conf . These are the most useful:

minpasswordlen

Minimum password length.

passwd_format

Password encoding scheme. The md5 setting enables passwords longer than 8 characters.

mixpasswordcase

If set to true, all lowercase passwords are disallowed.

6.4.3.3 The freely available npasswd command

If you'd like to precheck user passwords but your version of Unix doesn't provide this feature, or if you want to impose more rigorous restrictions on password selection than your system supports, there are freely available programs that you can use for this purpose. For example, the npasswd package (written by Clyde Hoover) is widely available (including all of our systems). It provides a replacement for the normal passwd command that can be configured to check proposed passwords according to a variety of criteria.

Looking at npasswd's configuration file, which is /usr/lib/passwd/passwd.conf by default, provides a good sense of the kind of checking it does:

# npasswd configuration file # Dictionaries passwd.dictionaries  /usr/dict/words  passwd.dictionaries  /usr/dict/new_words  passwd.dictionaries  /etc/local_words  # Content controls passwd.singlecase      no      Disallow single-case passwords. passwd.alphaonly       no      Disallow all alphabetic passwords. passwd.charclasses     2       Minimum number of character types in password. passwd.whitespace      yes     Allow whitespace characters in passwords. passwd.printableonly   no      Allow nonprinting characters in passwords. passwd.maxrepeat       2       Only two adjacent characters can be the same. # Minimum password length   passwd.minpassword     8

npasswd performs some simple length and character-type tests on a proposed password and then checks it against the words in the dictionaries specified in the configuration file.

Checking a proposed password against every login name, group name, and so on, on the system rather than merely against the user's own seems an unambiguous improvement. It is fairly easy to generate a list of such words. The following script performs a basic version of this task:

#!/bin/sh # mk_local_words - generate local word list file  PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb; export PATH  umask 077# protect against prying eyes  rm -f /etc/local_words  set `hostname | awk -F. '{print $1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7}'`  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do      echo $1 >> /etc/local_tmp; shift  done  set `domainname | awk -F. '{print $1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7}'`  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do      echo $1 >> /etc/local_tmp; shift  done # usernames, then GECOS names  cat /etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print $1}' >> /etc/local_tmp  cat /etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print $5}' | \      awk -F, '{print $1}' | \      awk '{print tolower($1)};{print tolower($2)}' | \      grep -v '^$' >> /etc/local_tmp  cat /etc/group | awk -F: '{print $1}' >> /etc/local_tmp  cat /etc/hosts.equiv >> /etc/local_tmp # add other local stuff to this file (e.g. org name)  if [ -f /etc/local_names ]; then      chmod 400 /etc/local_names      cat /etc/local_names >> /etc/local_tmp  fi  sort /etc/local_tmp | uniq > /etc/local_words  rm -f /etc/local_tmp 

This version can be easily modified or extended to capture the important words on your system. Note that standard awk does not contain the tolower function, although both nawk and gawk (GNU awk) do.

6.4.3.4 Password history lists

Users tend to dislike creating new passwords almost as much as they dislike having to change them in the first place, so it is a common practice for users to oscillate between the same two passwords. Password history records are designed to prevent this. Some number of previous passwords for each user are remembered by the system and cannot be reselected. The HP-UX, Tru64, and AIX password facilities offer this feature. Note that the password history feature is only effective when it is combined with a minimum password lifetime (otherwise, a user can just keep changing his password until the one he wants falls off the list).

Under AIX, the following attributes in /etc/security/user control how and when previous passwords can be reused:

histexpire

Number of weeks until a user can reuse an old password (maximum is 260, which is 5 years).

histsize

The number of old passwords to remember and reject if reselected too soon (maximum is 50).

On Tru64 systems, this feature is enabled when the u_pwdepth in a user's protected password database file is nonzero. Its maximum value is 9. It corresponds to the Password History Limit slider on the user account modification screen. The list of old passwords is stored in the u_pwdict field, and items cannot be reselected as long as they remain in the history list.

On HP-UX systems, password history settings can be specified on a system-wide basis in the /etc/default/security file, as in this example:

PASSWORD_HISTORY_DEPTH=5     Remember 5 passwords.

The maximum setting is 10.

6.4.3.5 Password settings default values

Default values forpassword aging settings can be specified on systems using them. These are the default value locations on the systems we are considering:

AIX
The default stanza in /etc/security/user
FreeBSD
The default user class in /etc/login.conf (although this serves as a default only for users not assigned to a specific class)
HP-UX
/etc/default/security and /tcb/auth/files/system/default
Linux
/etc/login.defs
Solaris
/etc/default/passwd and /etc/default/login
Tru64
/etc/auth/system/default

We've seen examples of most of these already.

Here is an example of the Linux defaults file, /etc/login.defs :

PASS_MAX_DAYS         90                     Must change every 3 months. PASS_MIN_DAYS         3                      Keep new password 3 days. PASS_WARN_AGE         7                      Warn 7 days before expiration. PASS_MIN_LEN          8                      Passwords must be at least 8 chars long. OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENABLE yes                    Reject very poor passwords. PASS_CHANGE_TRIES     3                      Users get 3 tries to pick a valid  password. PASS_ALWAYS_WARN      yes                    Warn root of bad passwords (but allow). PASS_MAX_LEN          8                      Encode this many password characters. CRACKLIB_DICTPATH /usr/lib/cracklib_dict     Path to dictionary files.

Note that some of these settings can interact with the PAM facility used on most Linux systems, so they may not operate exactly as described in this section. PAM is discussed later in this chapter.

The Solaris /etc/default/passwd file is very similar (although the attribute names are spelled differently):

MAXWEEKS=1       Keep new passwords for one week. MINWEEKS=26      Password expires after 6 months. PASSLENGTH=6     Minimum password length. WARNWEEKS=1      Warn user 7 days before expiration.

6.4.4 Testing User Passwords for Weaknesses

As we've noted, having users select effective passwords is one of the best ways to protect system security, and educating them about good selection principles can go a long way in this direction. Sometimes, however, you want to be able to assess how well users are doing at this task. Attempting to discern user passwords using a password-cracking program is one way to go about finding out. In this section, we will consider two such programs, crack and john, beginning with the latter, somewhat simpler facility.

It is usually reasonable to test the security of passwords on systems you administer (depending on site policies). However, cautious administrators obtain written permission to run password cracking programs against their own systems.

In contrast, attempting to crack passwords on computers you don't administer is both unethical and (in most cases) illegal. Avoid this temptation and the complications it can bring.

6.4.4.1 John the Ripper

The John package its full name is John the Ripper is an easy-to-use and effective password cracking facility. It is available for all of the Unix systems we are considering.

Once installed, the john command is used to test the passwords contained in the password file given as its argument. The package includes the unshadow command, which can be used to create a traditional Unix password file from passwd and shadow files.

Here is a simple example of running john:

# unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /secure/pwdtest # chmod go= /secure/pwdtest # john -rules -wordfile:/usr/dict/many_words /secure/pwdtest

The first command creates a password file for testing, and the second command protects it from unauthorized access. The final command initiates a john session (which it starts in the background), in this case checking the passwords against the words in the specified dictionary file and many transformations of these words.

As john runs, it periodically writes status information to files in its installation directory (usually /usr/lib/john); the file john.pot holds information about the passwords cracked so far, and the file restore contains information necessary for restarting the current session if it is interrupted (the command to do so is simply john -restore). You can specify an alternate restart filename by including the -session:name option on the john command line, which takes the desired session name as its argument and names the file accordingly.

The john facility can operate in several distinct password-cracking modes (requested via distinct options to the john command):

Single crack mode (-single)

Passwords are checked against GECOS field information and a multitude of transformations of it.

Wordlist mode (-rules)

Passwords are checked against the words in a dictionary file a text file containing one word per line whose location can be specified as an argument to the -wordfile option. The default file is /var/lib/john/password.lst. The transformations are defined in the facility's configuration file and can be extended and/or customized by the system administrator.

Incremental mode (-incremental[:modename])

Tries all combinations of characters or a subset of characters in a brute-force attempt to crack passwords. The optional modename specifies the character subset to use, as defined in john's configuration file (discussed below). This mode can take an arbitrarily long amount of time to complete.

External mode (-external:modename)

Attempt to crack passwords using an administrator-defined procedure specified in the configuration file (written in a C-like language). The modename specifies which procedure to use.

As we noted, John records its progress periodically to its restart file. You can force this information to be written and displayed using commands like these:

# kill -HUP  pid # john -status guesses: 3  time: 0:00:21:52 68%  c/s: 46329

Similarly, the following command reports the last recorded status information for the session named urgent:

# john -status:urgent

Some aspects of john's functioning are controlled by the facility's configuration file, typically /var/lib/john/john.ini. Here are some sample entries from that file:

# John settings [Options] # Wordlist file name, to be used in batch mode Wordfile = /var/lib/john/password.lst # If Y, use idle cycles only Idle = N # Crash recovery file saving delay in seconds Save = 600 # Beep when a password is found (who needs this anyway?) Beep = N

Later sections of this file contain rules/specifications of the procedures for each of the cracking modes.

6.4.4.2 Using Crack to find poorly chosen passwords

Crack is a freely available package that attempts to determine Unix passwords using the words in an online dictionary as starting points for generating guesses. The package includes a lot of files and may seem somewhat daunting at first, but it generally builds without problems and is actually quite easy to use. These are the most important parts of its directory structure (all relative to its top-level directory, created when the package is unpacked):

Crack

Crack driver script; edit the first section of the script to configure Crack for your system, and then build the package with the Crack -makeonly command. This same script is used to run the program itself.

Dict

Subdirectory tree containing dictionary source files (in addition to the standard online dictionary, usually /usr/dict/words). Dictionary source files are text files containing one word per line, and they are given the extension .dwg. You may add files here as desired; placing them into one of the existing subdirectories is the easiest way.

src

Location of Crack source code.

scripts/mkgecosd

Rules for generating guesses from GECOS field entries.

conf/rules.*

Rules for generating guesses from dictionary words.

run/F-merged

Text file containing clear text form of all cracked passwords. We don't advise keeping this file online except when you are actually running Crack. During a Crack run, several other temporary files are also kept here.

run/Dhost.pid

Results files for a particular Crack run, including passwords cracked during that run (the hostname and PID filename components are filled in as appropriate).

run/dict

The compressed Crack dictionaries used during a run are built as needed and stored here.

The entire Crack directory tree should be owned by root and should allow no access by anyone but root.

Crack also provides a utility to convert the password and shadow password files into a single conventional-style file suitable for use by the program; it is named shadowmrg.sv and is stored in the scripts subdirectory. It takes the two filenames as its arguments and writes the merged file to standard output.

Here is an example invocation of Crack:

# Crack -nice 5 /secure/pwdtest

The script builds the compressed dictionary files, if necessary, and then starts the password cracker program in the background. While Crack is running, you can use the Reporter script to check on its progress (located in the same directory as the Crack script). In this case, Crack runs at lower priority than normal jobs due to the inclusion of -nice.

If you want to stop a Crack run in progress, run the plaster script in the scripts subdirectory.

Eventually or quickly, depending on the speed of your CPU and the length of the dictionary files Crack produces output like the following (in the file Dhost.pid where host is the hostname and pid is the process ID of the main Crack process):

I:968296152:OpenDictStream: status: /ok/ stat=1 look=679 find=679  genset='conf/rules.basic' rule='!?Xc' dgrp='1'     prog='smartcat run/dict/1.*' O:968296152:679 I:968296155:LoadDictionary: loaded 130614 words into memory G:968296209:KHcqrOsvoY80o:Arcana

The general procedure Crack uses is illustrated by this output. It opens each dictionary file in turn and then applies each rule from the various collection of rules files in the run subdirectory to the words in it, using each transformed word as a guess for every remaining uncracked user password. When it finds a match, it displays the cracked and encoded versions of the password in the output; in this example, the password "Arcana" has just been cracked. Once a rule has been applied to every dictionary word and every password, Crack continues on to the next rule, and eventually on to the next dictionary, until all possibilities have been exhausted or all passwords have been cracked.

Rules specify transformations to apply to a dictionary word and are written using a metalanguage unique to Crack. Here are some example entries illustrating some of its features:

!?Al
Choose only all-alphabetic-character words and convert to lowercase before using as a guess.
!?Ac
Choose only all-alphabetic-character words and capitalize.
>4r
Select words longer than four characters and reverse them. Other transformations are reflection (f) and doubling (d).
>2<8!?A$0
Choose all alphabetic words having 3-7 characters and add a final "0".
>2<8!?A$1
Same as previous but adds a final "1".
>2<7!?A$2$2
Choose all-alphabetic words of 3-6 characters and append "22".
>7!?Alx05$9$9
Choose all-alphabetic words of 8 or more characters, convert to lowercase, extract the first 6 characters, and append "99" (note that character numbering within a word begins at 0).

The installed rules files contain several important types of transformations, and they can be extended and customized as desired.

Once a Crack run has completed, it is important to remove any remaining scratch files, because they may contain clear-text passwords. Running the command make tidy is one way to do so. You will also want to copy the D* results files and run/F-merged file to offline storage and then delete the online copies (restoring the latter the next time you want to run Crack).

NOTE

figs/armadillo_tip.gif

There are several large dictionary files available on the Internet (for example, see ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/wordlists). Using them to augment the standard Unix dictionary (and any package-provided ones) will make any password cracking program more successful (but it will also take longer to complete).

6.4.4.3 How well do they do?

We ran Crack and John on a password file containing several poorly chosen passwords. Table 6-11 shows the results we obtained with the standard program options and configurations, using only the standard Unix dictionary with the words "arcana" and "vermillion" added.

Table 6-11. Password-cracking results

Test Password

Crack

John

vermilli

yes

yes

marymary

yes

yes

maryyram

yes

yes

arcana

yes

yes

Arcana

yes

yes

arcana1

yes

yes

arca^Na

no

no

arcana#

no

no

arcana24

no

no

Both of them cracked passwords with simple transformations, but not with special characters or the addition of two numerals. However, adding rules to either facility to handle these cases is very easy.



Essential System Administration
Essential System Administration, Third Edition
ISBN: 0596003439
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2002
Pages: 162

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