Arguments Against Surveillance

The arguments against surveillance can be divided in three groups: those that refer to the results of surveillance on the individual; those that refer to the consequences for society; and finally, arguments against the economic usefulness of surveillance. The arguments against surveillance and for privacy protection are similar enough for no difference to be made between them here. This implies a relationship between surveillance and privacy that may be simplistic (Stalder, 2002), but which will suffice for our purposes.

The most frequently named, and arguably ethically most serious, arguments against surveillance target the consequences it has on the individual who is surveilled. In a very general sense, surveillance can be understood as an objectification of the other, which Introna (2003), using Levinas ethical theories , sees as unethical, per se. While even most critics of surveillance would not go quite this far, many agree that surveillance can hurt the individual. Insofar as it infringes privacy, surveillance affects the basis of self-determination and self-identity (Severson, 1997; van den Hoeven, 2001). We seem to need a protective cocoon in order to flourish (Brown, 2000). This begs the question of whether employers have the right to such incisive power over their employees (Nye, 2002). A related problem is that of the autonomy of the individual. Autonomy is regarded as central for some ethical theories, and, in order to develop it and to live a life according to their own design, individuals seem to require an unobserved space (Brey, 2001; Spinello, 1997). Not allowing people to have this apparently necessary unobserved space is thus an expression of a lack of respect for their wishes and needs (Elgesiem, 1996), which in itself is ethically problematic .

Surveillance can adversely affect the development and character of the individual. Drawing on several authors, Nissenbaum suggests that a lack of privacy can jeopardise the individual s mental health (Nissenbaum, 2001). Related to this is the concept of trust. On the one hand, it can be argued that trust is essential for our day-to-day lives and also for all sorts of business transactions (Solomon & Flores, 2001). On the other hand, surveillance can be understood as an expression of distrust , and, worse , continued surveillance may make it hard, or impossible , to establish trusting relationships (Gallivan & Depledge, 2003; Johnson, 2001; Koehn, 2001). This argument can be extended to state that surveillance can impede the building and maintaining of healthy relationships with others (Rachels, 1995).

Next to the arguments against surveillance that are based on the disadvantages it produces for the individual, one can find a group of arguments that focus on the negative effects on society. Among them one can find the logical extension of the argument relating to the individual, which holds that a society made up of individuals who have personality problems because of a lack of privacy is likely to be deficient . This, for example, might be problematic in democracies that are based on the idea of the mature and autonomous individual. A second line of argument concentrates on the effect surveillance has on the use and distribution of power (Forester & Morrison, 1994; Rule et al., 1995). The discussion regarding surveillance and power often uses the theoretical framework provided by Michel Foucault (1975). It analyses the way ICT can be used to create a panopticon and how this normalises and disciplines the individuals (Goold, 2003; Introna, 2001; Yoon, 1996).

Finally, and possibly for this chapter the most interesting, there are voices that argue against surveillance on the basis that it is bad for business, that it hurts the economic system. These arguments tend to emphasise that surveillance can be, and often will be, interpreted as an expression of a lack of trust, and that such a lack of trust may be more harmful to the functioning of an organisation than could be justified by the advantages of surveillance. What does it say about a company when management doubts their employees ability to work without close supervision, when the working assumption is that employees will behave immorally (Bowie, 1999)? Empirical research suggests that this relationship does exist, that managers in companies where e-mail use is monitored , for example, are less likely to trust employees than those where no monitoring happens (Weisband & Reinig, 1995). Furthermore, employee surveillance seems to be the result of a mindset of early industrial revolution, when managers had to force an unwilling workforce to do their jobs. It seems unsuitable for modern employment relationships (Thompson, 2003), where the individual initiative of the employee is of central importance, as is the case in virtual teams or in teleworking (Jerrard & Chang, 2003). Finally, surveillance can produce a host of unexpected problems based on cultural and legal issues. Many companies today work in an international environment and have an international workforce. Views of privacy and the evaluation of the legitimacy of surveillance differ vastly between different cultures. Accordingly, there are huge differences regarding the admissibility of surveillance from a legal point of view (Langford, 1999).

Where does this leave us? This very brief overview of the arguments for and against surveillance has shown that, while there may be good reasons for surveillance in some cases, it is a deeply and fundamentally problematic activity. It threatens the autonomy of the individual, it can have negative results for society, and it may even be damaging for businesses. Given this result, the findings of our research presented in the first part of the chapter take on a new meaning.

Some Explanations for the Lack of Awareness of the Issues Surrounding Surveillance

There is a variety of possible explanations for the apparent indifference or complacency about the use of electronic monitoring and surveillance in the workplace, which the studies described here have revealed. With respect to the survey of undergraduate students, it may be that youth and/or inexperience have affected attitudes. The study does yield some evidence that age and/or experience does moderate attitudes, in that there are variations of response between those students in the first or second year of their studies and those who have completed a 48-week industrial placement. Another possible explanation that may apply both to this study, which had an emphasis on CCTV as a surveillance technology, and to the third study, is that they were conducted in the UK, which has been described as the country having made more use of CCTV in public spaces than any other (Norris & Armstrong, 1999). Perhaps the population of that country has become accustomed to the ubiquitous nature of CCTV systems and perceives no problem with them or other monitoring and surveillance systems. The unthinking acceptance of CCTV as a good thing is encouraged by media coverage of its use in crime detection. For example, CCTV recordings from shops or banks that have been burgled are regularly shown on television, together with an appeal to the public to help identify the criminals involved; when this leads to an arrest, this result is widely publicised. Perhaps the most well known case, the murder of a toddler kidnapped by two older boys and caught on a shopping centre CCTV, gave a huge impetus to the expansion of CCTV systems in public places in the UK.

Another aspect of contemporary life is the collection of personal data on an unprecedented scale by virtue of being a citizen or consumer. The subjects of our studies, educated and economically active adults, are likely to use financial institutions, shops, and the Internet; they likely pay taxes and vote, and, consequently, have many pieces of data held about them in numerous computer systems. Indeed, for there not to be such records about oneself would make it quite difficult to function in society. Perhaps it is because our subjects are so accustomed to this aspect of modern life that they are not concerned when they encounter surveillance-enabling technologies in the workplace. They may, indeed, see their employer as having more right to gather information about them than a supermarket or a bank.

Within the workplace, there often tends to be an emphasis on the employer s, rather than the employees , rights. It is hard to disagree with the assertion that an employer is entitled to protect its premises and property from theft or damage by employees or others. Indeed, some surveillance systems are introduced to safeguard employees, either by dint of the nature of their job (e.g., bus drivers in a city centre by night) or the location of their premises where there may be security risks in the immediate vicinity as employees access their means of transport home. It may be that the subjects of the studies reported here have accepted these arguments for workplace monitoring and surveillance systems that they have encountered . Sewell and Barker (2001) argue that framing the problem of surveillance in terms of a tension between individual privacy rights and the state s (or in this case, the employer s) right to intrude on that privacy for the common good . . . is bound to err on the side of control whereby we commonly dismiss any misgivings with the popular aphorism, if you ve got nothing to hide, you ve got nothing to fear , thereby justifying almost any level of intrusion in the name of the Common Good (Sewell & Barker, 2001,p.187). Until, or unless, they are exposed to the misuse of workplace monitoring and surveillance systems in a way that affects them personally , perhaps the majority of employees will accept the populist arguments justifying their use.

It is possible that there are deeper underlying issues that explain this perception. One explanation that struck us as plausible is that of religion. Members of Christian societies (and presumably of other societies where a monotheistic religion is prevalent ) may get used to the idea of being watched constantly because of the assumption that God holds all information about everybody. Disregarding whether or not this is a theologically sound view of Christian religion, it seems to us to be one that most children growing up in a Christian setting would agree with. This type of expectation of being watched may make it easier to accept technological surveillance in the workplace. This is again possible irrespective of factual religious convictions because, as Weber (1996) has shown, perceptions and tendencies to act based on religion can survive long after the actual belief has died. It seems likely to us that such deep cultural convictions are also of importance for the acceptability of arguments such as the one presented in the last paragraph. The if you have nothing to hide, then surveillance cannot be a bad thing type of argument will certainly be strengthened in its power if it is part of the individual and collective background. Another interesting point is that most of our respondents, be they IS professionals, normal employees, or university students, accept as a starting point that surveillance, as long as it is not misused, is acceptable. The most important objections we found against surveillance concerned intentional misuse by the party doing the surveillance. An employer is seen to have a right to use surveillance for business purposes but not for reasons of personal curiosity . This raises the interesting issue of who gets to determine which uses of surveillance are legitimate and which ones are not. More interestingly, it implies that some uses of surveillance are accepted as legitimate and seem beyond question. This is, in fact, reflected by social realities where CCTV cameras in the UK, for example, are usually not challenged on grounds of principle. However, the arguments against surveillance recounted in the last section generally do not even consider whether surveillance is legitimate. If surveillance hurts the individual s development or trust in an organization, then this does not seem to depend on the legitimacy of its aims.

The reasons advanced here to explain our findings can only be speculative ; further research is required to determine what might be the factors at work in the lack of concern about electronic workplace monitoring and surveillance that we have detected .