| The victim of a vulnerability attack (see Chapter 2) usually crashes, deadlocks, or has some key resource tied up. Vulnerability attacks need only a few packets to be effective, and therefore can be launched from one or very few agents. In a flooding attack, the resource is tied up as long as the attack packets keep coming in, and is reclaimed when the attack is aborted. Flooding attacks thus need a constant flow of the attack packets into the victim network to be effective. Vulnerability attacks target protocol or implementation bugs in the victim's systems. They base their success on much the same premise as intrusion attempts and worms do, relying on the presence of protocol and implementation bugs in the victim's software that can be exploited for the attacker's purpose. While intruders and worm writers simply want to break into the machine, the aim of the vulnerability attack is to crash it or otherwise cripple it. Future security mechanisms for defending against intrusions and worms and better software writing standards are likely to help address DDoS vulnerability attacks. In the meantime, patching and updating server machines and filtering malformed packets offer a significant immunity to known vulnerability attacks. A resourceful attacker could still bypass these defenses by detecting new vulnerabilities in the latest software releases and crafting new types of packets to exploit them. This is a subtle attack that requires a lot of skill and effort on the part of the attacker, and is not very common. There are much easier ways to deny service. Flooding attacks target a specific resource and simply generate a lot of packets that consume it. Naturally, if the attack packets stood out in any way (e.g., they had a specific value in one of the header fields), defense mechanisms could easily filter them out. Since a flooding attack does not need any specific packets, attackers create a varied mixture of traffic that blends with the legitimate users' traffic. They also use IP spoofing to create a greater variety of packet sources and hide agent identities. The victim perceives the flooding attack as a sudden flood of requests for service from numerous (potentially legitimate) users, and attempts to serve all of them, ultimately exhausting its resources and dropping any surplus traffic it cannot handle. As there are many more attack packets than the legitimate ones, legitimate traffic stands a very low chance of obtaining a share of the resource, and a good portion of it gets dropped. But the legitimate traffic does not lose only because of the high attack volume. It is usually congestion-responsive traffic it perceives packet drops as a sign of congestion and reduces its sending rate. This decreases the chance of obtaining resources even further, resulting in more legitimate drops. The following characteristics of DDoS flooding attacks make these attacks very effective for the attacker's purpose and extremely challenging for the defense: Simplicity. There are many DDoS tools that can be easily downloaded or otherwise obtained and set into action. They make agent recruitment and activation automatic, and can be used by inexperienced users. These tools are exceedingly simple, and some of them have been around for years. Still, they generate effective attacks with little or no tweaking. Traffic variety. The similarity of the attack traffic to legitimate traffic makes separation and filtering extremely hard. Unlike other security threats that need specially crafted packets (e.g., intrusions, worms, viruses), flooding attacks need only a high traffic volume and can vary packet contents and header values at will. IP spoofing. IP spoofing makes the attack traffic appear as if it comes from numerous legitimate clients. This defeats many resource-sharing approaches that identify a client by his IP address. If IP spoofing were eliminated, agents could potentially be distinguished from the legitimate clients by their aggressive sending patterns, and their traffic could be filtered. In the presence of IP spoofing, the victim sees a lot of service initiation requests from numerous seemingly legitimate users. While the victim could easily tell those packets apart from ongoing communications with the legitimate users, it cannot discern new legitimate requests for service from the attack ones. Thus, the victim cannot serve any new users during the attack. If the attack is long, the damage to victim's business is obvious. High-volume traffic. The high volume of the attack traffic at the victim not only overwhelms the targeted resource, but makes traffic profiling hard. At such high packet rates, the defense mechanism can do only simple per-packet processing. The main challenge of DDoS defense is to discern the legitimate from the attack traffic, at high packet speeds. Numerous agent machines. The strength of a DDoS attack lies in the numerous agent machines distributed all over the Internet. With so many agents, the attacker can take on even the largest networks, and she can vary her attack by deploying subsets of agents at a time or sending very few packets from each agent machine. Varying attack strategies defeat many defense mechanisms that attempt to trace back the attack to its source. Even in the cases when the attacker does not vary the attacking machines, the mere number of agents involved makes traceback an unattractive solution. What if we knew the identities of 10,000 machines that are attacking our network? This would hardly get us any closer to stopping the attack. The situation would clearly be simplified if the attacker were not able to recruit so many agents. As mentioned above, the general increase of Internet hosts and, more recently, the high percentage of novice Internet users suggest that the pool of potential agents will only increase in the future. Furthermore, the distributed Internet management model makes it unlikely that any security mechanism will be widely deployed. Thus, even if we found ways to secure machines permanently and make them impervious to the attacker's intrusion attempts, it would take many years until these mechanisms would be sufficiently deployed to impact the DDoS threat.[1] [1] One could contemplate a self-spreading patching or updating mechanism, as done before by some independent party [Hex01] in response to the CodeRed worm threat [CER01a], but that is legally and ethically questionable and more challenging than it might at first appear.
Weak spots in the Internet topology. The current Internet hub-and-spoke topology has a handful of highly connected and very well provisioned spots that relay traffic for the rest of the Internet. These hubs are highly provisioned to handle heavy traffic in the first place, but if these few spots were taken down by an attacker or heavily congested, the Internet would grind to a halt. Amassing a large number of agent machines and generating heavy traffic passing through those hot spots would have a devastating effect on global connectivity. For further discussion of this threat, see [GOM03] or [AJB00, Bar02].
Let's face it: A flooding DDoS attack seems like a perfect crime in the Internet realm. Means (attack tools) and accomplices (agent machines) are abundant and easily obtainable. A sufficient attack volume is likely to bring the strongest victim to its knees and the right mixture of the attack traffic, along with IP spoofing, will defeat attack filtering attempts. Since numerous businesses rely heavily on online access, taking that away is sure to inflict considerable damage to the victim. Finally, IP spoofing, numerous agent machines and lack of automated tracing mechanisms across the networks guarantee little to no risk to perpetrators of being caught. The seriousness of the DDoS problem and the increased frequency, sophistication and strength of attacks have led to the advent of numerous defense mechanisms. Yet, although a great effort has been invested in research and development, the problem is hardly dented, let alone solved. Why is this so? |
