If all your clients see the value in spending the money in the proactive security manner rather than the reactive manner, this chapter could end here. The reality is much different. Even if your clients do have a managed and controlled network, they will probably not have a well-working, well-functioning machine at home unless they are taking the same sort of steps of ensuring that antivirus, patching, and antispyware are in place, and restricting uneducated end users from running as administrator. The reality is that, probably more often than not, you will get asked about an ill-running machine or one inundated with pop-ups. A workstation or standalone computer that is virus- and spyware-infected is typically an ill-running machine that just doesn't act as "peppy" as it once did. It could also be evidenced by the router showing a log of traffic patterns and activity. After you identify a machine, or a server for that matter, that has been infected and is possibly no longer your machine anymore, your first plan of attack should be to remove that computer from the location and isolate it to ensure that you limit the risk of exposure. Again, remember the illness analogy. If you have an extremely sick, infectious patient, you remove him and quarantine the patient during treatment. For a workstation, merely unplug the network connection from the back of the workstation. If you suspect the server, merely unplug the RJ45 network connection from the wall. The typical security consultant keeps a jump bag or toolkit of security tools to help him deal with desktop issues. Recently, a post to the incidents.org website listed one consultant's recommended jump bag. Consider building one of your own for those tools that you regularly use to clean or deploy workstations. Many, if not all, of the tools on this list are freely available on the Web, and the links for each can be found in Appendix A, "SBS Resources." Build your own CD-ROM or USB thumbdrive toolkit and always keep a copy of the latest .dat file signatures on that thumbdrive to ensure that you can easily scan an infected machine. Table 10.8 lists some possible items for your security toolkit.
To this list you could add the Administrator's NT password reset disk information located at http://home.eunet.no/~pnordahl/ntpasswd/ and WinPE or Bart's PE http://www.nu2.nu/pebuilder/. PEs are preinstallation or maintenance operating systems that allow the technician to boot from a safe operating system but still have tools to clean and disinfect the system safely. You can even have a bootable USB thumbdrive that can reset the local administrator's password, but don't forget, in a network, for devices still on the network, all you need to do is go to the user menu on the console and reset the password. If you have a severely impacted machine, the only way you may be able to clean and clear severe malware is one of three methods:
Even after these three methods have been used, you may have situations where you cannot trust the system anymore. Especially in an office situation, you have to ask yourself, can you trust this system?
In most cases, security intrusions occur when the system is not properly maintained. The typical way that rootkits and other extreme forms of malware enter a system is through a weakness. Weak passwords, not patching, misconfigurationall these are chinks in your armor that could allow something to occur. If you suspect that a real intrusion has occurred, and you are not in an industry that requires regulatory investigation, your best method to determine whether something truly has occurred is to contact Microsoft Product Support Services (PSS) and request a security investigation. This investigation may use tools from PSS that perform an online analysis of your system. The goal of the analysis is to give you recommendations and guidance for preventing the issues in the future. Keep in mind that the recommended way to recover from an intrusion is to be formatted and reinstalled from known CD-ROM media, have all security patches installed, and then and only then be reattached to the network. More of this is discussed at http://www.cert.org/nav/recovering.html. |