COUNTERING SUSTAINED TERRORIST INFORMATION WARFARE TACTICS

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Terrorism is, among other things, a weapon used by the weak against the strong. The United States has moved into the 21^st century as a preeminent, global power in a period of tremendous flux within societies, among nations, and across states and regions. Terrorism will accompany changes at each of these levels, as it has in other periods of flux in the international environment. To the extent that the United States continues to be engaged as a global power, terrorism will have the potential to affect American interests directly and indirectly, from attacks on U.S. territory (including low-probability but high-consequence “superterrorism” with weapons of mass destruction) to attacks affecting the U.S.’s diplomatic and economic ties abroad, or the U.S.’s ability to maintain a forward military presence or project power in times of crisis. The United States will also have a unique, systemic interest in terrorism as a global problem (including acts of “domestic” terrorism confined within state borders that make up the bulk of terrorism worldwide) even where the United States is not directly or even indirectly targeted. In one way or another, terrorism can affect the U.S.’s freedom of action, not just with regard to national security strategy narrowly defined, but across a range of compelling issues, from drugs and money laundering to information and energy policy.

Many of the U.S.’s high-priority national objectives have been shaken by the recent experience of terrorism. The Oklahoma bombing, and World Trade Center and Pentagon 9-11 terrorist attacks, struck at the U.S.’s sense of security within its borders. Attacks against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia raise questions about the U.S.’s strategy for presence and stability in an area of critical importance for world energy supply. The U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen raise questions about the exposure that comes with active engagement in world affairs, and point to the risks of privately sponsored terrorism. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin and the increased campaign of suicide bombings in Israel, has put the Middle East peace process in serious jeopardy, threatening a critical and long-standing U.S. diplomatic objective. Elsewhere, terrorism has destabilized allies (in Egypt and Turkey), and has rendered counternarcotics relationships difficult (in Colombia and Mexico). Where societies and regions are fundamentally unstable, and where political outcomes are delicately poised, terrorism will have a particular ability to affect strategic futures.

Overall Observations

Most contemporary analysis of terrorism focus on terrorist political violence as a stand-alone phenomenon, without reference to its geopolitical and strategic context. Similarly, counterterrorism policy is rarely discussed in terms of its place in broader national security planning. Prior to the specter of “superterrorism,” using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, however horrible, never posed an existential threat to U.S. security. With the important exception of WMD, terrorism still does not pose a grave threat to America’s future as it does to many other societies around the world. But many types of terrorism do pose a threat to U.S. interests, from homeland defense to regional security and the stability of the international system. As a global power, the U.S. perspective on terrorism is bound to differ in substantial ways from that of others, including allies such as Britain, France, and Israel, whose experiences provide lessons, but not necessarily direction for U.S. counterterrorism policy. In light of the preceding IW arsenal and tactics analysis of the military, certain overall sustained terrorist information-warfare tactics observations stand out:

• Terrorism

• Geopolitics of terrorism

• Counterterrorism versus new terrorism

• U.S. Exposure

• Comprehensive counterterrorism strategy

Terrorism

Terrorism is becoming a more diverse and lethal problem. Contemporary terrorism occupies an expanded place on the conflict spectrum, from connections to drug trafficking and crime to its use as an “asymmetric strategy” by state and non-state adversaries in a war paradigm. For a variety of reasons, primarily the rise of religious cults with transcendent agendas, but also the hardening of established political groups, terrorism has become more lethal. With the potential for catastrophic terrorism using weapons of mass destruction, lethality could increase dramatically.

Geopolitics of Terrorism

The geopolitics of terrorism are changing. Over the next decades, the prevailing image of terrorism affecting U.S. interests as a problem emanating largely from the Middle East is likely to be overtaken by a more diverse set of risks. The Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America are set to emerge as significant sources of terrorism aimed at or affecting U.S. civilian and military activities. Moreover, the vast bulk of global terrorism will continue to be confined within the borders of affected states. More anarchic futures in the Third World could fuel this type of terrorism, threatening America’s systemic interests as a global power and placing constraints on the U.S.’s international engagement.

Counterterrorism versus New Terrorism

Much counterterrorism experience is losing its relevance in light of the “new” terrorism. Many established images of counterterrorism policy, especially the use of force against state sponsors, are losing their relevance as traditional forms of terrorist behavior and organization (largely a product of the ideological and national liberation movements of the 1960s–1980s) give way to new patterns. The new terrorism often lacks a detailed political agenda against which the use of violence can be calibrated. It is, therefore, more lethal. It is less hierarchical in organization, more highly networked, more diffuse in membership and sponsorship, and may aim at disruption as well as destruction. The absence of clear-cut sponsorship, above all, will complicate the task of deterrence and response. It will also compel a reorientation of policy to target nonstate sponsors and individual suspects.

U.S. Exposure

Foreign experts see U.S. exposure increasing, but view the problem in narrower terms. A survey of expert British, French, and Israeli perspectives yields a gloomy outlook with regard to U.S. exposure to terrorist risks, which are widely seen as deepening, particularly with regard to U.S. forces in the Gulf. Policy makers and observers in these allied countries are not surprisingly focused on specific national risks, few of which are analogous to risks facing the United States at home and abroad. With the limited exception of France, which shares a global and expeditionary outlook in strategic terms, terrorist challenges are generally viewed in narrower, but starker, terms. Notably, experts in all three countries share a degree of skepticism about technology as a “solution” in counterterrorism.

Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategy

A comprehensive counterterrorism strategy should have core, environment shaping, and hedging components. Treating terrorism as one of many national security challenges suggests a multidimensional approach. Core, longer-term strategy must address the political, economic, and social roots of international terrorism; make deterrence relevant to nonstate actors as well as state sponsors; and reduce the risk of truly catastrophic terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. The environment-shaping aspect aims to create conditions for successfully managing terrorist risks, making terrorism more transparent, shrinking “zones of chaos,” harnessing key alliances to the counterterrorism effort, reducing U.S. exposure, and cutting off terrorism’s resources. Finally, the United States can hedge against inevitable terrorism by hardening policies as well as targets, and preparing to mitigate the effects of increasingly lethal terrorist acts.

Implications for Military Strategy and the U.S. Air Force

In many instances, air and space power will not be the best instruments in the U.S. counterterrorism arsenal, and air power will rarely be used independently against terrorism. However, air and space power can play a role in intelligence and covert action. There will also be instances, as in the past, where air and space power will be instruments of choice in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, terrorism and counterterrorism policy are changing in ways that will significantly affect the future contribution of air- and space-based instruments.

Events in Sigonella and Afghanistan as well as Operation El Dorado Canyon may be key models for the future. Air power in the service of counterterrorism will include, but will also go beyond, the surveillance and punishment of state sponsors. Deterrence and response will likely evolve in the direction of a more “personalized” approach, emphasizing the monitoring and attack of key nodes in terrorist networks and the forcible apprehension of terrorist suspects—with or without the cooperation of local states. Future demands on air power may be driven as much by requirements for intercepting and extracting suspects as by the need to attack terrorist training camps and strike regimes supporting the export of terrorism.

Air and space power will help make terrorism (an inherently amorphous phenomenon) more transparent. The ability to identify and to target terrorist-related activity and to help expose terrorism and its sponsors for policy makers and international opinion will be key contributions of air- and space-based assets. As terrorism becomes more diffuse and its sponsorship increasingly hazy, finding the “smoking gun” will become more difficult, but essential to determine strategies and build a consensus for action. Space-based sensors, surveillance by UAVs, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) will facilitate the application of air power and other instruments in the service of counterterrorism.

Gaining leverage in addressing the new terrorism will be a key strategic and technical challenge. Future requirements for counterterrorism will be part of a broader need to tailor air and space power to challenges posed by nonstate actors, including networks of individuals. At the same time, policy instruments, including air and space power, will need to concentrate on detecting and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists—whether as a stand-alone apocalyptic act or as a low-tech delivery system in the hands of adversaries.

Much terrorism (and counterterrorism action) will focus on urban areas, with strong political and operational constraints. Terrorism is increasingly an urban phenomenon, worldwide. One explanation for this is that the political fate of most modern societies is determined by what happens in cities. Terrorists seeking to influence political conditions have many incentives to attack urban targets. Terrorists with transcendental objectives will, similarly, find symbolic and vulnerable targets in urban settings. The use of air power in a counterterrorist mode faces the more general problem of operating in an urban environment (the difficult Israeli experience in Beirut and South Lebanon is instructive). Terrorists and their facilities will be difficult to locate and target. Operations against them or to rescue hostages will pose severe challenges for the use of air power, not least the risk of placing uninvolved civilians in harm’s way. The viability of air power as an instrument in such settings may depend on the capacity for discriminate targeting and the use of less-than-lethal technologies.

Air power’s pervasiveness and speed are advantages in the face of transnational and transregional terrorism. In an era in which terrorist acts may take place across the globe and where sponsors cross national and regional lines, counterterrorism strategies will become “horizontal” in character. Where terrorists and their sponsors can be identified and attacked with purpose, the global sight and reach of air- and space-based assets will be valuable to national decision makers.

Air and space power will have a synergistic effect with other counterterrorism instruments. Air and space power can be used in concert with covert action, diplomacy, economic instruments, and joint military operations. The notion of “parallel warfare,” developed in relation to attacks on infrastructure in war, will also be relevant to counterterrorism operations. Operations using a range of instruments can be designed to act, in parallel, on terrorist supporters, terrorist infrastructure and networks, and the terrorists themselves.

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