OFFENSIVE CONTAINMENT INFORMATION WARFARE TOOLS AND TACTICS

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Of all the activities that have emerged with the evolution of IW and information operations, Command and Control Warfare (C2W) has attracted the most attention. The U.S.’s approach to C2W is comprehensive. This country has committed substantial resources to the development of technologies, doctrine, strategies, and organizations that will equip it to meet an information threat in any future conventional war. Countries like Australia, however, like most non-superpower nations of the world, will not be able to commit the substantial resources needed to follow the American model. Therefore, the general approach discussed in this chapter is tempered by the economic realities that will dictate the degree to which mid-level powers can invest in their own strategies.

Note 

Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is the approach to military operations that employs all measures (including but not limited to Electronic Warfare (EW), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS), operations security, and targeting), in a deliberate and integrated manner, mutually supported by intelligence and ITS, to disrupt or inhibit an adversary’s ability to command and control his or her forces while protecting and enhancing our own.

C2W is the war-fighting or tactical application of MIWT and is usually aimed at a specific and defined battlespace, although it may be conducted in conjunction with other MIWT that may be focused on strategic information targets. There are five individual elements of C2W, covering both offensive and defensive applications.

• Operations security

• Military deception

• Psychological operations

• Electronic warfare

• Targeting

Operations Security

Operations Security (OPSEC) is a term that appears in many military documents in almost as many contexts, with several apparently different meanings. OPSEC is a process used for denying adversaries information about friendly disposition, intentions, capabilities, or limitations. It requires the employment of specialist equipment, including software, the adoption of suitable procedures, and most important, the development of a pro-security organizational culture. OPSEC is equally important as a defensive posture as it is in developing offensive strategies. By denying a potential enemy an understanding of the capabilities of friendly systems, possible hostile C2W will be more likely to miscalculate the friendly information capabilities and be ineffective.

Military Deception

Military deception is used to inject ambiguity and create false assessments in the decision-making process of the enemy. The objectives of employing military deception are to create a false deduction of friendly intentions, capabilities, and/or dispositions by the enemy. The target of deception is the enemy decision maker, that is, the individual who has the necessary authority to make a decision. There is no point influencing a decision if, in the event of ambiguity, the decision maker passes the decision to a higher authority. In this case, the higher authority must also be the target of deception.

Psychological Operations

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are operations that are planned activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The objective of PSYOPS is to cause enemy, friendly, and neutral personnel to act favorably toward friendly organizations. PSYOPS have been used throughout history to influence adversary leaders and groups. The expansion and development of information technology (IT), and associated global media coverage, has enhanced modern PSYOPS opportunities.

Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare (EW) is the military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum. This action retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Targeting

Targeting is not just a process, nor is it just focused on destructive ends. Targeting is a capability that emphasizes the requirement to collect, process, and interpret information regarding decisive points in an enemy’s command and control system; and, then selects the most effective option of incapacitating them. There are many hard- and soft-kill options available to a commander. Soft-kill options include the use of EW, strategic computer operations and information weapons, whereas hard-kill options refer to the various means of physically destroying targets.

Hard or soft destruction requires the capability to remove selected targets from an enemy’s order of battle. These targets include vital communication nodes, national infrastructure, vital personnel, and specific military equipment. Any arm of the military may achieve destruction. Physical destruction has the highest risk associated with its application, and, unlike the other elements of C2W, physical destruction tends to be permanent, that is, buildings are destroyed and people are killed. This can be either a desirable or undesirable outcome, and so must be considered when strategies are being developed. The diplomatic recovery time for physical destruction is usually considerably longer than that of the other elements. Accordingly, even though it is often the most effective method of demonstrating resolve, physical destruction is generally used as a last resort. However, a commander must have the option of employing hard- and soft-kill options to accomplish a desired C2W effect.

The Objective of C2W

Until the 1991 Gulf War, the C2W elements had rarely been used in conjunction with each other to specifically target an enemy’s ability to command and control its forces. In the Gulf War post-mortem, the advantages of combining the five elements in pursuit of a single objective were realized and true C2W was born.

The ultimate objective of C2W is to decapitate the enemy’s command structure from its body of combat forces while ensuring the integrity of friendly command and control systems. C2W aims to reduce the uncertainty of combat by creating a battlespace that becomes more predictable for friendly forces as the C2W effort increases, while becoming exponentially less predictable for the enemy. C2W activities seek to lift the fog of war for friendly forces while thickening the fog for the enemy. C2W strategies focus the five elements specifically on the decision cycles of both friendly and enemy forces. Therefore, the aim of C2W is to gain, maintain, or widen a gap in the effectiveness of C2 in favor of friendly forces throughout a campaign and particularly at decisive points in a battle.

C2W and the OODA Loop

The often-quoted Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop has been adopted as the focal point of C2W. The concept of the OODA loop had its origins in the Korean War where an American pilot identified the advantages of having good visibility and sensitive controls on board the U.S. Sabre jet fighters. Although the Russian MiG 15s were faster, more powerful, more maneuverable, and could sustain greater bank angles, the American jets were consistently victorious in air to air engagements. The U.S. pilots simply had a shorter total period between observing an event, orientating themselves to the possible ramifications of the event, making a decision, and acting. The value of a relatively short decision cycle was realized. Since the inception of air to air combat, staying inside the enemy’s decision loop has been a consistent objective. This has been a recognized objective of many forms of warfare.

The OODA loop concept is now applied to most aspects of modern warfare, from land maneuvers to strategic missile developments. The OODA loop can also be seen to operate in the business world. Those who are quick to observe an opportunity, recognize the opportunity, and exploit the opportunity, are more frequently the successful or victorious business persons. The OODA loop theories can be found in the heart of modern C2 systems and, consequently, in modern C2W strategies. Successful C2W operations will, therefore, increase the enemy’s decision cycle (his or her OODA loop) to such a point that he or she will become increasingly vulnerable to attack.

C2W in the Gulf War

In the 1991 Gulf War, the Coalition forces attacked the Iraqi C2 system from the outset. Even before the war had commenced, EW, PSYOPS, and deception were employed for influencing the Iraqi people and hierarchy. During the first hours of the air attacks in Iraq, ITS and communication devices were targeted, and, in many cases physically destroyed, leaving the huge force that had occupied Kuwait completely cut off from the commanders in Baghdad. The Iraqi air defense system was virtually shut down by coalition activity within hours of the commencement of Operation Desert Storm. The extant Iraqi air defense system was amongst the most extensive in the world. Shutting such an extensive system down with apparent ease was a significant achievement and the result of a calculated offensive involving all of the C2W elements. This early success gave the coalition forces air supremacy. In turn, this supremacy significantly reduced the potential for coalition air fatalities and allowed the coalition air forces to strike Iraqi ground targets almost at will. The coalition forces effectively destroyed the ability of the Iraqi military commanders to observe, and the Iraqi OODA loop was significantly increased.

In conventional wars that may follow the Gulf War, defense of friendly C2 systems and attacks on enemy systems will be of paramount importance. The side with the smallest decision cycle will have a decided and, probably, decisive advantage. A confused army leads to another’s victory.

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