Ground Attack

The Egyptians had positioned their ground forces in three heavily fortified lines covered by massive interlocking firepower. This configuration, modeled after the Soviet doctrine of defense in depth, was formidable. But Israeli senior leaders , owing to their experiences in previous wars and to years of exhaustive intelligence gathering (the Israelis version of due diligence), had identified Egypt s Achilles heel, or critical vulnerability : a slow and cumbersome centralized decision-making process, far removed from the action on the ground and the information needed to control it.

Figure 2.2: Israeli Ground Attack, 1967

Under the Egyptian system of command and control, rigid, detailed orders were given from central locations, thereby leaving scant opportunity for frontline commanders to make decisions or react to changing situations. Egyptian frontline units were not free to open fire or make decisions without approval from higher command, and frontline soldiers were removed from officers with decision-making authority by many layers . These shortcomings, coupled with an understanding of the paralyzing fear associated with isolation in desert warfare , led the Israelis to believe that they could cause their enemy s collapse by rapidly bypassing frontline units, penetrating deep into rear areas, and systematically dividing forces ”all before the Egyptians could organize an effective counterattack.

General Tal moved first and, though assigned the least ground to cover, had perhaps the most daunting task: ahead of him lay four Egyptian divisions, each heavily armed and densely compressed along the northernmost route between the Israeli border and the Suez Canal. Rather than match his strength against that of his much larger opponent , Tal opted to selectively attack key points in the Egyptian defenses with overwhelming force. In several instances he ordered the three brigades under his command to focus all of their tanks into fists of armor , ^[6] which were sufficiently powerful to punch through the Egyptians lines and then fan out to attack several key objectives.

Tal s tactics were so effective that, by the end of Day One, his forces had moved beyond Khan Yunis and penetrated all the way to the town of Al Arish, well ahead of where he planned to attack on Day Two. When his forces reached Al Arish, Egyptian frontline units, isolated from their supporting units and cut off from communications with their higher commands, were flailing in disorder and beginning to flee their positions .

Meanwhile, to the south, Sharon s objective was to crack through the first defensive line, anchored at Umm Qatef, and then join Yoffe to assault the second line at Jabal Libni. To increase his chances of success, Sharon dispatched armor units to the south in a diversionary move intended to deceive his opponent into believing that the attack was coming from that direction and distract the Egyptian forces at Al Qusayma and Kuntilla.

Colonel Avraham Mendler was responsible for conducting the deceptive effort to the south at Kuntilla but received no explicit orders to attack enemy troops. Nevertheless, as he saw events unfold before him, he realized that Egyptian forces were being sent north to reinforce Umm Qatef. Rather than wait for specific guidance from Sharon, Mendler made a decentralized decision to attack and routed the Egyptian forces at Kuntilla. This apparently minor tactical victory would later be recognized as a significant contribution to Sharon s overall efforts at Umm Qatef.

Through a heavy dust storm and constant enemy shelling, Sharon s forces, breaking through the perimeter defense, converged on the confused Egyptians from all directions and prepared for an all-out assault. Not all of the Israeli troops would arrive in time for the battle, and dense minefields would slow other attacking units. But Sharon s units pressed through the night and, by dawn, had penetrated deep into the Egyptians labyrinthine defenses. Before daybreak the Israelis tanks breached the heavily mined route toward Umm Qatef and fought a vicious, close-range duel with the Egyptian tankers . By daybreak on Day Two, Sharon s forces secured Umm Qatef.

Twenty-four hours into the war, the Egyptian army was already crumbling, as a result of the confusion and chaos created by the fast-moving Israelis.

As Sharon s forces advanced, Yoffe penetrated deep into the western Sinai and cut off the vital road junctions. To accomplish his daunting mission, Yoffe decided to attempt a crossing of the Wadi Haridin, a treacherous sandy area previously deemed only fit for camels. ^[7] He boldly ordered one of his brigades to strip its tanks of all excess weight ”almost all food, water, and spare parts ”and make the passage through the Wadi Haridin.

On the morning of Day Two, Tal dispatched his brigades on multiple axes to secure the northern part of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. Sharon s forces proceeded toward Al Qusayma after squelching the remaining resistance at Umm Qatef. Meanwhile, Yoffe s forces had already sent the Egyptians reeling after a tank battle near Bir Lahfan. Massive confusion and chaos reigned within the Egyptian command, and most of the frontline units had fled their initial positions. Communications effectively ceased to exist. By the middle of the second day, Supreme Headquarters apparently lost the will to continue fighting ”even though half of its fighting force remained fresh and intact ”and ordered a full retreat from the Sinai.

Tal, Sharon, and Yoffe had advanced so far ahead of their initial battle plans that they had no specific guidance for continuing the war. But they did not allow a lack of guidance to slow the momentum of their offensive. Throughout the war these three generals repeatedly analyzed the rapidly evolving situations they faced, made sound and timely decisions, and seamlessly transitioned to the exploitation of subsequent battlefield opportunities ”all in real time. The Egyptians could not match this blistering decision-making tempo . Their responses came increasingly late, and they were eventually overcome by events; that is, their responses were no longer appropriate to the situation on the ground by the time their orders were issued.

The next day, Gavish issued new orders to his commanders. Tal was to move westward toward the Suez Canal to remove any remaining pockets of resistance. Sharon was dispatched south with the goal of circling the Egyptians and driving them to the north. Yoffe was to split his forces and head for the Mitla and Giddi Passes to cut off the fleeing Egyptians and set up an ambush into which Sharon and Tal could push the Egyptians.

Yoffe started his next advance early on Day Three. Surprised by the speed with which the Egyptians were fleeing, he immediately directed his brigades to race ahead to the Mitla and Giddi Passes to engage the Egyptians. Upon arrival, he ordered his troops to position any bombed-out vehicles near the pass and form a man-made channel through which the remainder of the Egyptian force ”thirty thousand men and three hundred tanks ”would be funneled.

Once in place at Mitla, the Israelis employed a combined arms attack ”the integration of the man-made channel, artillery , armor, direct machine gun fire, and aircraft bombing runs ”to place the Egyptians in an inescapable damned if you do, damned if you don t situation. As the Egyptians proceeded through the pass and the man-made channel, their movement was restricted. The Israelis used armor and artillery to stall the Egyptians forward movement and then destroyed their opponents in place with devastating direct fire and air strikes.

By the end of Day Three, Israel had essentially captured the entire Sinai Peninsula; all that remained was pursuing the retreating Egyptians and securing some of the recently vacated outposts at the far outreaches of the desert. On June 8, little more than four days after the war began , the shattered Egyptian forces agreed to a cease -fire, thereby allowing Israel to recommit forces to the northern fronts and secure quick victories over Syria and Jordan.

^[6] Ibid, 178

^[7] Higgins, Peter E., "Historical Applications of Maneuver Warfare in the 20th Century," Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1990.