| Encyclopedia of the Persian Gulf War

Page 135

IL-76 Illyushin (Candid)–Italy

IL-76 Ilyushin (Candid)

This huge Soviet transport plane (NATO code name: Candid) was used to a limited degree by the Iraqis for intelligence capabilities during the Persian Gulf War, but its precise application, as well as the exact numbers of the craft employed during the conflict, cannot be determined. Military aviation expert John W. R. Taylor states, “Before Desert Storm, Iraqi Airways operated a fleet of around 30 IL-76Ts and IL-76Ms, mainly for military duties, of which 15 were flown to sanctuary in Iran. This total may include two of the three AEW&C [airborne early warning and control system] conversions produced in Iraq under the name Adnan 1; the third was put out of commission during an attack on the Al Taqaddum Airfield.” In Military Aircraft of the World, coauthored with Gordon Swanborough, Taylor writes, “The first export deliveries of IL-76s—a counterpart to the C-141A Starlifter—were reported in mid-1978, when a small batch went to Iraq.”

The standard Soviet (and now Russian) version of the IL-76 is powered by four Soloviev D-30KP turbofan engines, each delivering 26,455 pounds (12,000 kg) of thrust. The plane has a wingspan of 165 feet 8 inches (50.50 m), a gross weight of 374,785 pounds (170,000 kg), and a pay-load capacity of 88,185 pounds (40,000 kg). Maximum speed is 528 mph (850 km/h), and maximum unrefueled range is 4,163 miles (6,700 km).

References:

Taylor, John W. R., ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1986–87 (London: Jane’s Publications, 1986), 234–236;

Taylor, John W. R., and Kenneth Munson, “Gallery of Middle East Airpower,” Air Force 77:10 (October 1994), 70;

Taylor, John W. R., and Gordon Swanborough, Military Aircraft of the World (New York: Scribner’s, 1979), 63.

Intelligence Operations

In August 1993 the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee surveyed and reported on successes and failures during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The subcommittee concluded that: (a) Intelligence collection was generally very good and deserving of praise, but major problems were found; (b) Intelligence distribution within the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO) was very poor from the standpoint of many Air Force units; (c) Intelligence analysis was mixed; the counting of Iraqi dead and destroyed tanks, for instance, had no generally accepted doctrine or methodology.

References:

“Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm,” Report of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 1993.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (35 U.S.C. 1701)

This legislation, enacted by Congress on 28 December 1977, was used by President George Bush to impose wide-reaching economic sanctions against Iraq at the onset of the Persian Gulf crisis. Under its authority, the president of the United States is granted sweeping powers in the event of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to make a “declaration of [a] national emergency.” The legislation reads: “(a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”