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Infectious Greed: Restoring Confidence in Americas Companies

ISBN: 0131406442
EAN: 2147483647

Year: 2003
Pages: 118

Authors: John R. Nofsinger, Kenneth A. Kim

BUY ON AMAZON

• Main Page
• Table of content
• Copyright
• Praise for Infectious Greed
• FINANCIAL TIMES Prentice Hall
• Financial Times Prentice Hall Books
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1. The Importance of Investor Confidence
• Asleep at the Wheel
• Investor Attitude
• Investor Confidence and the Stock Market
• Long-Term Economic Effects
• Our Approach
• Endnotes
• Chapter 2. The Structure of Corporations
• Business Forms
• People in Business
• Separation of Ownership and Control
• Can Investors Influence Managers?
• Are Investors Helpless?
• A System of Problems
• International Monitoring
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Part 1: The Failure of Executives
• Chapter 3. Executive Compensation and Incentives
• Types of Executive Compensation
• CEO Pay Around the World
• Hidden Compensation
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 4. Executive Behavior
• Options and Fraud
• Timing of Sales
• Company LoansA Potential Abuse
• Grand Theft
• Why Do Some Executives Misbehave?
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Part 2: The Failure of Monitoring Systems
• Chapter 5. Accountants and Auditors
• Accounting Functions
• Auditing
• The Changing Role of Accounting
• From Management to Fraud
• Fraud, Plain and Simple
• Consultants
• When the Auditor is also a Consultant
• Fear of All Sums
• An International Perspective
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 6. The Board of Directors
• Current Board Regulations
• More Attention on Directors
• Who Are Directors?
• The Board s Functions
• Problems with Boards
• Is Enron s Board Partially to Blame?
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 7. Investment Banks
• Some Historical Perspective
• Investment Banking Activities
• IPO Problems
• IPOs and Fraud
• Structured Deals
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 8. Analysts
• The Traditional Role of the Analyst
• Can Analysts Predict?
• Analyst Compensation
• Potential Conflicts of Interest
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 9. More Failed Monitors: Credit Rating Agencies and Lawyers
• Credit Rating Agencies
• Attorneys
• Endnotes
• Part 3: Shortcomings in Enforcement and Investor Activism
• Chapter 10. The Securities and Exchange Commission
• The Securities Acts
• Organizational Structure of the SEC
• Assessment of the Acts and the SEC
• SEC Problem Areas
• Arthur Levitt s I Told You So
• The Man in the Middle: Harvey Pitt
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 11. Investor Activism
• What Is Shareholder Activism?
• Does Institutional Shareholder Activism Pay Off?
• Potential Roadblocks to Effective Shareholder Activism
• The Future Role of Shareholder Activists
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Part 4: Restoring Confidence
• Chapter 12. New Rules, Regulations, and Policies
• A Review of the Corporate Problems
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
• Other Proposals for Change
• More Change
• Endnotes
• Chapter 13. Create Good Incentives for Long-Term Solutions
• The Power of Incentives
• Our Recommendations
• Summary
• Endnotes
• Chapter 14. Regaining Investor Confidence
• Protecting Investors (Not)
• Investor Confidence
• Failing to Regain Confidence
• Regaining the Confidence
• Summary
• Endnotes