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¢   Table of Contents
Infectious Greed
By John  Nofsinger, Kenneth  Kim
   
Publisher : Financial Times Prentice Hall
Pub Date : January 23, 2003
ISBN : 0-13-140644-2
Pages : 320


In Infectious Greed , two leading financial experts offer a powerful new explanation of why the corporate scandals happened ”and propose market-driven reforms that don't just "patch" the system but fix it for generations to come. Discover how the system came to provide massive incentives for malfeasance by CEOs, boards , auditors , analysts, and investment houses ”and learn how those "bad" incentives can be replaced by even more powerful incentives for integrity.


   
¢   Table of Contents
Infectious Greed
By John  Nofsinger, Kenneth  Kim
   
Publisher : Financial Times Prentice Hall
Pub Date : January 23, 2003
ISBN : 0-13-140644-2
Pages : 320


      Copyright
      Praise for Infectious Greed
      FINANCIAL TIMES Prentice Hall
      Financial Times Prentice Hall Books
      Preface
      Acknowledgments
      Chapter  1.   The Importance of Investor Confidence
        Asleep at the Wheel
        Investor Attitude
        Investor Confidence and the Stock Market
        Long-Term Economic Effects
        Our Approach
        Endnotes
     
      Chapter  2.   The Structure of Corporations
        Business Forms
        People in Business
        Separation of Ownership and Control
        Can Investors Influence Managers?
        Are Investors Helpless?
        A System of Problems
        International Monitoring
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
      Part  1.   The Failure of Executives
        Chapter  3.   Executive Compensation and Incentives
        Types of Executive Compensation
        CEO Pay Around the World
        Hidden Compensation
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  4.   Executive Behavior
        Options and Fraud
        Timing of Sales
        Company Loans ”A Potential Abuse
        Grand Theft
        Why Do Some Executives Misbehave?
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
     
      Part  2.   The Failure of Monitoring Systems
        Chapter  5.   Accountants and Auditors
        Accounting Functions
        Auditing
        The Changing Role of Accounting
        From Management to Fraud
        Fraud, Plain and Simple
        Consultants
        When the Auditor is also a Consultant
        Fear of All Sums
        An International Perspective
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  6.   The Board of Directors
        Current Board Regulations
        More Attention on Directors
        Who Are Directors?
        The Board's Functions
        Problems with Boards
        Is Enron's Board Partially to Blame?
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  7.   Investment Banks
        Some Historical Perspective
        Investment Banking Activities
        IPO Problems
        IPOs and Fraud
        Structured Deals
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  8.   Analysts
        The Traditional Role of the Analyst
        Can Analysts Predict?
        Analyst Compensation
        Potential Conflicts of Interest
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  9.   More Failed Monitors: Credit Rating Agencies and Lawyers
        Credit Rating Agencies
        Attorneys
        Endnotes
     
     
      Part 3:   Shortcomings in Enforcement and Investor Activism
        Chapter  10.   The Securities and Exchange Commission
        The Securities Acts
        Organizational Structure of the SEC
        Assessment of the Acts and the SEC
        SEC Problem Areas
        Arthur Levitt's I Told You So
        The Man in the Middle: Harvey Pitt
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  11.   Investor Activism
        What Is Shareholder Activism?
        Does Institutional Shareholder Activism Pay Off?
        Potential Roadblocks to Effective Shareholder Activism
        The Future Role of Shareholder Activists
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
     
      Part  4.   Restoring Confidence
        Chapter  12.   New Rules, Regulations, and Policies
        A Review of the Corporate Problems
        Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
        Other Proposals for Change
        More Change
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  13.   Create Good Incentives for Long-Term Solutions
        The Power of Incentives
        Our Recommendations
        Summary
        Endnotes
     
        Chapter  14.   Regaining Investor Confidence
        Protecting Investors (Not)
        Investor Confidence
        Failing to Regain Confidence
        Regaining the Confidence
        Summary
        Endnotes