Introduction

I m not afraid of theory, I m afraid of meta-theory, and meta-meta-theory. (Frank Kermode, in Payne & Schad, 2003,p. 117)

The fears expressed by Frank Kermode s quote are aimed at literary criticism ” a field approached by all but the most casual visitor with expectations of omnipresent commentary , interpretation, and dogma. The statement also serves as an appropriate warning for those considering the subject of this paper. As with Sir Frank s endeavor, the subject of academic monitoring and surveillance ^[1] is saturated with theory or, more accurately, layers of theories . Indeed, I will suggest here that the task at hand is more accurately described as an investigation of interactions rather than the elaboration of a single topic. This is because the main thematic actors ” academics and monitoring ” present historically separate and robustly independent sets of issues, which neither fade into the background nor achieve cohesion with the other. Recent technologically-driven changes in our perceptions of organizations and individuals simultaneously blur and accentuate conceptual distinctions while also challenging much of the presumptions upon which they are based.

Normative questions concerning monitoring are not new. They have engaged legal and ethical thought for well over a century, but they have largely done so in the relatively discrete contexts of specific problem areas such as the reform of criminals (Bentham, 1843), the conduct of national defense (Lyon, 1994) and criminal investigation (Smith, 2000). Arguably, due to the cost and complexity of conventional implementation, surveillance has historically been circumscribed in its actual application. For similar reasons, particularly those related to the extraordinary nature of the practice, past decisions to monitor have been made in subordination to the prevailing doctrines of society, including legal warrant requirements, judicial review, and the accepted but often unwritten guidelines of business ethics. With the advent of digital technologies, monitoring has become simple to initiate, and, under various guises such as consumer protection, quality assurance, and safety, has been gradually inserted into the everyday experiences of Western society. As will be discussed further, the cultural rhetoric accompanying this radical but quiet transformation has largely trumped the traditional formal and informal adjudicative structures, which, in the past, would have subjected the changes to critical evaluation.

As with the formation of any social norm, determinations regarding surveillance do not take place in a vacuum . Consequently, cultural attributes specific to certain environments must also come into play. It is here that the long venerated, but perpetually contested, socio-legal-ethical construct of academic freedom exerts its influence. In the title of his latest book, David Lyon (2004) associates surveillance with social sorting. This characterization extends not only to the processing of collected data, but also to such issues of control as the designation of subjects and the degree of their scrutinization. Significantly, no matter which of the many definitions of academic freedom is chosen , the core dynamic will also be that of social sorting as expressed by categorizing activities based upon perceptions of authority, autonomy, and privilege. As with monitoring, conventional practices relating to academic freedom have emerged from hybrid legal and social arrangements made possible by the relatively unique and, therefore, extraordinary status of the academy within society. This stasis has been disrupted by many of the same transformative elements alluded to within the context of monitoring, and the traditional legal and social arbiters have likewise become incapacitated.

In what follows , the theoretical dynamics of academic freedom and surveillance will initially be considered separately. However, in the end, an accounting for a present, shared state of normative gridlock will need to be made. In order to accomplish this objective, it will be necessary throughout to uncover the processes of redefinition that Neil Postman regarded as largely unconscious and, in all cases, as dangerous.

^[1] Although Lyon (2003) notes that the term surveillance was once reserved for operations of highly specific scrutiny, it is now used to describe routine situations of data collection. Reflecting this change of nomenclature , this chapter will employ the terms surveillance and monitoring synonymously.