SUMMARY

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Information technology is being developed by strategic planners both as an offensive battlefield weapon, and as a weapon for “logistics attack,” as a means to disrupt the civilian infrastructure on which an enemy’s military apparatus depends. Technology has already been used effectively by American forces in the Gulf War and in the conflict in Haiti.

However, information warfare is a double-edged sword. Those countries most capable of waging it are also the ones most vulnerable to it. The increasing dependence on sophisticated information systems brings with it an increased vulnerability to hostile elements and terrorists. The following are conclusions drawn from the information warfare arsenal of the future

Conclusions Drawn from the Information Warfare Arsenal of the Future

• Even though the anticipated national security threats of the coming decades involve less-developed countries, the CVW threat and other methods of intrusion and disruption are not necessarily beyond their reach.

• Opportunities to deceive and confuse through an elaborate misinformation scheme along a myriad of information paths are available to anyone.

• The information warfare arsenal of the future provides a new avenue to employ deception techniques through the use of multiple paths that create the perception and validation of truth.

• There exists the prospect of an intelligence analyst manipulating an adversary’s command-and-control system so that reality is distorted

• Tomorrow’s soldier will depend more than ever on the very well-known and trusted factors of mobility.

• Imagine a scenario depicting a “left hook” in the Iraqi desert that fails because the systems in use were successfully attacked by CVW, or some other intrusion method, with the resulting disruption putting U.S. troops in a flailing posture—facing the unknown and losing confidence in their operation.

• One thing is sure. An Iraqi “left hook” will be difficult to repeat.

• One can assume that Iraq, and others, will exploit the GPS to their own advantage. The information warfare arsenal is coming of age!

• World War II set the stage, but only with today’s technology can we expect action in this sphere of warfare on a grand scale.

• The necessity to prevent irresponsible groups and individuals from getting access to nanotechnological manufacturing capability is a prime concern in the near future.

• The chapter has shown how this quest for containment has shaped many aspect of society, most notably via the institution of a global surveillance network.

An Agenda for Action in Preparing for the Information Warfare Arsenal of the Future

In the United States, where the threat is most immediately recognized, debate is currently going on to decide what part government can and should play in protecting civilian networks. On the one hand, the civilian networks are controlled by private interest groups, some of them internationally owned. Government regulation would seem to be interference or even repression. On the other hand, the vulnerability and ease of manipulation of some networks are weak links in modern society, and their exploitation by hostile elements threatens all elements of society, and not just the direct controllers of the networks. One solution is to require organizations with a dependence on sensitive information technology to fulfill certain security criteria before being issued a government license. Something like this has been done in Israel already, with the legislation of the “Computer Laws” of 1994.

The United States government needs to set an agenda for action that goes beyond the work already done in preparation for defending against the information warfare arsenal of the future. Action steps should include, but not be limited to the following 12 areas:

1. Identify substrate groups who have embraced the information revolution, as has the rest of society. Going a stage further and attacking the NII can certainly be an attractive option for substrate groups. However, as the PIRA case shows, to inflict even a portion of the disruption that the doomsday mongers suggest would require a tremendous investment in IPB, not to mention actually implementing the assault. More technology-savvy groups such as environmental protesters may, in fact, be the first to use offensive IW techniques but they will have limited aims and not pose a national security threat. It is likely to be some time yet before professional cyberterrorists become a significant IW threat.

2. Institute a review of national vulnerabilities to a IW arsenal of the future. This prospect leaves governments with a window of opportunity that needs to be seized. In the past, states have tended to react to changing terrorist threats rather than pre-empting them, and the substrate group usually retains the initiative. This may also be the case with cyberterrorism. As yet, though, there has not been national leadership of the sort provided by the White House and the Congress.

3. Proactively monitoring the threat, doing a holistic assessment of national vulnerabilities, and creating a rigorously enforced information assurance program can meet this new threat. Although it is obvious that the American NII is far more vulnerable to the IW arsenal of the future than the British NII, due to the far higher level of connectivity, there is little room for complacency. For once, the British government, in conjunction with its European partners, has the opportunity of staying ahead of an emerging threat from terrorist and other substrate groups. It will not be long before substrate groups graduate from exploiting the Internet for propaganda to using it offensively.

4. Conduct strategic IW campaigns. The introduction of non-nuclear electromagnetic bombs into the IW arsenal of a modern air force considerably broadens the options for conducting strategic campaigns. Clearly, such weapons are potent force multipliers in conducting a conventional war, particularly when applied to electronic combat, OCA, and strategic air attack operations.

5. Develop the use of IW weapons responsibly. The massed use of such IW weapons would provide a decisive advantage to any nation with the capability to effectively target and deliver them. The qualitative advantage in capability so gained would provide a significant advantage even against a much stronger opponent not in the possession of this capability.

6. Commit to strategic IW campaigns. Electromagnetic weapons however, open up less conventional alternatives for the conduct of a strategic campaign, which derive from their ability to inflict significant material damage without inflicting visible collateral damage and loss of life. Western governments have been traditionally reluctant to commit to strategic campaigns, as the expectation of a lengthy and costly battle, with mass media coverage of its highly visible results, will quickly produce domestic political pressure to cease the conflict.

7. Develop a strategy of graduated response. An alternative is a strategy of graduated response (SGR). In this strategy, an opponent who threatens escalation to a full-scale war is preemptively attacked with electromagnetic weapons, to gain command of the electromagnetic spectrum and command of the air. Selective attacks with electromagnetic weapons may then be applied against chosen strategic targets, to force concession. Should these fail to produce results, more targets may be disabled by electromagnetic attack. Escalation would be sustained and graduated, to produce steadily increasing pressure to concede the dispute. Air and sea blockades are complementary means via which pressure may be applied.

8. Develop advanced electromagnetic weapons. Because electromagnetic weapons can cause damage on a large scale very quickly, the rate at which damage can be inflicted can be very rapid, in which respect such a campaign will differ from the conventional, where the rate at which damage is inflicted is limited by the usable sortie rate of strategic air attack capable assets.

9. Implement a full-scale conventional strategic air attack campaign. Should blockade and the total disabling of vital economic assets fail to yield results, these may then be systematically reduced by conventional weapons, to further escalate the pressure. Finally, a full-scale conventional strategic air attack campaign would follow, to wholly destroy the hostile nation’s warfighting capability.

10. Use the strategy of graduated response. Other situations where electromagnetic bombs may find useful application is in dealing with governments that actively implement a policy of state-sponsored terrorism or infoterrorism, or alternately choose to conduct a sustained low-intensity land warfare campaign. Again, the strategy of graduated response, using electromagnetic bombs in the initial phases, would place the government under significant pressure to concede.

11. The central theme here is the need to regulate nanotechnology because of its immense abuse potential.

12. Advanced nanotechnology should not be used to build small self-replicating machines that can feed on organic matter—a bit like bacteria but much more versatile, and potentially more destructive than the H-bomb.

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