Chapter 4: The Theory of Responsibility and Information Systems

In the broadest possible sense, responsibility is but a set of practices that we use to describe and understand individual and social behaviour (French, 1992, p. IX). In order to understand how we can use the term as a description and what results from the description, one must be aware of possible definitions, implications, dimensions, conditions, etc. In this chapter we will therefore attempt to describe all these different features of the word. In a first step we will look at the overall definitions that can be found in the literature and the implied objectives of its use. This part will also contain a first reflection on how responsibility relates to ethics and morality. The next part of this chapter will analyse the conditions that are commonly named for the ascription of responsibility. This will then allow us to discuss the classical dimensions, namely subject, object, and instance. From there we will proceed to take a look at the other relevant determinants of responsibility such as type, temporal dimension, sort of imputation, and the limits of ascription. As a summary we will extract the implications that most sorts and definitions of responsibility share. In total this chapter will lay the theoretical groundwork needed for addressing the problems that responsibility in information systems pose, which will then be discussed in the following chapters.

DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITY

Even though a definition is usually thought to be a rather brief process with a clear and concise phrase as result, the definition of responsibility is more complex. The term responsibility has many different meanings, which makes it very hard to grasp. There are different ways to react to such confusion. On the one hand one can give up in the face of such an obstacle and decide to give one s own definition. The advantage would be the clarity that is derived from proceeding in this way. The downside is that much of the ordinary language meaning is lost. On the other hand one can therefore try to pay attention to the general use of the word and try to distil the relevant core . In this chapter we will attempt this latter method. It is useful to distinguish between the meanings and objectives of responsibility. Meanings and objectives often refer to one another. However, in some cases they can even become contradictory. The somewhat extensive discussion of these two aspects will find its justification later on in the book when it will become useful in explicating and solving some of the detailed problems such as the question: Who can be subject of responsibility?

Meanings of Responsibility

We have already seen that there is a multitude of possible meanings of the term responsibility. Another factor that complicates the definition of the word is its inflationary use. This follows from what was said so far. If responsibility is perceived as a moral notion that helps us cope with the problems of the modern world, then it is only natural that it is in high demand. The lack of clarity is thus a result of its positive potential and general recognition. Another problem is the overextension of the term. Some theoreticians of responsibility make claims that are so wide that they become meaningless. In order to overcome these problems, it is imperative that we define the term and narrow it down. The different ways in which it is used in everyday life should be helpful in this endeavour.

A first and clear hint to the content of responsibility comes from its etymology. Responsibility comes from the response, from answering. We can find this as the heart of responsibility in the work of many authors. ˜Having a responsibility is interwoven with the notion ˜Having a liability to answer , and having such a liability or obligation seems to imply (French, 1979, p. 210). The idea of a liability to answer is also reflected by Lewis (1972, p. 124f) or Collste (2000a, p. 125). This etymological root of the notion is reflected in other European languages as well. The French responsabilit also stands in a literal sense for being able to respond (Etchegoyen, 1993, p. 45; cf. Trigeaud, 1999, p. 94; Ricoeur, 1990a, p. 195). And the same is true for the German Verantwortung, which is based on Antwort, the answer (cf. Lenk & Maring, 1995, p. 247; Lenk, 1991a, p. 64; Schwartl nder, 1991, p. 19). Answering is in itself already an ethically charged idea because it presupposes language, someone to whom one must answer, some kind of relationship, respect, etc.

The second common meaning of responsibility is not as clearly ethical. It is the use of the term for describing a causal relationship. In this sense responsibility can again have a wide range of meanings. Depending on whether we say that a natural disaster, a rogue state, or a mass murder was responsible for human deaths, the term means something different. One thing all of these meanings have in common, however, is that somebody or something caused something. While causality does play a role in responsibility, the limitation to causality is definitely too narrow. Most authors who refer to it do so as just one aspect of responsibility (cf. Goodpaster & Matthews, 1982, p. 133; Weckert & Adeney, 1997, p. 89; Johnson, 2001, p. 174).

The use of responsibility as a means to establish a causal relationship is in fact part of a wider meaning of the term. It is part of the central idea of imputation or ascription (Ricoeur, 1994, p. 24f). This meaning can again be demonstrated to be one of the etymological roots of the notion. While the word responsibility is relatively new in ethical contexts, its central theoretical problem of ascription (Latin: imputatio ) has a long history (cf. Schmidt, 1992; Schwartl nder, 1991). The purpose of a responsibility ascription can be understood to be the production or a relationship between several entities. In this book these entities are called dimensions. The two most important dimensions are the subject and the object. The object is the entity that is being ascribed to the subject. To remain within our examples, if we say the mass murderer is responsible for the deaths, then the mass murderer is the subject whereas the deaths are the object. The process of ascription generates the relationship between the two. If we agree on the ascription, then we can say that it was not the disaster and not the state that caused the deaths, but the mass murder. One purpose of a theory of responsibility as it is being developed here is to develop and justify criteria for such an imputation (Bayertz, 1995b, p. 64f).

The fact that responsibility is first of all an ascription allows several immediate conclusions. Firstly, an ascription is clearly a social construct. While the same may be true for every other moral, ethical, or legal term, in the case of responsibility there can be no doubt that it depends directly on those who are involved in the social process of ascribing. The social construct of a responsibility ascription is used to establish a relationship that has no independent metaphysical reality as such, but is always and without doubt dependent on everybody involved. Secondly, the character of an ascription is that it depends on and is constituted by communication. In order to realise an imputation or ascription, there needs to be some sort of communication between the affected parties. This is another hint of the ethical relevance of responsibility. Where there is communication, several ethical conditions must be fulfilled which will be discussed later.

Another important aspect of the idea of ascription is that it is concerned with consequences. When responsibility is ascribed to someone or something, then this generally means that some sort of consequence is taken into consideration and is made public (cf. Gehlen, 1973, p. 151; Ricoeur, 1990a, p. 341; Zimmerli, 1991, p. 83). This is one of the more important properties to which we will return on several occasions. Whenever one speaks of responsibility, there must be some sort of consequence to speak about.

The meanings of responsibility discussed so far were rather formal and limited in their approach. Responsibility was understood as a propensity to answer, as causality, or as the social construct of ascription referred to specific individuals or situations. There is also a wider view of responsibility as a human constant, as a part of what it means to be human. Birnbacher (1995, p. 165) shows that responsibility as part of morality can be of existential importance in providing meaning and orientation. Being responsible for someone or something can ease uncertainty concerning one s behaviour and one s self. In this sense responsibility is a key term of modernity because it explains man s behaviour towards himself and others. It is a sign of the creative relationship among humans who understand themselves as competent to form themselves and their environment (Bender, 1994, p. 132). Some authors go so far as to describe responsibility as one of the differences between man and animal (Taylor, 1995, p. 27). As Neuberg (1997, p. 2) points out, the difference between a human society and a pack of wolves is that we can treat each other differently, we can recognise one another as moral persons. Responsibility is thus constitutive for humans because it is based on specific properties, abilities , and conditions. Among these conditions are some that we generally see as genuinely human such as free will, the ability to recognise others as fellow humans, etc. (B hret, 1987, p. 6). The human properties that allow responsibility are so close to the core of humanity that they are sometimes seen as part of human dignity. According to Lenk (Lenk & Maring, 1995, p. 249; Lenk, 1994b, p. 118), a human being can only be a moral person if he or she is able to accept responsibility. On the other hand human dignity demands that man as a free and acting being assume responsibility.

There is one last meaning of responsibility worth mentioning, because it often interferes with other interpretations and at the same time causes or expresses them. This is responsibility as a moral sentiment. The most extensive analysis of this view of responsibility has been done by Wallace who defines it as follows:

To hold someone morally responsible is to view the person as the potential target of a special kind of moral appraisal. People who are morally responsible are not seen merely as acting in ways that happen to be good or bad; they are not just causally responsible for certain welcome or unwelcome happenings, the way a clogged drain might be said to be responsible for the unfortunate overflowing of a basin. Rather, the actions of morally responsible people are thought to reflect specially on them as agents , opening them to a kind of moral appraisal that does more than record a causal connection between them and the consequences of their actions. (Wallace, 1996, p. 52)

This view of responsibility goes back to Strawson (1997), for whom moral responsibility can be understood in terms of certain social practices. Responsibility stands for a certain emotional reaction to what an actor does (cf. Fischer, 1999, p. 93).

This understanding of responsibility has the advantage of describing one important aspect that is often overlooked by other approaches. When we say: A is responsible for X, then this usually contains an emotional aspect. We feel that A s behaviour was adequate or not, that she should be punished or commended. Whatever the specific case, a certain measure of emotional attitude towards A is involved. Another advantage of this definition of responsibility is that it solves several fundamental problems, especially the question of freedom as a condition of responsibility. The weakness of the approach is that it is self-contained, that it has no external consequences. While this facilitates its strengths, it leads to a loss of the original intention of using the term. In order to clarify this, we will use the next section to discuss what the purpose of responsibility might be.

Objectives of Responsibility

The social construct of responsibility only comes into existence because the people involved in it think it is worthwhile. Responsibility ascriptions thus always have an objective. In order to be able to decide most of the detailed questions about responsibility in IS, it is important to know this objective.

Usually responsibility ascriptions lead to sanctions, whether in the form of punishments, rewards, blame, or praise (cf. French, 1992, p. 18; Lenk, 1998, p. 263). In most cases that are discussed in the literature, the negative aspects are emphasised and thus the attribution of punishment is often seen as the main reason we are interested in attributing moral responsibility (Velasquez, 1991, p. 122). The same is true for most other kinds of responsibility, most notably for legal responsibility (cf. Bayertz, 1995b, p. 22). The difference between the two are the criteria for evaluating the outcome and the sanctions following a blameworthy action. In law, the criteria for evaluation are formally decided and legally institutionalised, while in morality the criteria for evaluation are accordingtosomeestablishedinformalethosandthesanctionsare,notinstitutionalised, blame (Collste, 2000a, p. 126). While most scholars agree that the purpose of responsibility ascriptions is the attribution of sanctions, mostly punishment, it is far less clear what the purpose of that punishment is.

Maybe the oldest and most widely spread reason for punishment is retribution. It can be found in its purest form in the Old Testament, and an eye for an eye still counts as a valid argument in many parts of the world. Finding a justification for retribution is somewhat difficult. Fauconnet (1928, p. 142) offers an explanation for retribution that is based on the idea that punishment rectifies the wrong in the eyes of society. Punishment is thus not aimed at the offender, but at those who witness the offence. The idea of retribution can be interpreted as a metaphysical notion, that is to say that a bad has to be counterbalanced by a good, in this case represented by the punishment. Another explanation of retribution is the motive of revenge. The great critic of responsibility, Nietzsche, believes that wherever we are looking for responsibility, we are in fact looking for revenge (Nietzsche, 1987, p. 229).

However, retribution does not have to be based on revenge. As H ffe (1996, p. 235f) demonstrates , Kant s legal theory is also based on retribution, but it is aimed at the weaknesses of utilitarian thinking. Kant s justification of sanctions is based on his concept of justice. Justice for him is universal and results from pure practical reason. It is not to be tainted by considerations of utility.Punishmentisjustifiedbyjusticeandthatmeansthateverypunishableact must be punished according to its severity. Hart observes a change in emphasis in modern retributive theory from the alleged justice or intrinsic goodness of the return of suffering for moral evil done, to the value of the authoritative expression, in the form of punishment, of moral condemnation for the moral wickedness involved in the offence (Hart, 1968, p. 235). The latter argument can also be found in theological contexts and has been stated by Pope Pius XII (1987, p. 221).

While the idea of retribution is old and has many notable supporters, it seems to be losing some of its appeal , at least in some parts of the world, among them Western Europe. The main criticism of retaliation for the sake of retaliation is that it does nothing to change events. If we punish someone for something she did, then this will not change anything about what she did. Most authors therefore emphasise the role of deterrence as the prime motivation for punishment. Deterrence and retribution are of course connected because retribution, the public sense that justice has been done, itself constitutes a deterrent to potential malefactors (Staddon, 1999, p. 160). Retaliation serving as deterrence can thus help stabilise social morality and under this condition was even accepted if not practised by Gandhi (French, 1992, p. 27f).

Some authors prefer to leave aside the idea of retribution all together and concentrate instead on the question of how the ascription of responsibility and sanction can improve social life. This idea is not new either. Even Plato thought that looking back to the past deed (except as a symptom indicating what was likely to cure or prevent) was irrational. To measure punishment by reference to it was, he said, like ˜lashing a rock (Hart, 1968, p. 163). Punishment according to the prospective theories is supposed to facilitate human coexistence by enforcing law or morality (cf. Bayertz, 1995a, p. 22; Schlick, 1930, p. 33; Fauconnet, 1928, p. 152). In its clearest form this intention is often called the economy of threats (cf. Wallace, 1996, p. 54; Hart, 1968, p. 40). The idea is that the subject of responsibility knows the possible outcomes of the planned action and attaches a probability to them. He is then able to calculate an expected value for the utility of the outcome. If the expected value is negative, then the subject will refrain from acting and deterrence is successful. This idea is very strong in the utilitarian tradition starting from Bentham s writing about justice and punishment. ^[7]

The idea of the economy of threats has the advantage of being highly rational and thus acceptable for many philosophers . However, it also contains several weaknesses. One of the central difficulties is that it overestimates the abilities of real agents. In order to work as intended, the economy of threats has to take for granted that the agent knows which alternatives are open , knows their consequences and the resulting utility, can ascribe or estimate a probability for each of the alternatives, and knows how to do the maths behind it. We have already discussed the problems of probability and will later on come to the problem of knowledge of results. It should be plain to see that no single human being is able to fulfil the prerequisites for the economy of threats. If people cannot fulfil them, then it is questionable whether the idea makes sense at all. What remains is an external view that does not take the internal states of the agent into account and just looks at the results. From the point of view of methodology, this is admissible since the economy of threats explicitly aims at real social consequences and only stipulates the agent s internal states in order to gain credibility. The ethical validity of the economy of threats approach thus boils down to the empirical question whether it is successful. ^[8] This opens the door to critics of punishment for reasons of deterrence such as Menninger (1987, p. 233), who states that the strategy of fighting crime by threatening terms of imprisonment has failed completely. Proponents of punishment therefore need to use some other sort of argument. Consequently, Lord Denning, a proponent of capital punishment, told the Royal Commission on CapitalPunishment:

It is a mistake to consider the object of punishment as being deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else The ultimate justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime: and from this point of view there are some murders which, in the present state of public opinion, demand the most emphatic denunciation of all, namely the death penalty . (cited after Hart, 1968, p. 170)

A last objective of responsibility ascriptions, that in some cases is similar to sanctions but driven by different motivations, is restitution. For the responsible agent it is in some cases of no difference whether she pays a fine or settles the damages, but the intention is different. Restitution has more clearly the goal of facilitating social life by giving some kind of compensation to the victim. While restitution will in many cases not make the victim whole again, it can do so better than punishment. Some authors believe that restitution is the first objective of responsibility, and punishment only holds the second place (H ffe, 1995, p. 21).

We now know several objectives of the sanctions resulting from responsibility, several reasons why a person or group of persons would go to the trouble and attempt an ascription. These motivations are important if we want to understand the details and problems of responsibility ascriptions, and in many cases they can help solve those problems. On the other hand they pose a problem of their own because in some cases they are not compatible. Retribution, revenge, restitution, and social change can be conflicting goals. If for the sake of retribution it may appear necessary to impose the most serious punishment, at the same time the goal of improving collective quality of life may lead to much more lenient measures. The objectives of responsibility also determine the approach to specific cases. Let us take a brief look at the question whether we should punish the insane, that is to say people who to our knowledge have no control over their actions. From the viewpoint of retribution, this may make sense. On the other hand it is impossible to deter someone who cannot control his or her action. Thus it would seem that from the point of view of the economy of threats, we should not punish them (which is Bentham s argument). Hart (1968, p. 19) demonstrates that the social good may still be served by punishing them, because they may not be deterred but their example may deter others. We see that the objectives determine the ascription of responsibility. According to Becker (1976, p. 68):

Actual criminal proceedings in the United States appear to seek a mixture of deterrence, compensation, and vengeance. I have already indicated that these goals are somewhat contradictory and cannot generally be simultaneously achieved....

One way to shed some light on this confusion may be to return to the normative foundations of responsibility which we will do in the next section.

Responsibility, Ethics, and Morality

Earlier on, during the discussion of the French and German tradition of moral philosophy, we said that responsibility is a moral notion. Now, after having introduced the notion of responsibility in some more detail, we can take the next step and see how responsibility fits in with the different theories of moral philosophy.

There is some ambiguity as to whether responsibility is always and exclusively a moral notion or maybe even no moral notion at all. This ambiguity is caused by the different meanings and definitions of ethics, morality, and responsibility. Many authors would follow Lewis, however, when he answers the question of what responsibility means:

It means simply to be a moral agent, and this means to be an agent capable of acting rightly or wrongly in the sense in which such conduct is immediately morally good or morally bad, as the case may be. (Lewis, 1991, p. 23)

While Lewis continues by saying that we cannot say what rightness, moral worth, and their correlatives mean, Etchegoyen (1999, p. 43) goes the opposite way and states that responsibility is the contemporary expression of the true morality.

Both of these statements tell us that responsibility and morality are closely related , but they do not really help us with the ethical classification of responsibility. Obviously ethics, morality, and responsibility are not equal, or else it would not make any sense to discuss them separately. A first difference is that moral rules tend to be expressed negatively, whereas responsibility is characterised by positive instructions. Moral rules frequently tell us what to refrain from doing ( Thou shalt not ), while responsibilities are often things we have to do (cf. Birnbacher, 1995, p. 151).

Other than that, responsibility can be used to express all sorts of moral theories and ideas. In the most general sense, responsibility stands for a relationship between two parties in which one party does something that affects the well-being of the other party (Ladd, 1992, p. 291). There is one meaning of the term ethics, however, that is ruled out by the use of the term responsibility, namely purely descriptive ethics. Responsibility as an ascription has the explicit purpose of accusing someone, of looking for retribution, deterrence, or maybe for rewards. Either way it is not neutral and by its definition never can be neutral (cf. H ffe, 1995, p. 21).

The rest of this chapter will be used to show how responsibility is related to different ethical theories. Responsibility is not equal to any of the concepts discussed so far, but it has areas of interaction with all of them. As a first example we can take a look at virtue ethics. This is the ethical tradition with the longest history, with Plato and Aristotle being the first great representatives. Virtue ethics is one of the traditions still frequently discussed today because it contains some aspects that are generally plausible. The underlying idea is that humans should live virtuously. There are many reasons why one should live this way. Traditionally virtue is seen as the path to the good life. Responsibility fits in here because it can be interpreted as a virtue. If acting responsibly is defined as taking a course of action such that its aim is the prevention of harm to others, then responsibility becomes a disposition to a certain sort of action and thus a virtue (Ladd, 1992, p. 297). This definition of responsibility is not exactly the same as the one we have used so far, but it is certainly translatable into our terms.

But responsibility is not only a virtue; it can also be described in the terms of teleology and deontology. While at first sight there seems to be a contradiction between teleology and deontology, this does not apply to responsibility. The term responsibility seems to have replaced the formerly dominant term of duty as the central concept of moral philosophy or become a sort of duty itself (cf. Ropohl, 1987, p. 154; Schwartl nder, 1991, p. 17f; Bochenski, 1991, p. 24; Bayertz, 1995b, p. 33; van Luijk, 1990, p. 40; Kettner, 1995, p. 311).

Responsibility, understood in a broad way as a representation of morality, always has to do with duty and intention. If responsibility is viewed from its objective of improving human coexistence, then it can be interpreted as the duty to avoid harm (cf. Hager, 1990, p. 60). Responsibility and obligation are closely related. In general, we have an obligation or a duty to fulfil our responsibilities, and we are responsible for fulfilling our obligations (De George, 1999, p. 110). As De George is quick to point out, responsibility and obligation are not the same. According to Jonas (1991, p. 194), responsibility is a specific case of obligation that is characterised by an external relationship. Another link that responsibility holds to the deontological ethical tradition is its reliance on conditions that are classically associated with deontological ideas such as freedom and autonomy, which will be discussed later on.

On the other hand responsibility is also clearly related to teleology. There are several arguments that support this claim. The first one is that the object of responsibility must be human life and human dignity (Kissling, 1995, p. 424). If one supports this statement, then responsibility aims at the good life and is thus teleological. Another hint towards the teleological quality of responsibility comes from the importance of consequences. Consequentialism is one type of teleological ethics that is characterised by its reliance on consequences for the ethical evaluation of facts or actions. The ascription of responsibility is always grounded on consequences, be they in the past or future. Assuming responsibility means that the subject agrees to accept the consequences of his or her actions (Sinn & Zimmerli, 1986, p. 35). On the other hand, successfully solving problems, thus dealing with consequences, can be seen as the quality mark of responsibility (Kaufmann, 1992, p. 76). It is doubtful that Etchegoyen (1999, p. 52) is right when he says that consequences are the only and exclusive foundation of responsibility, but it is generally accepted that consequences play an important role.

Responsibility is also close to the French tradition of moral philosophy as it was introduced earlier. The duty to answer for the consequences that one has caused is always a duty towards someone else, thus to the other who plays such an eminent role in the French tradition. It is therefore no surprise that especially French authors emphasise this aspect. The answer, the heart of responsibility, first of all presupposes the existence of the other (Etchegoyen, 1999, p. 83; 1993, p. 210; Philippe, 1991, p. 235). This relationship between myself and the other is based on equality. The fact that I answer means that there is someone who is similar to me in that she has the same basic aptitudes and rights, that she is a moral person like myself . There are also other concepts of responsibility that put the stress not on equality but on the opposite, on the fact that there is responsibility even if the other does not recognise me. In the extreme it is the other s death and death in general that is the cause of all responsibility (cf. Levinas, 1983, 1984; Malka, 1984). While this is a very specific theory of responsibility that we will not be able to discuss here in more detail, the fundamental idea that responsibility is based on the other and that its moral quality arises in large part from this relationship can be found in other philosophic traditions as well. A bridge between the German and the French tradition in this respect is built by Ricoeur (1994, p. 24f), who sees the similarity of Jonas approach to the French thinkers. For Jonas, responsibility is the solicitude for another being that is recognised as obligation in the face of its vulnerability (Jonas, 1984, p. 391).

Most theories of responsibility converge on the fact that when we are responsible, have responsibility, act responsibly, the other plays an important role. What makes the ascription of consequences morally relevant is that they have an impact on others. The moral relevance of the other can again be justified by deontological ideas (Summer, 1998, p. 109) as well as by teleological or other moral theories. Responsibility can thus be defined as an ascription based on the fact that a moral being is affected (Neumaier, 1994, p. 170). This importance of the other means that the agent can never determine the scope and scale of his or her responsibilities since it is always determined by others. Others are affected and thus are the reason for responsibility ascriptions. At the same time they are involved in the process of ascription, in the imputation of sanctions and the realisation of the results.

This description of the moral roots of responsibility was supposed to show that the term does not belong unequivocally to any specific moral theory, but is compatible with most of them. It was thus also meant to demonstrate that the apparent contradiction between ethics of responsibility and ethics of disposition ( Verantwortungsethik, Gesinnungsethik ) that was famously put forward by Weber (1992) is not as divisive as it seems at first sight. Weber distinguished between the two approaches to ethics saying that one, the ethics of responsibility, considered the consequences, whereas the other aimed mainlyatintentionormentalstateswhenmakingethicaljudgments.Eventhough Weber himself pointed out that the two aspects are not mutually exclusive but in fact depend on one another, one can find this putative confrontation in many texts about responsibility. We hope to have made clear that it is neither relevant nor true and that responsibility combines the different aspects of duty, obligation, and consequentialism while also offering possibilities to accommodate other ethical theories and schools .

The multiple possibilities of explaining and justifying responsibility are one of the central strengths of the term, but at the same time are also one of its weaknesses. Responsibility always suffers from a certain ambiguity and is always open to different interpretations. It is also impossible to give a final foundation for it. Unlike some of the ethical traditions that try to anchor their theories in reason, love, peace , or whatever else, a theory of responsibility always has to accept that there is no final foundation. Responsibility is the expression of morality, and without morality there is no responsibility.

Therefore responsibility always contains an element of decision that cannot itself be explained in other terms (Berger, 1994, p. 137). The alternatives to that are describingresponsibilityassimplypartofhumannature(Neuberg,1997b,p.16) or to seek a foundation in metaphysics (Jonas, 1984; Levinas, 1984).

^[7] Foucault (1975) gives a good overview of the change in the perception of punishment from a medieval spectacle with the purpose of revenging the breach of the prince s sovereignty to the modern perception of punishment as socially useful, aimed at rehabilitating the perpetrator and deterring future crimes.

^[8] We do not want to go into a discussion whether this argument falls into the trap of the naturalistic fallacy, that is to say whether it draws normative conclusions from factual statements. We would not necessarily deny that this is so, but think that the validity of the argument is not affected by it.