German Invasion of France

Despite being outnumbered by almost one million soldiers and by a ratio of three to two in artillery pieces and tanks in the invasion of France in 1940, the German Army smashed through the weakest point in the Allied line and brought the primarily French army to its knees. The Germans achieved this overwhelming victory by focusing fifteen hundred aircraft and forty-five infantry and tank divisions against nine French divisions in the lightly defended Ardennes forest.

The Germans original plan, to strike France in the North through Belgium and Holland, was compromised three months prior to the intended invasion date, and the French moved the large majority of their forces north to defend against the expected attack. The commitment of thirty Allied divisions to a heavily defended line from southern Holland through Belgium left only a small contingent to the south to defend the Meuse River, which lay on the western side of the Ardennes, a wooded area that they believed difficult for tanks to navigate. In fact the French were so confident that the Germans would steer clear of the Ardennes that they manned large portions of the defensive line with overaged, undertrained reservists.

The forward-thinking German general Heinz Guderian, who had developed and proven the efficacy of a fast-striking armor concept during the 1930s, was adamant in his belief that any attack on France should be conducted through the Ardennes. After all, Guderian reasoned, the forest provided ideal camouflage, and passage through it was much easier than widely believed. The High Command of the Germans western front shared these innovative views and eventually convinced Hitler of their merits. With the original plan compromised and German intelligence sources confirming French weakness in the South, Hitler gave the order for his army to deliver a massive power punch through the weakest point in the French line via the impenetrable Ardennes. ^[3]

Figure 7.1: German Invasion of France, 1940

The Germans plan brought almost all available armor, infantry, and artillery forces and every available aircraft to bear on the thinly held Ardennes forest. The lead tank division, commanded by none other than Erwin Rommel and supported for the first time in combat by low-flying German dive bombers, smashed through the French defenses. Guderian, in command of the XIX Panzer Corps ”the most formidable armored unit in the German Army ”poured through the opening shortly thereafter. In short order, breakthrough ”breaching the line ”became breakout ”an advance at breakneck speed behind and around the French defenders.

Focus was not limited to the strategic level. German tank commanders used radios to fight in packs , a tactic that Guderian had pioneered against the newer , faster, more heavily armored French Somua tanks, which normally operated individually. While the twenty-ton French Somuas were superior to the ten-ton German Panzer II s on all counts (save the radio), a single Somua was no match for a pack of Panzers coordinated by radio. In the air the German Luftwaffe massed its planes in huge waves to defeat individual Allied fighters systematically and annihilate the poorly concealed French forces on the ground.

Within four days of crossing the Meuse, Guderian s corps reached the English Channel. Behind him, the remainder of the German Army created a forty-mile gap in the French defense and swarmed through the French countryside. Though France did not officially surrender until June 21, the battle was essentially over once the French line was breached.

Leadership Lessons

The outnumbered Germans focused their strength against the weakest point in their opponent s line. And that focus pervaded the entire attack, from Hitler s strategic commitment of all operational strength of the Luftwaffe to tactical pack fighting by the German Panzers. ^[4] This overwhelming commitment did, however, expose some risk; the Germans positions in the North were highly vulnerable to counterattack. But given the low probability that the French defenders would leave their static defensive positions , Guderian accepted this risk as an inevitable by-product of his plan.

^[3] Leckie, Robert, Delivered from Evil, The Saga of World War II , 150.

^[4] Ibid, 160.