Cooperation in the Trenches

You’re in a six-foot trench in sight of the enemy. Poison gas, bullets, shrapnel, and artillery shells put your life in constant danger. Sure, you’re patriotic and hope for victory, but what you really crave is survival. You have been told that your enemies are inhuman, baby-killing scum; however, you suspect that they are just as scared as you are. The high commands on both sides are going for victory, not peace, but perhaps there is a way to give peace a chance in your little corner of the war.

Your battalion has faced the same enemy troops for quite some time.^[12] Up until now, both sides have tried to inflict maximum damage on their foes. What would happen, however, if you stopped trying to kill? What if your snipers stopped trying to hit enemy soldiers, and then instead aimed at rocks? What if your artillery fired at the exact same spot each time so that the enemy could easily avoid getting killed?^[13]

If you stop trying to hurt the enemy, they will obviously be thrilled. They might at first ascribe your actions to treason or stupidity. If they believe that you are rational, however, they will realize that the only reason you are being nice is to get reciprocity. Once they understand your motives, your enemy will have a choice: either accept your implicit deal and stop trying to kill you, or reject the bargain and put their own lives back in extreme peril.^[14]

In The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod writes about how troops in World War I found themselves in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game and often responded by not trying to kill the enemy.^[15] The military leaders on all sides opposed and attempted to suppress these informal truces. The soldiers received such massive benefits from escaping their prisoners’ dilemma, however, that they formed a separate, if temporary, peace.

As we have previously discussed, companies sometimes try to create a prisoners’ dilemma situation among their employees. Axelrod’s accounts of World War I show the perils of this tactic in repeated play. In a one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game, the workers will always lose, but if the game is played repeatedly they have a chance.

Imagine, as discussed previously, a boss who tries to motivate his workers by setting them up in competition among each other. The boss could create a prisoners’ dilemma game by announcing that employees who get the best results will be rewarded, while those who do below-average work will be terminated. If the employees go along with the game, their lives will likely be dominated by hard work and stress. What if they all played lazy, however? If the boss judges individual performance by relative standards, then if everyone plays lazy, everyone is considered average. Sure, all employees will lose out on the chance to be the star, but perhaps it’s worth losing this opportunity in return for having a comfortable working environment. Furthermore, if some employee does try to defect by putting in long hours, the other employees could punish this nonlaggard defector by ostracizing him. Consequently, by working together, our employees could escape their trenches if they play their game repeatedly.

If the employees adopt collective laziness, how could our boss now motivate these employees? He would have to impose an objective standard on performance and be willing to fire everyone if everyone underperforms. In repeated games, employees can always overcome the prisoners’ dilemma inherent in relative standards if they cooperate and effectively identify and punish defectors.

Recognizing that employees might embark upon deliberate collective laziness increases the difficulty of creating employee incentive systems. If there is no chance of collusion, a boss need only ask if he has created incentives for individuals to put in their best efforts. If you allow for collusion, however, you must ask whether all employees would be better off if they all were lazy compared to if they all worked hard. If you base your incentive scheme upon relative performance within a small group the answer might be that collective laziness is your employees’ smartest strategy.

^[12]Ibid., 77.

^[13]See Axelrod (1984), 86 who cites Hills (1919), 96.

^[14]See Axelrod (1984), 78–79.

^[15]See Axelrod (1984), Chapter 4.