Giving up control by cutting off communications would also help you capture our hypothetical castle. Recall that in the battle for the castle your enemies will surrender only if they believe you will fight until victory. To credibly commit to never retreating, you could first order your troops to fight to the death, then leave your troops behind on the island. If your enemies see you leave and believe that no one else on the island has the ability to call off the attack, then they will think that your troops will fight to the end.
Cutting off communications can be useful in business negotiations as well. For example, imagine
In a 1965
[4] Davis (1970), 107–108.
[5] Ibid.
Securing a reputation for honesty also
A kidnapper demands ransom, but the victim’s family should
There are advantages, however, to not killing your hostage. First, the police won’t work as hard to catch you if you’re guilty of just kidnapping rather than kidnapping and murder. Second, you will get a far lighter
If the victim’s family thinks that you will release their loved one because you fear a murder conviction, then they should believe that you will fear this
A kidnapper planning on plying his trade in the future would benefit from having a reputation for honesty. A repeat kidnapper wants his victim’s families to know that in the past he has released his victims if, but only if, his demands were met. Consequently, a victim’s family should perhaps only pay off a kidnapper who intends to kidnap again.
Blackmailers, as well as kidnappers, face substantial credibility problems. A blackmailer promises to disclose embarrassing information about his victim if the victim doesn’t pay. For example, a treacherous mistress might threaten to reveal her married boyfriend’s adulterous activities if he does not give her $30,000. Would this disclosure threat be credible, however?
{% if main.adsdop %}{% include 'adsenceinline.tpl' %}{% endif %}Before you ever pay off a blackmailer, you should examine her incentives to disclose the embarrassing information. If your blackmailer hated you and would enjoy seeing you suffer, then she would disclose the information regardless of whether you pay her off.
Blackmail is illegal, even if the blackmailer has the complete legal right to reveal the embarrassing information. If your blackmailer reveals her information, it increases the chance of her getting jailed, if for no other reason than you are now more likely to file charges. The criminality of blackmail provides an incentive for the blackmailer not to disclose, but this incentive exists with equal force whether or not you pay her off. A rational one-time blackmailer, therefore, should be just as likely to disclose regardless of whether you pay her.
Furthermore, even if you met your blackmailer’s demands, why wouldn’t she continue to demand money? When you pay off a blackmailer, she gets your money, but all you get is her word not to disclose. A professional blackmailer would not want future victims to believe that she has betrayed past customers. A one-time blackmailer, however, would have a strong incentive to make further demands of her victim. After all, if a victim were willing to pay $30,000 last month not to have the information released, then surely he would be willing to pay a few thousand more this month to avoid humiliation. The best way to deal with a one-time blackmailer, then, is probably either to take your
If your blackmailer plans on playing her
What does blackmail and kidnapping have to do with business? Blackmailers and kidnappers can hope to profit from their trade only if they can get people to trust them. Since these criminals can’t rely upon others believing in their