Section 10.8. Summary


10.8. Summary

  • An object is labeled in one of four ways: policy statements (for example, type transition rules), hard-coded object manager defaults, program-requested labeling, and initial SIDs.

  • The policy must always contain the appropriate access in addition to any relevant labeling statements for an object to be successfully labeled.

  • Labeling decisions often use information from the execution environment (for example, security context for the process and related object instances).

  • File-related labeling behavior is specified per-filesystem using the filesystem use statements or the generalized security context statement.

  • Extended attribute labeling is used for most native Linux filesystems and supports program-requested labeling and persistent storage of security contexts.

  • Labels on extended attribute labeled filesystems are managed using file context files and utilities that read those files.

  • Task-based and transition-based labeling are used primarily for pseudo filesystems.

  • Generalized security context labeling is used primarily for labeling proc and legacy filesystems.

  • Network interfaces are labeled by interface name (for example, eth0) using the netifcon statement.

  • Network nodes are labeled by IP address and netmask using the nodecon statement.

  • Ports are labeled by number using the portcon statement.

  • Successfully sending or receiving network data often requires permissions on several socket objects in addition to permission on the relevant node and netif objects.

  • System V IPC objects, with the exception of msg objects, receive the security context of the creating process. Msg objects are labeled based on type_transition rules or the security context of the creating process.

  • Processes receive the same security context as their parent. This security context can be changed through a domain or dynamic context transition.

  • The capability object has the same security context as the associated process.

  • The security and system objects receive the security context of the kernel and security initial SIDs, respectively.

  • Initial SIDs are used to label some objects and are a failsafe default to prevent objects from having a missing or invalid security context.




SELinux by Example(c) Using Security Enhanced Linux
SELinux by Example: Using Security Enhanced Linux
ISBN: 0131963694
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2007
Pages: 154

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