The Conceptual Background of NAT


NAT was first presented in 1994 in RFC 1631, which was later replaced by RFC 3022. NAT was proposed as a possible short-term, temporary solution (to be used until IPv6 was deployed) to the growing shortage of public IP addresses. NAT also was seen as a possible solution to the growing demands on routers that handled noncontiguous address blocks. It was thought that NAT might possibly reduce or eliminate the need for CIDR, which, in turn, was prompting address reallocations and changes to router software and network configurations. NAT was also seen as a means to avoid the cost and overhead of local network renumbering when the address spaces were reallocated, or when a site changed service providers and was assigned a new public address block.

NAT was seen not only as a short-term solution, but also as a solution that conceivably would cause more problems than it solved. With the exception of FTP, most problematic application protocols were thought to be legacy protocols that would gradually fall into disuse. It was assumed that, in the face of NAT, network application developers would naturally become more mindful of end-to-end considerations, would be careful not to embed address information in new applications' data, and would avoid diverging from the standard client/server model.

Just the opposite turned out to be the case. IPv6 has yet to be deployed, giving NAT permanent, long-term status. Use of NAT became almost universal as Internet access became more available to the general public and available IPv4 addresses became ever more scarce. The standard application protocols of the time and the common standard protocols still in use todayincluding DNS, HTTP, SMTP, POP, and NNTPwork just fine with NAT, and all NAT implementations provide special support for FTP.

NAT's success at transparent translation is a result of the standard client/server connection characteristics of these common protocols. The exceptions didn't turn out to be a few legacy and oddball applications, however. Internet applications have become increasingly interactive. Newer applications sometimes don't have a clear client/server relationship. Sometimes a single server coordinates communication among multiple users, who may also initiate communication among themselves, independent of the server. Multiple servers can operate in conjunction with distributed services running across multiple NAT address domains, or with services that are provided by different kinds of servers operating cooperatively. Multimedia and other multistreaming and two-way, multiconnection sessions can initiate connections in both directions, may have many simultaneous connections per session, and may rely on both TCP and UDP simultaneously. The client isn't always a stationary, permanently addressable entity, as with dynamic client location in terms of mobile devices and telecommuting employees. Some services rely on end-to-end packet and data integrity, as do the IPSec encryption and authentication protocols.

These newer network applications do not work with NAT transparently. Specific application-layer gateway (ALG) support for each application must be provided for NAT to be capable of translating these packets correctly. In the case of encryption, end-to-end Transport-layer security protocols using encryption and authentication methods don't work, period.

Regardless of the difficulties associated with NAT, its usefulness ensures that it's here to stay for the duration of IPv4. In the meantime, firewall folks are looking at alternative ways of firewalling to solve the problems that the newer protocols introduce, both in terms of NAT and in terms of packet filtering itself.

We need alternative firewalling methods because firewalling itself has problems when implemented with current technology. NAT isn't the only problem. Multimedia, and the cost and overhead of application-level gateways, are gradually forcing the issue. Some of these protocols simply cannot be filtered with current firewall (and NAT) approaches.

Three general categories of NAT exist, as described in RFC 2663, "IP Network Address Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations":

  • Traditional, outbound, unidirectional NAT is used for networks with private address space. Outgoing sessions can be initiated from the private LAN to remote Internet hosts. Incoming sessions cannot be initiated from remote hosts to local hosts in the privately addressed LAN.

    Traditional NAT is divided into two general subtypes, although the two subtypes can overlap in practice:

    • Basic NAT performs address translation only. It is usually used to map local private source addresses to one from a pool of public addresses. For the duration of all sessions initiated by a particular local host, there is a one-to-one mapping between a particular public and private address pair.

    • Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT) performs address translation but also replaces the local LAN host's source port with a source port on the NAT device. It is usually used to map local private source addresses to a single public address (as in Linux masquerading). Because the NAT device has a single IP address to map all outgoing private LAN connections to, the private and public source port pair is used to associate a particular connection with a particular private host address and a particular connection from that host.

  • Bidirectional NAT performs two-way address translation, allowing both outbound and inbound connections. There is a one-to-one mapping between a public address and a private address. Effectively, the public address is a public alias for the local host's private address. This allows remote hosts to address the private host by the public address associated with it. The NAT device translates the public destination address in the incoming packet to the private address that the local host is actually assigned.

    One use of this is bidirectional address mapping between IPv4 and IPv6 address spaces. Although both addresses are routable within their own address spaces, IPv6 addresses are not routable within the IPv4 address space. A host in the IPv4 address space cannot directly reference a host in the IPv6 address space. Likewise, a host in the IPv6 space can directly reference a host in the IPv4 space. It is the IPv6 host's address that is being translated back and forth between the two addressing realms.

    Another use for bidirectional NAT that is more relevant to Linux users is to forward connections between the Internet and privately addressed local servers when the site offers public services from a LAN but has a single public IP address.

  • Twice NAT performs two-way source and destination address translation, but both the source and destination addresses are translated in both directions. Twice NAT is used when the source and destination networks' address spaces collide. This could be because one site mistakenly used public addresses assigned to someone else. Twice NAT can be used as a convenience when a site is renumbered or assigned to a new public address block but the owner doesn't want to administer the new address assignments immediately.

The advantages of NAT include these:

  • Packets containing standard application protocol data are transparently translated between networks.

  • Standard client/server services "just work" with NAT.

  • NAT alleviates the problems caused by the growing shortage of available IP addresses by sharing one public address or a small block of public addresses among an entire local network.

  • NAT reduces the need for both local and public IP address renumbering.

  • NAT reduces the need to deploy and administer more complicated routing schemes within larger local networks.

  • In NAT's most common form in conjunction with private IP addresses, unwanted incoming traffic isn't passed along because the local machines aren't addressable.

  • In one of NAT's other forms, it's used to allow virtual servers, in which a server farm appears to be a single, addressable server for load balancing.

The disadvantages of NAT include these:

  • NAT introduces single points of failure within the network by maintaining critical state within the network itself.

  • Maintaining critical state on the NAT device breaks the Internet paradigm in that packets can no longer be automatically rerouted around failed NAT routers.

  • NAT breaks the Internet paradigm of end-to-end transparency by modifying packet contents en route.

  • As a result of modifying addressing information, application-specific NAT support is required for any application that embeds local addresses or ports in the application payload.

  • As a result of modifying addressing information for applications that embed local addresses or ports in the application payload, incoming packets destined to a NAT host must be defragmented before forwarding.

  • NAT increases resource and performance requirements for NAT devices, which otherwise would be dedicated to fast datagram forwarding. NAT represents not only the overhead of defragmentation, packet inspection, and packet modification, but also the overhead of state maintenance, state timeouts, and state garbage collection.

  • Because of state maintenance within the network and the associated resource requirements, NAT devices are not infinitely scalable. Additionally, without complicated sharing techniques, hosts cannot use multiple peer NAT devices, an aspect of the single point of failure.

  • Bidirectional, multistream protocols require application-specific NAT support to forward incoming secondary streams to the proper local host. (Note that these protocols generally require ALG support for firewalling as well.)

  • NAT can break the capability to run multiple instances of the same local network client application in connection with the same remote server. This problem tends to occur with network games and IRC, where the session has associated incoming streams.

  • NAT cannot be used with transport mode IPSec for end-to-end security for a few reasons:

    • End-to-end Transport-layer security techniques are not possible because the techniques rely on end-to-end integrity of the packet header contents for authentication.

    • End-to-end Transport-layer security techniques are not possible because the techniques rely on end-to-end integrity of the packet's data payload, which also relies on packet header integrity.

    • End-to-end Transport-layer security techniques are not possible because data encryption renders the packet's contents unavailable for inspection. NAT modifications are not possible to change embedded address and port information.

    • Security trust relationships must be extended into the network from the endpoint hosts, possibly to a point outside the local site altogether. IPSec and most VPN technologies must be extended to the NAT device (in other words, IPSec tunnel mode). Again, the NAT device becomes a single point of failure because the NAT device must terminate the VPN and establish a new link as a proxy to the destination.




Linux Firewalls
Linux Firewalls: Attack Detection and Response with iptables, psad, and fwsnort
ISBN: 1593271417
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2005
Pages: 163
Authors: Michael Rash

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