2.13 Restricting Filesystem and Network Access on FreeBSD

2.13.1 Problem

Your program runs primarily (if not exclusively) on FreeBSD, and you want to impose restrictions on your program's filesystem and network capabilities that are above and beyond what chroot( ) can do. (See Recipe 2.12.)

2.13.2 Solution

FreeBSD implements a system call known as jail( ), which will "imprison" a process and its descendants. It does all that chroot( ) does and more.

2.13.3 Discussion

Ordinarily, a jail is constructed on FreeBSD by the system administrator using the jail program, which is essentially a wrapper around the jail( ) system call. (Discounting comments and blank lines, the code is a mere 35 lines.) However, it is possible to use the jail( ) system call in your own programs.

The FreeBSD jail does everything that chroot( ) does, and then some. It restricts much of the superuser's normal abilities, and it restricts the IP address that programs running inside the jail may use.

Creating a jail is as simple as filling in a data structure with the appropriate information and calling jail( ). The same caveats that apply to chroot( ) also apply to jail( ) because jail( ) calls chroot( ) internally. In particular, only the superuser may create a jail successfully.

Presently, the jail configuration structure contains only four fields: version, path, hostname, and ip_number. The version field must be set to 0, and the path field is treated the same as chroot( )'s argument is. The hostname field sets the hostname of the jail; however, it is possible to change it from within the jail.

The ip_number field is the IP address to which processes running within the jail are restricted. Processes within the jail will only be able to bind to this address regardless of what other IP addresses are assigned to the system. In addition, all IP traffic emanating from processes within the jail will be forced to use this address as its source.

The IP address assigned to a jail must be configured on the system; typically, it should be set up as an alias rather than as the primary address for a network interface unless the network interface is dedicated to the jail. For example, a system with two network interfaces may be configured to route all traffic from processes outside the jail to one interface, and route all traffic from processes inside the jail to the other.

2.13.4 See Also

Recipe 2.12



Secure Programming Cookbook for C and C++
Secure Programming Cookbook for C and C++: Recipes for Cryptography, Authentication, Input Validation & More
ISBN: 0596003943
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2005
Pages: 266

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