10.4 Understanding X.509 Certificate Verification Methodology

10.4.1 Problem

You have an X.509 certificate, and you want to determine whether the certificate should be considered "valid." While the requirements defining validity may be different from application to application, you will be interested in knowing whether the identity bound to that certificate ought to be trusted.

10.4.2 Solution

First, establish a trusted path from the certificate to an installed root certificate. Then, if you have a trusted path, use information in the certificate to determine the rights of the entity tied to that certificate. Finally, check to make sure the certificate presented has not been compromised or otherwise revoked.

10.4.3 Discussion

The specifics of how to do certificate verification vary depending on the library you are using. However, the methodology remains much the same no matter which library you use. Most libraries perform basic certificate verification for you but leave you to perform identity checks, such as ensuring that a certificate presented by a server is actually appropriate for that server to be presenting.

First, note that public key infrastructures tend to support "hierarchies" of certificates, although not all infrastructures do. That is, a root certificate from VeriSign might be used to sign a "signing" certificate at AT&T, which might then be used to sign individual certificates for AT&T employees. VeriSign may not sign the employee certificates directly, but we can establish a chain of trust, because the personal certificates are "trusted" by the AT&T signing certificate, and VeriSign trusts the AT&T signing certificate. There can be arbitrary levels of depth in a certificate hierarchy. For example, the AT&T company-wide signing certificate could be used to sign department-wide certificates, which may then sign individual certificates.

Second, just because a CA signs a certificate does not necessarily mean that the certificate should be trusted by the entity that is presenting it. For example, suppose that you want to perform an electronic commerce transaction with Amazon. When an SSL connection to Amazon's server is established, the server presents a certificate. The first thing you do is check to see that there is a trusted path to a root CA that you trust. Suppose that the certificate presented to you is signed by VeriSign and has not expired. Does that mean the transaction should go forward? No! You have no idea whether the certificate that has been presented to you was issued to Amazon or not. For all you know, it could have been issued to Fred's Mattress Warehouse or any other entity. If you get a certificate that is not from Amazon or its representative, it is probably an attacker's certificate. Therefore, you need to verify the information in the certificate to make sure that it really should be trusted. Remember that the signature on the certificate proves that the data in the certificate has not been altered. A certificate issued to attacker.org cannot be modified to look like a certificate issued to Amazon because the signature verification would fail.

Third, what happens if Amazon's private key is stolen? They will create a new private key and get a new certificate issued that is bound to that new key, but what about the old key? An attacker could present the old certificate, and you wouldn't be able to tell the difference between it and the new certificate until the old certificate expires.

One solution to this problem is to use a certificate revocation list (CRL), a list of certificate serial numbers signed by the CA that represent invalid certificates. These lists are updated periodically and should be downloaded frequently to avoid stale information. Most CAs issue CRLs. (See Recipe 10.10 and Recipe 10.11 for details on where to look for CRLs and how to obtain them.) Another solution is to interactively ask the CA using the OCSP. (We discuss this protocol in Recipe 10.12.)

In general, a certificate is verified against a collection of other certificate material that is, CA certificates and CRLs. To verify a certificate, all of the certificates in the chain must be known. Trusted certificates are certificates that are known to be valid without having to perform signature verification on them; however, they could be invalid for other reasons, as we will soon see. Untrusted certificates can also be present in the hierarchy, in which case they must also be verified using trusted certificates. There must always be at least one trusted certificate at the root of the hierarchy. If there is not, the certificate cannot be considered valid.

All certificates in the certification path must be checked to ensure they are valid for their assigned date. Every certificate has a beginning and an ending date for their validity period, and if the current date is outside that range, the certificate cannot be considered valid. Most people who have any familiarity with certificates usually realize that certificates expire, but many do not realize that they can have validity dates into the future and will not necessarily be valid yet at the point when they are presented.

Finally, you must check every certificate in the certification path to ensure that it has not been revoked. Revocation status can be checked using a CRL or by consulting an OCSP responder. It is best to be able to handle both types of revocation checks because one or the other may not always be available or reliable.

Once the validity of every certificate in the certification path has been verified, the basic verification tests are complete, but you are not done yet! You have only established that the certificate was issued by a CA that you trust, is within its valid period, and has not been revoked. Nothing has been done to verify that the entity that presented it to you is actually the entity that owns it. The details of how to do this vary, but in the most common case of a server presenting a certificate to a client, the hostname of the server should be embedded in the certificate. The hostname in the certificate can be compared to the hostname of the server that presented it (see Recipe 10.8). If the hostnames do not match, the certificate should not be trusted.

In situations where it isn't feasible to perform full certificate verification, an alternative is to compare the certificate against a list of known good certificates. See Recipe 10.9 for a discussion of how to do this.

10.4.4 See Also

Recipe 10.8, Recipe 10.9, Recipe 10.10, Recipe 10.11, Recipe 10.12