IEEE 802.11 supports multicast and broadcast messages. One example in which multicast is useful is video distribution. If you want to send a live broadcast to many stations, you don't want to have to send to each station individually you want to transmit one copy on the LAN and allow all the relevant stations to receive the video frames. This is an example of group multicast. A special case of multicast is broadcast, in which the message is sent to all devices on the LAN. Broadcasts are used widely in LAN protocols.
In an infrastructure network (that is, a network using an access point), multicasts are only sent from the access point to the mobile devices. Mobile devices are not allowed to send broadcasts directly; however, they can initiate a broadcast by sending the message to the access point, which then broadcasts it on the station's behalf (to both the wireless devices and any attached wired LAN). On the wireless side, we want multicasts and broadcasts to be encrypted and protected from tampering.
We cannot use the pairwise keys for broadcasts. Each mobile device has a different set of pairwise keys so it would be necessary to send multiple copies of the broadcast, each encrypted differently. While this would work, it would completely defeat the advantage of the multicast message. Therefore, a separate key hierarchy is maintained specifically for use in encrypting multicasts. This is called the group key hierarchy.
Unlike pairwise keys, all the mobile devices and the access point share a single set of group keys. This allows all the stations to decrypt a multicast message sent from the access point. While this solves a problem, it also creates one: how to handle the case in which a mobile station leaves the network.
If a mobile device chooses to leave the Wi-Fi LAN, it should notify the access point by sending an IEEE 802.11 disassociate message. When it does this, the access point erases the copy of the pairwise keys for the departing mobile device and stops sending it messages. If the device wants to rejoin later, it must go through the whole key establishment phase from scratch. But what about the group key? Even though the device has left the network, it can still receive and decrypt the multicasts that are sent because it still has a valid group key available. This is not acceptable from a security standpoint; if a device leaves the network, it should no longer be allowed any access at all.
The solution to this problem is to change the group key when a device leaves the network. This is a bit like changing the locks on your house after a long-term guest leaves; you don't want anyone to have a door key who is not living in your house. So group keys have an added complication: the need to rekey.
Negotiating the pairwise keys was complicated because we had to start with no secure connection in place and we ran the risk of all sorts of attacks from simple snooping to message forgery. The situation for group keys is easier because we can wait until the pairwise keys are established and then use the secure link to send the group key value. This provides a significant simplification and means that the actual group key values can be sent directly to each station without concern about interception or modification. Group key distribution is done using EAPOL-Key messages, as for pairwise key. However, only two messages are needed, not four.
The access point performs the following steps during group key distribution:
Because it is necessary to update the group key from time to time, a method is needed to perform the update without causing a break in the service. This would be a problem if the mobile device could store only a single group key because it takes time to go round each device and give them all the new key value. What key would you use for multicast transmissions during this update period the old one or the new one? Whichever you chose, some of the stations would not be able to decrypt.
Fortunately, the original WEP standard made provision for multiple keys to be stored in the mobile device: Up to four keys can be installed at one time. Each transmitted frame carries a 2-bit field called KeyID that specifies which of the four keys should be used for decryption. Pairwise keys are sent with a KeyID value of 0. But we can take advantage of the other three key storage slots for group key updates.
Suppose that the current group keys are installed into KeyID 1. When we want to update, the authenticator sends the new key with instructions to put it at KeyID 2. During this key update phase, multicasts are still sent using KeyID 1 until all the attached stations have been informed of the new key. Finally, the authenticator switches over and all the multicasts from then on (until the next key change) are sent with KeyID 2.
We now know how to send the GTK, but how is the GMK generated and how is the GTK derived? In the case of pairwise keys, the PMK was produced by the upper-layer authentication method (or by using preshared keys). Clearly, this process doesn't apply for the group keys because the key is not generated per device. However, because the object of the group keys is only to protect messages and not provide authentication, there is no need to tie the key into the identity of any specific device. In fact the key can be quite arbitrarily chosen. You haven't even got the problem of ensuring that both ends of a link pick the same value because the access point simply sends its chosen value in the EAPOL-Key messages.
So the rule is as follows: The access point allocates a GMK simply by choosing a 256-bit cryptographic-quality random number. This sounds easy but there is a gotcha: the words "cryptographic-quality" are important. Many programming languages provide a function that produces a "random" number on request. Usually the numbers produced look random but actually are quite predictable. They may come from a stored table or be derived from the clock value. If an attacker knows how your "random" number is generated, he can guess your GMK. Cryptographic quality means that no one in the universe knows what the random value will be until the moment it is generated. Methods for generating such numbers are suggested in the IEEE 802.11i standard.
Once the GMK is selected, it is necessary to derive the group temporal keys. Two keys are required:
The combination of these two keys forms a 256-bit value, the GTK. This is the value that is sent by the access point to each attached station. The GTK is derived from the GMK by combining with a nonce value and the MAC address of the access point. Given that the GMK is completely random to start with, this is arguably an unnecessary step but it does provide consistency with the pairwise key case.
Summary of the Key Establishment Process
The following steps summarize the process of establishing and distributing the keys used by WPA or RSN:
Only after all these phases have completed is user data finally allowed to flow between the authenticator and the supplicant. At last the communications link is open for business and all the keys are available to implement the encryption and protection needed.