Preface

Over the last four years, Microsoft has made security a top priority. This was first illustrated by the Windows 2000 operating system (OS), which includes major security enhancements. Windows 2000 supports several open security standards (e.g., Kerberos, IPsec). These standards are critical for security interoperability with other platforms and drive the operating system’s open reputation—or the fact of not just being rooted on proprietary security protocols. Windows 2000 also included an important shift in the overall security manageability of the platform: Group Policy Objects (GPOs) were a big step forward.

After the release of Windows 2000, Microsoft, its flagship OS, and other MS applications were hit badly by the hacker community. These events forced Microsoft into a series of strategic security announcements, first of which was the Secure Windows Initiative, whose primary goal was to enhance the Windows base OS. Then came the Strategic Technology Protection Program (STTP), which provided a set of software tools and prescriptive guidance documents enabling customers to get secure and stay secure. Finally in 2002, Microsoft announced the Trustworthy Computing (TWC) initiative, which is about four principles: secure by default, by design, by deployment, and communications. Secure by design means that Microsoft takes the appropriate steps to make sure the overall design of their products is secure. This principle primarily affects the Microsoft development teams. The goal of secure by default is to ship products that are secure enough out of the box. Secure in deployment means the software is easily maintainable from a security point-of-view once the product has been installed. Communications means that Microsoft has become much more verbose in the IT security community and that they offer prescriptive security guidance to their customers to a maximum extent. A major TWCrelated initiative for the years to come is the Microsoft Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), which is all about providing trustworthy computing platforms.

Windows Server 2003 is Microsoft’s first enterprise OS resulting out of the TWC initiative. The main difference from its predecessor is that Windows Server 2003 is much more hardened by default. Instead of focusing on the security feature set of the OS, Microsoft now primarily stresses this default lockdown to the outside world. It is fair to say that Microsoft’s efforts in the security space are truly impressive, but as with any security solution, technological advances are not enough. We should never forget the important role of people and processes. Security governance has become more important, and Microsoft also delivers solutions in this space: Good examples are the Microsoft Operations Framework (MOF) and security patch management initiatives.

I had the privilege to work with Windows Server 2003 (or Whistler, as it was codenamed back then) from a very early stage in the product’s lifestyle. Hewlett-Packard was involved in the Whistler Joint Development Program (JDP). At HP we also created an internal test forest (codenamed QNet), starting with the Beta versions of the Whistler software. Perhaps the opportunity that helped me most with getting experienced with this new Microsoft OS was the development and delivery of the Windows Server 2003 Academies. This is a five-day learning event consisting of both lectures and hands-on labs focusing on Windows Server 2003. We delivered the academies successfully to both HP Services (HPS) consultants and HP customers. I also leveraged the experiences gained when writing my previous book Mission-Critical Active Directory, which I co-authored with Micky Balladelli.

This book focuses on the security infrastructure building blocks Microsoft provides as part of the Windows Server 2003 operating system. It covers authentication, authorization, key management, and security management infrastructures. The first chapters introduce general Windows security concepts. Special attention is given to single sign-on (SSO) and the account management and authentication integration between Windows and UNIX platforms. The book is based on years of experience with the Windows family of enterprise operating systems, both internally at HP and at customer sites. As such, the book also provides architectural guidance and best practices for the design of Windows-rooted security infrastructures.

The book does not cover the typical communications security infrastructure building blocks coming with the OS. For example, Microsoft’s RADIUS solution—Internet Authentication Services (IAS)—is mentioned but is not covered in detail. Also, the book does not offer an introduction to general security and cryptographic terminology because it assumes that the reader is already familiar with these concepts. Finally, the book does not cover any of the security infrastructure building blocks Microsoft provides as part of their other product offerings: Good examples are the security infrastructure features of Systems Management Server (SMS) and Operations Manager (MOM).

If you discover inaccuracies or if you have general comments on the structure and/or content of the book, don’t hesitate to send me your feedback. Your comments are very much appreciated! You can reach me at [e-mail].

Enjoy reading my book!

Jan De Clercq
December 2003