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Chapter 1: The Challenge of Trusted Security Infrastructures
Figure 1.1: The access or TSI layer.
Figure 1.2: Positioning trusted security infrastructures.
Figure 1.3: The fundamental role of trust.
Figure 1.4: Shift from authorization service decentralization to centralization.
Figure 1.5: TSI overview.
Figure 1.6: MIIS 3.0 architecture.
Figure 1.7: MOM architecture.
Figure 1.8: SMS architecture.
Figure 1.9: MPS architecture.
Chapter 2: Windows Security Authorities and Principals
Figure 2.1: Security authority.
Figure 2.2: LSA process and subprocesses available on Windows domain controllers.
Figure 2.3: Windows Server 2003 AD domains, trees, and an AD forest.
Figure 2.4: Security authority and security principals.
Figure 2.5: Defining UPN suffixes.
Figure 2.6: Using setspn to display the SPNs linked to a machine.
Figure 2.7: Configuring a service to use the local service account.
Figure 2.8: Using net user with the /random switch.
Figure 2.9: Using the MBSA tool to audit password quality.
Figure 2.10: L0phtcrack GUI.
Figure 2.11: Configuring Syskey.
Figure 2.12: Pwdump3 output.
Figure 2.13: Running John the Ripper.
Figure 2.14: Account lockout process.
Figure 2.15: Suggested account lockout policy settings.
Figure 2.16: Additional account info tab.
Figure 2.17: LockoutStatus.exe tool.
Chapter 3: Windows Trust Relationships
Figure 3.1: Security authorities and trust relationships.
Figure 3.2: Trust relationships: trusting versus trusted domain.
Figure 3.3: Windows trust types.
Figure 3.4: Trusts tab.
Figure 3.5: Trust properties.
Figure 3.6: Number of trust relationships required in Windows Server 2003 and NT4.
Figure 3.7: Trust relationships: behind the scenes.
Figure 3.8: Checking out TDO objects using ADSI Edit.
Figure 3.9: Cross-forest trust transitivity between two forests.
Figure 3.10: Cross-forest trust between multiple forests.
Figure 3.11: The new Windows Server 2003 Trust Wizard.
Figure 3.12: Windows Server 2003 forest trust attributes (as viewed from AdsiEdit).
Figure 3.13: Display of other forest “hptest.net” in Object Picker.
Figure 3.14: TLN restrictions example: disabling DNS namespaces.
Figure 3.15: TLN restrictions example: enabling DNS namespaces when running the Trust Wizard.
Figure 3.16: TLN restrictions example: disabling DNS namespaces from the Trust Properties.
Figure 3.17: TLN restrictions example.
Figure 3.18: TLN restriction for *.hr.hewlettpackardtest.net: main view.
Figure 3.19: TLN restriction for *.hr.hewlettpackardtest.net: edit view.
Figure 3.20: Enabling the selective authentication feature of a forest trust relationship.
Figure 3.21: Setting the “Allowed to Authenticate” permission for a foreign security principal.
Figure 3.22:
SID filtering between two forests.
Figure 3.23: Validating a secure channel from the GUI.
Figure 3.24: RPC operation.
Chapter 4: Introducing Windows Authentication
Figure 4.1:
Authentication Infrastructure terminology.
Figure 4.2: Interactive authentication architecture.
Figure 4.3: Noninteractive authentication architecture.
Figure 4.4: Role of the Negotiate SSPI.
Figure 4.5:
Using SSPI Workbench.
Figure 4.6: Machine startup.
Figure 4.7: User logon process.
Figure 4.8: Finding out the authenticating DC using “set l.”
Figure 4.9: Basic NTLM authentication flow.
Figure 4.10: Running runas.exe from the command line.
Figure 4.11: Running runas.exe from the command line with smart card credentials.
Figure 4.12: Secondary logon process from Windows Explorer.
Figure 4.13: Successful logon event.
Figure 4.14: Failed logon event.
Figure 4.15: Using the nlparse.exe tool.
Chapter 5: Kerberos
Figure 5.1: Session keys and encrypted session keys.
Figure 5.2: Kerberos authentication is based on symmetric key cryptography.
Figure 5.3: A KDC provides scalability.
Figure 5.4: Kerberos entities and master key concept.
Figure 5.5: Windows Server 2003 key hierarchy.
Figure 5.6: Kerberos ticket distribution Method 1.
Figure 5.7: Kerberos ticket distribution Method 2.
Figure 5.8: The use of the master key.
Figure 5.9: The role of the Kerberos TGT.
Figure 5.10: The complete Kerberos protocol. Request Ticket + Auth
Figure 5.11: Local logon process in a single domain environment.
Figure 5.12: Network logon process in a single domain environment.
Figure 5.13: Local logon in a multiple domain environment.
Figure 5.14: Network logon in a multiple domain environment.
Figure 5.15: Effect of a shortcut trust on multiple domain logon traffic.
Figure 5.16: Transitive trusts in mixed-mode domains.
Figure 5.17: Multiple domain logon process revisited.
Figure 5.18: Multiple domain logon process: under the hood.
Figure 5.19: Forest trust authentication flow.
Figure 5.20: Basic S4U2Proxy operation.
Figure 5.21: Configuring delegation in Windows Server 2003.
Figure 5.22: The new “msDSAllowedToDelegate To” AD account attribute enabling constrained delegation.
Figure 5.23: Basic S4U2Self operation.
Figure 5.24: Combined S4U2Self operation and S4U2Proxy operation.
Figure 5.25: Sample scenario.
Figure 5.26: From Windows Server 2003 authentication to authorization.
Figure 5.27
Figure 5.28: Kerberos and disabled accounts: Example
Figure 5.29: Relationship between Kerberos ticket and authenticator.
Figure 5.30: Looking at the Kerberos ticket cache using the Klist utility.
Figure 5.31: Looking at the Kerberos ticket cache using the Kerbtray utility.
Figure 5.32: Smart card logon trust model.
Figure 5.33: Smart card logon process.
Figure 5.34: Kerberos-related GPO settings.
Figure 5.35: Sample SNTP hierarchy.
Figure 5.36: Defining Kerberos account mappings.
Figure 5.37: UNIX-Windows Server 2003 Kerberos interoperability using a cross-realm trust.
Chapter 6: IIS Authentication
Figure 6.1: IIS 6.0 architecture.
Figure 6.2: Configuring IIS authentication options.
Figure 6.3: SecurID-based IIS authentication.
Figure 6.4: Typical HTTP authentication exchange.
Figure 6.5: Anonymous access exchange.
Figure 6.6: Using the IIS Resource Kit WebFetch (WFetch) tool.
Figure 6.7: Basic authentication exchange.
Figure 6.8: Basic authentication credential prompt.
Figure 6.9: Basic authentication warning.
Figure 6.10: Basic authentication credential prompt with custom realm.
Figure 6.11: Digest authentication warning.
Figure 6.12: Digest authentication exchange.
Figure 6.13: Digest authentication dialog box.
Figure 6.14: WFetch advanced digest authentication exchange.
Figure 6.15: Integrated Windows authentication dialog box.
Figure 6.16: Internet Explorer SSL/TLS lock symbol.
Figure 6.17: SSL Web server certificate wizard.
Figure 6.18: Starting the Web server certificate wizard.
Figure 6.19: Configuring SSL/TLS.
Figure 6.20: Setting up a many- to-one certificate mapping rule in the ISM.
Figure 6.21: Enabling the Windows directory service mapper.
Figure 6.22: Certificate validation process.
Figure 6.23: (a) Browser-side certificate trust error, and (b) browser-side certificate time and name error.
Figure 6.24: Browser-side SSL/TLS revocation check error.
Figure 6.25: Browser-side SSL/TLS certificate revocation checking option.
Figure 6.26: SSL and HTTP proxy approaches: SSL tunneling.
Figure 6.27: SSL and HTTP proxy approaches: SSL bridging (single tunnel terminated on proxy).
Figure 6.28: SSL and HTTP proxy approaches: SSL bridging (single tunnel terminated on Web server).
Figure 6.29: SSL and HTTP proxy approaches: SSL bridging (two tunnels).
Figure 6.30: Setting up SSL bridging using the OWA Publishing Wizard.
Chapter 7: Microsoft Passport
Figure 7.1: Passport infrastructure.
Figure 7.2: Passport authentication sequence.
Figure 7.3: Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 built-in MS Passport login dialog box:(a) MoneyCentral login and(b) bCentral login.
Figure 7.4: .NET Passport Wizard.
Figure 7.5: Disabling automatic cookie handling in Internet Explorer 6.0.
Figure 7.6: Internet Explorer cookie “privacy alert.”
Figure 7.7: Passport authentication sequence including cookies: initial login (Windows XP and Windows Server 2003).
Figure 7.8: Passport authentication sequence including cookies: log in to second site (Windows XP and Windows Server 2003).
Figure 7.9: The “Edit your .NET Passport profile” dialog box.
Figure 7.10: Checking out a site’s P3P privacy report in Internet Explorer 6.0.
Figure 7.11: WFetch HTTP Passport authentication trace.
Chapter 8: UNIX and Windows Authentication Interoperability
Figure 8.1: The PAM architecture.
Figure 8.2: The NIS Architecture.
Figure 8.3: The NIS+ architecture.
Figure 8.4: The NSS architecture.
Figure 8.5: AD4Unix AD schema style configuration.
Figure 8.6:
AD user and group object properties with a UNIX-specific property tab.
Figure 8.7:
SFU Server for NIS architecture.
Figure 8.8:
Samba architecture.
Figure 8.9:
SFU Name User Mapping Service architecture.
Figure 8.10: SFU password synchronization architecture: Windows to UNIX.
Figure 8.11: SFU password synchronization architecture: UNIX to Windows.
Figure 8.12: NIS/LDAP gateway architecture.
Figure 8.13: The pam_unix-centric architecture.
Figure 8.14: Pam_LDAP-centric architecture.
Figure 8.15: Kerberos-centric architecture: Windows KDCs.
Figure 8.16: Kerberos-centric architecture: UNIX and Windows KDCs.
Figure 8.17:
Vintela Authentication Services (VAS)
Figure 8.18:
Samba Winbind architecture.
Chapter 9: Single Sign-On
Figure 9.1: SSO with a single authentication authority and a single authentication server.
Figure 9.2:
SSO in an environment with a single authentication authority and multiple authentication servers.
Figure 9.3: Authentication in an environment with multiple authentication authorities.
Figure 9.4:
Authentication in a token-based SSO environment.
Figure 9.5: Authentication in a PKI-based SSO environment.
Figure 9.6:
Password synchronization-based SSO.
Figure 9.7:
Authentication in an SSO environment using a client-side secure cache.
Figure 9.8: Authentication in a secure server-side credential caching SSO environment.
Figure 9.9: Credential Manager key ring UI.
Figure 9.10: Credential Manager operation.
Figure 9.11: Dialog boxes after disablingCredential Manager.
Figure 9.12: Cmdkey operation.
Figure 9.13:
IAS scenarios.
Chapter 10: Windows Server 2003 Authorization
Figure 10.1: Generic authorization model.
Figure 10.2: Windows authorization model.
Figure 10.3:
Using whoami /all to look at the access token content.
Figure 10.4: Access control list (ACL) content.
Figure 10.5: Windows 2000 ACL editor GUI.
Figure 10.6: Inheritance in the ACL editor’s advanced view (Windows 2000).
Figure 10.7: Inheritance in the ACL editor’s advanced view (Windows Server 2003).
Figure 10.8: Controlling inheritance using blocking.
Figure 10.9: Setting inheritance in the ACL editor (file system).
Figure 10.10: ACL editor warning message.
Figure 10.11: ACL editor warning message (AD only).
Figure 10.12: Setting inheritance in the ACL editor (file system).
Figure 10.13: Object type–based ACEs.
Figure 10.14: Object type-based ACEs in the ACL editor—advanced view.
Figure 10.15: Object type-based ACEs in the ACL editor—advanced view, permission entry details.
Figure 10.16: Dssec.dat content.
Figure 10.17: Property-based ACEs.
Figure 10.18: Property-based ACEs in the ACL editor.
Figure 10.19: Property-based ACEs in the ACL editor.
Figure 10.20: Changing the attributeSecurityGUID property for the Telephone-Number attribute.
Figure 10.21: Extended rights types.
Figure 10.22: Canonical evaluation order.
Figure 10.23: ACL evaluation example 1.
Figure 10.24: ACL evaluation example 2.
Figure 10.25: Effective permissions tab.
Figure 10.26: Modifying the default AD Security descriptor.
Figure 10.27: Using ldp.exe.
Figure 10.28: AD object quota error.
Figure 10.29: Security to distribution group conversion warning.
Figure 10.30: Windows administrator pyramid.
Figure 10.31: Group usage guidelines.
Figure 10.32: Organizational unit hierarchy example.
Figure 10.33: Delegation wizard.
Figure 10.34:
Delegation tab in GPMC.
Figure 10.35: Delegwiz.inf configuration file.
Figure 10.36: Setting permissions for the pwdLastSet user account attribute.
Figure 10.37: Default permissions for self security principal
Chapter 11: Malicious Mobile Code Protection
Figure 11.1: Malicious mobile code protection architecture.
Figure 11.2: Setting the default security level.
Figure 11.3: Creating a hash rule for the Solitaire executable.
Figure 11.4: Setting SRP- designated file-type properties.
Figure 11.5: Sample SRP rule scenario.
Figure 11.6:
.
NET Framework Configuration tool and Security Policy containers.
Figure 11.7: Code group properties.
Figure 11.8: CAS policy evaluation order.
Figure 11.9: Default CAS policy evaluation process.
Figure 11.10: Effect of the “Exclusive” code group attribute on CAS security policy evaluation.
Figure 11.11: Effect of the “LevelFinal” code group attribute on CAS security policy evaluation.
Figure 11.12: Normal CAS stack walk behavior.
Figure 11.13: Normal CAS stack walk behavior: protection against luring attack.
Figure 11.14: CAS stack walk behavior with the “Assert” stack walk modifier.
Figure 11.15: CAS stack walk behavior with the “Deny” stack walk modifier.
Chapter 12: New Authorization Tracks: Role-Based Access Control and Digital Rights Management
Figure 12.1: Comparing the DAC and the RBAC models.
Figure 12.2: Authorization Manager architecture overview.
Figure 12.3: Authorization Manager MMC snap-in (azman.msc).
Figure 12.4:
Authorization Manager concepts.
Figure 12.5: Impersonation/delegation versus trusted application model.
Figure 12.6: XrML license example.
Figure 12.7: Setting RM on PowerPoint 2003 presentation.
Figure 12.8: IE with RM add-on.
Figure 12.9: WRM information flow.
Chapter 13: Introducing Windows Server 2003 Public Key Infrastructure
Figure 13.1: : Microsoft Windows NT and PKI timeline.
Figure 13.2: Certificate Server architecture.
Figure 13.3: Querying AD for PKI-related information using the Sites and Services MMC snap-in.
Figure 13.4:
PKIView tool.
Figure 13.5: CryptoAPI architecture.
Figure 13.6:
The Windows certificate viewer.
Figure 13.7:
The Windows Server 2003 Certificate Templates MMC snap-in.
Figure 13.8: General tab in the cross-certification authority certificate template’s properties.
Figure 13.9: Windows Server 2003 and XP physical and logical certificate stores.
Figure 13.10: Classifying certificates in a certificate store based on certificate purpose.
Figure 13.11: Viewing logical certificates stores from theCertificates MMC snap-in.
Figure 13.12: Viewing physical certificates stores from theCertificates MMC snap-in.
Figure 13.13: nShield device with internal SCSI connector.
Figure 13.14: An nShield security world and its different components.
Figure 13.15: The Luna CA HSM.
Figure 13.16:
DPAPI key protection architecture.
Figure 13.17:
Setting strong private key protection.
Chapter 14: Trust in Windows Server 2003 PKI
Figure 14.1: A trust taxonomy: direct trust relationships.
Figure 14.2: A trust taxonomy: indirect trust relationships.
Figure 14.3: A trust taxonomy: indirect trust relationships.
Figure 14.4: Hierarchical trust model.
Figure 14.5: Networked trust model.
Figure 14.6: Cross-certification CA trust relationship.
Figure 14.7: Meshed trust model.
Figure 14.8: Bridge CA trust model.
Figure 14.9: Hybrid trust model.
Figure 14.10: The new constraint extensions in the certificate viewer.
Figure 14.11:
Basic constraints—Path Length Constraint example.
Figure 14.12: Name Constraints example.
Figure 14.13: Issuance policy example.
Figure 14.14: Application policy example.
Figure 14.15: Issuance policy mapping for cross-certified CAs example.
Figure 14.16: Issuance policy mapping PKI user example.
Figure 14.17: Require explicit policy Policy Constraint example.
Figure 14.18: Inhibit policy mapping Policy Constraint example.
Figure 14.19: Pop-up dialog box when adding a certificate to the root certificate store.
Figure 14.20: GPO trusted root certification authorities settings.
Figure 14.21: Configuring trust settings on individual certificates.
Figure 14.22: Specifying CTL time and application trust limits.
Figure 14.23: CA type dialog box.
Figure 14.24: Hierarchical trust example.
Figure 14.25: Cross-certified trust example.
Figure 14.26: Cross-certification scenarios.
Figure 14.27: Issuance requirements for cross-certification authority certificate.
Figure 14.28: crossCertificatePair attribute for an AD CA object (viewed using AdsiEdit).
Figure 14.29
crossCertificatePair attribute for an AD CA object (viewed using AdsiEdit).
Figure 14.30: Setting application policies on a version 2 certificate template.
Figure 14.31:
Setting application policies on a version 2 certificate template.
Figure 14.32: Setting application policies on a version 2 certificate template.
Chapter 15: The Certificate Life Cycle
Figure 15.1: The certificate life cycle.
Figure 15.2: Automatic Certificate Request Wizard.
Figure 15.3: Setting autoenrollment permissions on the certificate template level.
Figure 15.4: Setting autoenrollment properties at the GPO level.
Figure 15.5: Autoenrollment text balloon.
Figure 15.6: Forcing user certificate autoenrollment.
Figure 15.7: User autoenrollment confirmation dialog box.
Figure 15.8: Forcing user certificate autoenrollment.
Figure 15.9: Issuance requirements in certificate template properties.
Figure 15.10: Setting up superseding certificate templates.
Figure 15.11: Certificate Request Wizard.
Figure 15.12: Certificate Request Wizard error message.
Figure 15.13: Web enrollment interface.
Figure 15.14: Web enrollment warning message (following the IE enhanced security configuration).
Figure 15.15:
Content of a certificate request.
Figure 15.16: Changing a stand- alone CA’s policy properties.
Figure 15.17: Certificate template property for certificate AD publication.
Figure 15.18: Backing up the private key using the Certificate Export Wizard.
Figure 15.19:
Windows Server 2003 key archival process.
Figure 15.20:
Archived key column in CA interface.
Figure 15.21: CA key recovery settings.
Figure 15.22: Key archival settings in certificate template properties.
Figure 15.23: Key recovery tool.
Figure 15.24: The Exchange 2003 KMS Key Export Wizard.
Figure 15.25: Manual CA archival database import.
Figure 15.26: Certificate validation steps.
Figure 15.27: Bringing up anX.509 certificate’s critical extensions.
Figure 15.28: Certificate chain processing.
Figure 15.29: Certificate chain processing examples 1 and 2.
Figure 15.30: Certificate chain processing example 3.
Figure 15.31: Certificate chain viewed from the certificate properties: (a) trusted CA certificate and (b) untrusted CA certificate.
Figure 15.32:
Certificate part of a certificate chain starting of (a) a valid CTL and (b) an invalid CTL.
Figure 15.33:
Cross-certification example.
Figure 15.34: Additional cross-certificate download locations.
Figure 15.35: Certification revocation reason codes.
Figure 15.36: Certificate revocation list distribution points (CDPs) operation.
Figure 15.37: Configuring CDPs.
Figure 15.38: The URL retrieval tool.
Figure 15.39:
Configuring (a) CRL publication intervals and (b) viewing CRLs.
Figure 15.40:
CRL (a) layout and (b) content.
Figure 15.41: Delta CRL operation.
Figure 15.42: Delta CRL layout.
Chapter 16: Building and Maintaining a Windows PKI
Figure 16.1: The four major phases of a PKI project.
Figure 16.2: Insourcing and outsourcing models.
Figure 16.3: CA key and certificate options during CA installation.
Figure 16.4: Certificate lifetime and key length in a typical PKI hierarchy.
Figure 16.5: CA naming and certificate lifetime options.
Figure 16.6: Using certutil to check the CA’s sanitized names.
Figure 16.7: A installation warning.
Figure 16.8: CA database installation options.
Figure 16.9: Defining CDPs using the replaceable parameter syntax.
Figure 16.10: Configuring AIAs from the CA properties.
Figure 16.11: Setting CA object permissions.
Figure 16.12: Assigning certificate managers restrictions.
Figure 16.13: Exporting a CA’s private key and certificate.
Figure 16.14: Backing up the system state and CA configuration data using the backup wizard.
Figure 16.15: Renew CA certificate wizard.
Figure 16.16: CA properties: CA certificates.
Figure 16.17: CA auditing settings.
Chapter 17: Windows Server 2003 PKI-enabled Applications
Figure 17.1: : How EFS encryption works.
Figure 17.2: How EFS decryption works.
Figure 17.3: Using efsinfo.
Figure 17.4: Setting up an EFS recovery agent using GPOs.
Figure 17.5: Setting up EFS file sharing.
Figure 17.6: Setting up a Web folder.
Figure 17.7: Enabling EFS encryption for offline files and folders.
Figure 17.8: Viewing the encryption details on the offline files and folders CSC database.
Figure 17.9: Define an EFS data recovery policy.
Figure 17.10: Starting up the Forgotten Password wizard.
Figure 17.11:
Basic S/MIME operation.
Figure 17.12: S/MIME configuration in Exchange 2003.
Figure 17.13: Setting up OWA S/MIME support.
Figure 17.14: Clear versus opaque S/MIME signing.
Figure 17.15: Setting opaque and clear signing message properties in Outlook 2003.
Figure 17.16: Setting opaque and clear signing message properties in Outlook Express 6.0.
Figure 17.17: S/MIME signed receipt tracking information.
Figure 17.18:
eAlladin eToken Format utility.
Figure 17.19:
Smart card certificate enrollment station interface.
Figure 17.20: Smart card logon interface.
Chapter 18: Windows Server 2003 Security Management
Figure 18.1: Coverage of security-related configuration settings by Windows security policy management tools.
Figure 18.2: GPE and different containers and settings.
Figure 18.3: GPMC interface.
Figure 18.4: Administrative template changes.
Figure 18.5: Local security policy configuration tool.
Figure 18.6: Security Templates MMC snap-in.
Figure 18.7: Importing security templates for a GPO’s security settings.
Figure 18.8: Security Configuration Wizard.
Figure 18.9: Microsoft Security Baseline Analyzer.
Figure 18.10: Checking for security updates from the MBSA.
Figure 18.11: Windows Update.
Figure 18.12: Configuring automatic patch updates using GPO.
Figure 18.13: Automatic updates dialog box.
Figure 18.14: SUS administration interface.
Figure 18.15: Security event log properties.
Figure 18.16: The eventcombmt tool.
Figure 18.17:
Setting up auditing.
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Windows Server 2003 Security Infrastructures: Core Security Features (HP Technologies)
ISBN: 1555582834
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2003
Pages: 137
Authors:
Jan De Clercq
BUY ON AMAZON
ADO.NET 3.5 Cookbook (Cookbooks (OReilly))
Searching and Analyzing Data
Getting an Identity Column Value from SQL Server
Nesting Manual Transactions with the SQL Server .NET Data Provider
Using a Transaction with a DataAdapter
Displaying an Image from a Database in a Windows Forms Control
Absolute Beginner[ap]s Guide to Project Management
Powerful Techniques for Project Control
Configuration Management Plan
Best Practices
Keys to Better Project Team Performance
Seven Tips for Sellers
The Java Tutorial: A Short Course on the Basics, 4th Edition
The Life Cycle of an Object
Interfaces
What about Thread.destroy?
Why Is Runtime.runFinalizersOnExit Deprecated?
Appendix E. Reference
PMP Practice Questions Exam Cram 2
Project PlanningCore Processes
Exam Prep Questions
Project Execution
Answers and Explanations
Appendix A. CD Contents and Installation Instructions
Telecommunications Essentials, Second Edition: The Complete Global Source (2nd Edition)
The PSTN
Wide Area Networking
IP QoS
The Migration to Optical Networking
Spectrum Utilization
Digital Character Animation 3 (No. 3)
Chapter Three. Rigging Characters
Chapter Four. Basics of Animation
Understanding Motion
Chapter Seven. Facial and Dialogue Animation
Conclusion
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