Encyclopedia of the Persian Gulf War

Page 299

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Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994–sVietnam Syndrome

Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994

See Veterans Persian Gulf Health Registry.

Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-585; 106 Stat. 4943)

This congressional legislation, enacted on 4 November 1992, includes provisions that established the Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Registry in the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA).

See also

National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993;

Veterans Persian Gulf Health Registry.

Veterans Persian Gulf Health Registry (VHR)

Following reports of possible poison-chemical victims from the Persian Gulf War, in 1991 the Veterans Administration (VA) established the Veterans Health Registry, a manifest of troops eligible for medical examination, treatments, and, if such evidence of chemical weapons use is found, benefits from the government. Modeled on the VA’s Agent Orange and Ionizing Radiation registries, the VHR was authorized by the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-585; 106 Stat. 4943) to “improve the delivery of health care services to eligible veterans and clarify the authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.”

References:

“VA Fact Sheet: Programs for Persian Gulf Veterans,” Department of Veterans Affairs, November 1994.

Veterans Persian Gulf Health Registry

Veterans Affairs secretary Jesse Brown testifies before the House Veterans’ Affairs subcommittee on 9 June 1994.

Vietnam Syndrome

“By God, we’ve licked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!” exclaimed President George Bush on 1 March 1991, at the close of the land portion of the Gulf War. Was he right? Many analysts, both in the military and civilian sectors, argue impressively that the key factor behind the syndrome—America’s fear that its days as a major military power were effectively over—was changed by the quick and decisive victory in the Persian Gulf.

In an editorial in the Washington Post, Jim Hoagland laid out his reasons why he felt Bush’s early handling of the crisis, before the outbreak of the air and ground wars, brought about a conclusion that was different in every way from the American experience in Vietnam. “Playing against type, America’s generals are refusing to fight the last war again in the Persian Gulf,” Hoagland wrote. “They have learned the lessons of Vietnam, which is more than can be said for the politicians and retread anti-war activists who argue today that the threat to world peace comes not from Saddam Hussein but from President Lyndon Baines Bush. . . . The Persian Gulf crisis represents the professional military’s revenge for Vietnam. By ruling out a deceptive ‘incremental’ buildup in the Gulf, the generals are forcing the politicians in Washington to take immediate and clear responsibility for the decisions (including those of the generals) on how this confrontation should be waged.”

Comparisons with Vietnam were ruled out early. Rep. Les Aspin (D–Wisconsin), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1990–1991, wrote in the white paper “The Military Option: The Conduct and Consequences of War in the Persian Gulf”: “I am convinced that we do not face another Vietnam in the Persian Gulf. There are four principal reasons why there is little risk of a long, drawn-out war: 1) A war in the Gulf would not be fought in the jungle, but in the desert, where there is little cover and

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