6.4 Conclusion


Is the position of labour uniquely different in Poland from elsewhere in CEE (or Western Europe)? In the short run the answer is yes, in some ways, but in the long run it has to be no. In the short run the political and symbolic importance of Solidarity has ensured a more favourable position for labour in Poland than in other parts of CEE, and labour s position in the privatization and restructuring process has been stronger than elsewhere.

The institutional objectives of organized labour were largely achieved in the early 1990s. However it is easy to exaggerate its successes, especially in the economic sphere. Although earnings were higher in Poland than in the Czech Republic and Hungary, the level of unemployment was also higher. In general the major determinant of the power of labour is the level of product demand “ when demand is high the power of labour is greater. High demand may be due to the merits of the product itself, to scarcity, to restrictions on competition or to other institutional influences. Some sectors of the Polish economy experienced high levels of demand in the 1990s, for example financial services. However the demand for the output of the highly unionized manufacturing sector and for basic utilities was weak. Although unemployment was high, this had less effect on the power of organized labour because of the limited substitutability of labour. While the fall in demand in the early 1990s led to the collapse of labour influence, political connections provided some protection, especially for institutional interests.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century Poland had become integrated into international capitalism . This was evident in the pattern of trade, with heavy dependence on exports to the EU, and in the increased flow of international capital. Foreign direct investment grew more slowly in Poland after 1989 than, for example, in Hungary, partly because of the perceived difficulties of dealing with Polish labour. However by 2001 the absolute level of FDI was greater in Poland than in its CEE neighbours, reflecting its larger population, although in per capita terms FDI remained below the level in Hungary. International capital was attracted by the size of the Polish domestic market, which was more than double that of its nearest competitor, and by its strategic geographical advantage as a route to Russia, with its oil and natural gas. Poland, like the CEE countries in general, was increasingly attractive as product markets were reaching maturity in Western Europe, for example for motor vehicles. However by 2001 Western firms were beginning to recognize that the degree of product market competition in Poland was starting to match that in Western Europe. The high profits that had been achievable in the early 1990s were disappearing “ the risk premium was becoming smaller. In such circumstances countries in the CIS and South-Eastern Europe became more attractive, as reflected in changes in the policies of international financial institutions. For example in 2001 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) gave higher priority to investment further east than Poland. Hence as Poland became a more ˜normal capitalist country it lost some of its attractiveness for international capital.

Polish unions believe that the best defence for their members is rapid incorporation into the EU. This view may well be correct as the days of the ˜Polish tiger may prove to be short-lived.

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Change Management in Transition Economies. Integrating Corporate Strategy, Structure and Culture
Change Management in Transition Economies: Integrating Corporate Strategy, Structure and Culture
ISBN: 1403901635
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2003
Pages: 121

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