Chapter 3: Globalization


3.1 The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike

Richard M. Locke

How should global corporations behave in the new international world order? What constitutes good corporate citizenship when the stakeholders are diverse and dispersed around the globe and where no clear or consensual rules and standards exist? These questions shape the behavior of most multinational corporations (MNCs) today. Although multinationals are eager to pursue the opportunities of increased global integration, they are more and more aware of the reactions which their strategies induce—both at home and abroad. Thus, they tread warily, lacking clear and agreed-upon definitions of good corporate citizenship.

Through a case study of Nike, Inc.—a company that has come to symbolize both the benefits and the risks inherent in globalization—this paper examines the various difficulties and complexities companies face as they seek to balance both company performance and good corporate citizenship in today's global world.

This paper is divided into three parts. First, it examines current debates over the basic conception of corporate citizenship. Second, it analyzes the evolution of Nike's global strategies, illustrating how this particular company has redefined its understanding of corporate citizenship in the light of the challenges and opportunities it has faced. The paper concludes by pondering the more general lessons this case study may have for management education and business strategy in the future.

Corporate Citizenship in a Global Economy

The issue of corporate citizenship and the role of corporations in society have been debated for centuries. The debates move through various waves of intensity, often provoked by revelations of corporate scandals and/or problems arising from various business practices (e.g., product safety and labor relations during the Industrial Revolution, defenserelated corruption scandals in the 1970s, and accounting abuses and the impact of globalization today). Notwithstanding this long history, and the fact that each year dozens of articles on this topic are published and numerous prizes for corporate social responsibility are awarded, there exists no agreed-upon definition of corporate citizenship. In fact, both in the literature and in the more general corporate social responsibility movement, there coexist alternative—sometimes even competing—conceptions of what constitutes good corporate citizenship, why it is important, and how it should be implemented.

Alternative Models of Corporate Citizenship

Although the literature on corporate citizenship (sometimes referred to as corporate social responsibility—CSR) is extensive and contains many subtle distinctions, it can be divided among four highly stylized models: (1) minimalist, (2) philanthropic, (3) encompassing, and (4) social activist conceptions of corporate citizenship. These four models differ both in terms of the supposed beneficiaries of corporate action (shareholders vs. broader societal stakeholders) and in the motivation behind these actions (instrumental vs. moral/ethical). (See table 3.1.1.)

Table 3.1.1: Alternative models of corporate citizenship

Motivation


Instrumental

Moral/ethical


Beneficiaries

Shareholders

Minimalist

Philanthropic

Stakeholders

Encompassing

Social activist

The more traditional or minimalist conception of corporate citizenship was perhaps best articulated by the economist Milton Friedman. According to Friedman, "the social responsibility of business is to increase the wealth of its shareholders" (1970). In other words, the sole responsibility of business is to those who have invested capital in the company. By maintaining a singular focus on wealth creation, businesses will promote efficiency and achieve optimal economic performance, which in this view is the ultimate good that a business can do for society. Of course, corporations should not violate laws or engage in any irregular activities that could harm the wealth of shareholders, but any attempt to incorporate social goals into core business activities will, according to this conception, lead to inefficiencies. Moreover, given that most managers do not have expertise in the area of social responsibility, engaging in these activities will simply distract them from their primary fiduciary responsibility, which is to protect and promote shareholder wealth.

The philanthropic model is an extension of this traditional view. Although it, too, is concerned primarily with the optimization of efficiency and shareholder wealth, it does recognize that individual managers, shareholders, and sometimes even companies can, at times, engage in various philanthropic activities. However, these activities are seen not as important or even related to core business activities, but rather as motivated by various moral or ethical concerns.

A more inclusive stakeholder view of the corporation underlies the third, more encompassing model of corporate citizenship. According to this view, management is responsible not solely to shareholders but also to other groups (e.g., employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers, and local communities) that may be affected by the company's practices. Therefore, managers must consider the interests of these other groups when making decisions. Some proponents of this approach contend that corporate responsiveness to a wide constellation of stakeholders enhances the resiliency of the firm in the face of external threats (Freeman 1984 in Brummer 1991). This, in turn, promotes the long-term survival of the firm. Others argue that company engagement in broader societal issues directly increases company profitability and hence shareholder wealth.[1] Thus, according to this third model of corporate citizenship, corporate behavior may be directed toward a wider constellation of actors, but it is nonetheless instrumental, geared toward maximizing benefits to this broader (albeit still limited) group.

The social activist view of corporate citizenship, the fourth model, extends the boundaries of supposed beneficiaries beyond those groups directly affected by company decision-making and toward society at large. According to this view, corporations should act to enhance broader societal goals and not merely to benefit a more restricted number of shareholders and/or stakeholders. Corporations should act not merely out of instrumental concerns but rather out of moral or even ethical considerations. In fact, because corporations are usually powerful and wealthy actors in society, they have a moral obligation to act in a way that aids their less fortunate fellow citizens.

Of course, there are many other, more subtle views of corporate citizenship. (See the references for a sampling of other views.) The point here is not to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on corporate citizenship but rather to highlight the existence of significant divergent opinions about several key dimensions of this issue, including:

  1. The role of management: Should managers behave solely to enhance shareholder wealth? Or should they act to benefit other groups (both within and outside the firm) as well? Do managerial responsibilities extend beyond what is required either by law or contractual obligation?

  2. The relation to profit: Should corporate decision-making be driven solely by economic considerations? Or are other (social) factors equally important? How does one measure and account for these other considerations? Is there an economic benefit to being a good corporate citizen?

  3. The realm of responsibility: Are corporations responsible for only the direct effects of their decisions and strategies or also the indirect effects? What are the boundaries or limits of these responsibilities?

Globalization

The debates surrounding competing conceptions of corporate citizenship have become more complex and heated as a result of globalization. During the last two decades of the twentieth century, global trade and global capital mobility increased dramatically. For example, trade among the industrial democracies grew at almost twice the rate of total economic output during the 1970s and 1980s.[2] Whereas global trade amounted to about one-third of total world output in the early 1970s, it approached 45 percent in 1995. Intra-industry trade, an indication of competition within similar product markets, far outstripped interindustry trade, thus heightening competition among producers for similar markets. At the same time, world trade became progressively less dominated by exchanges within the OECD nations, since various newly industrialized countries (e.g., South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, India, and China) increased their exports after the oil crisis of the 1970s. A recent study by the World Bank shows that 24 developing countries, home to about 3 billion people, increased their integration into the world economy since 1980. Manufactures rose from less than 25 percent of developing country exports in 1980 to more than 80 percent in 1998.[3] As a result, these countries achieved higher growth in per capita incomes (on average 5 percent growth), longer life expectancies, and better schooling.[4]

Financial integration and movement of capital across borders also increased dramatically in these years. For example, international bank lending grew from around $200 billion in 1973 to almost $4 trillion in 1992.[5] Although the raw numbers on international capital flow are staggering, some economists, including those working at the International Monetary Fund, believe that the best indicator of capital mobility is the existence of government restrictions on international capital movements. In the early 1970s, less than 15 percent of countries had no capital controls. By the mid-1990s, about 30 percent of countries had removed controls on capital mobility.[6] This trend continued throughout the decade.

This increased flow of trade and capital, as well as the dramatic improvements in information, communication, and transportation technologies, has opened up all sorts of opportunities for MNCs to invest in or source from lower-cost developing countries. Yet these opportunities are not without risk. As corporations increasingly disperse parts of their value chain throughout the developing world, they encounter a number of issues that challenge their original conceptions of corporate citizenship. How should these corporations behave when they are operating in several different countries, each with its own wages, regulations, customs, and standards (or lack thereof)? What standards should they abide by and who—national governments, international organizations like the ILO, or the corporations themselves—should set these standards? To whom are these corporations responsible? To their shareholders and direct employees? To their vendors, suppliers, and customers? Or even to the employees of their third-party vendors and the local communities in which those factories are located? What are the boundaries or limits of a corporation's responsibilities? In short, globalization has exacerbated the tensions and debates already present within the corporate social responsibility movement.

In order to better illustrate the complexity of these issues, we now turn to an examination of Nike, Inc.—a company that has come to symbolize both the promise and the perils of globalization.

The Athletic Footwear Industry

The athletic footwear industry experienced an explosive growth in the last two decades. In 1985, consumers in the United States alone spent $5 billion and purchased 250 million pair of shoes.[7] In 2001, they spent over $13 billion and bought over 335 million pair of shoes.[8] Although the industry is highly segmented—by different sports, models, and price—the branded shoe segment is dominated by a few large companies (e.g., Nike, Reebok, and Adidas). In fact, the top 10 footwear companies control over 70 percent of the global athletic footwear market (see table 3.1.2). Since displacing Adidas in the early 1980s and Reebok in the early 1990s, Nike has become the largest and most important athletic shoe company in the world. (See figure 3.1.1.)

Table 3.1.2: Market share

Athletic footwear market share

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999


Nike

22.5

25.4

24.4

22.7

27.1

32.1

35.3

N/A

30.4

Reebok

18.8

20.0

18.9

18.3

17.4

14.7

14.5

N/A

11.2

Adidas

13.6

10.0

9.3

10.3

9.9

10.2

10.3

N/A

15.5

Fila

0.9

2.1

2.7

3.0

4.1

6.0

5.7

N/A

3.9

Converse

3.4

3.5

4.0

4.2

3.3

2.7

3.2

N/A

2.2

New Balance

1.8

1.8

2.1

2.2

2.5

2.9

3.1

N/A

3.8

ASICS

4.7

5.4

5.2

4.7

4.2

3.5

3.0

N/A

2.5

Puma

4.6

3.8

4.3

3.1

2.4

2.4

2.1

N/A

2.1

Keds/Prokeds

3.0

3.9

3.9

3.0

2.4

1.9

1.5

N/A

0.0

Airwalk

0.0

0.0

0.4

1.1

1.2

1.4

1.1

N/A

0.0

Top 10

73.3

75.9

75.2

72.6

74.5

77.8

79.8

0.0

71.6

Others

26.7

24.1

24.8

27.4

25.5

22.2

20.2

28.4

Totals

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

0.0

100.0

Sources: HBS Case #9-299-084 "Nike, Inc.: Entering the Millennium," March 31, 1999, and Footwear News, December 27, 1999

click to expand
Figure 3.1.1: Global athletic footwear market share—top 6.

The Promise of Globalization: Nike, Inc.

Founded in 1964 through an investment of $500 each by Phil Knight and Bill Bowerman, the company (then called Blue Ribbon Sports—BLS) has evolved from being an importer and distributor of Japanese specialty running shoes to becoming the world leader in the design, distribution, and marketing of athletic footwear. Nike has stated: "Our business model in 1964 is essentially the same as our model today: We grow by investing our money in design, development, marketing and sales and then contract with other companies to manufacture our products."[9]

According to company legend, Nike's business model was developed by Knight while he attended Stanford Business School in the early 1960s. Knight realized that while lower-cost, high-quality Japanese producers were beginning to take over the U.S. consumer appliance and electronic markets, most leading footwear companies (e.g., Adidas) were still manufacturing their own shoes in higher-cost countries like the United States and Germany. By outsourcing shoe production to lower-cost Japanese producers, Knight believed that BLS could undersell its competitors and break into this market. As a result, BLS began to import high-tech sports shoes from Onitsuka Tiger of Japan. As sales increased to almost $2 million in the early 1970s, BLS parted ways with Onitsuka and began to design and subcontract its own line of shoes. The Nike brand was launched in 1972, and the company officially changed its name to Nike, Inc. in 1978.

Nike first developed a strong working relationship with two Japanese shoe manufacturers, Nippon Rubber and Nihon-Koyo. But as costs and prices increased in Japan over the course of the 1970s (owing to a combination of a tighter labor market, the impact of the first oil crisis on Japan's economy, and a shift in the dollar/yen exchange rate as a result of the so-called "Nixon shock"),[10] Nike began to search for alternative, lower-cost producers. During these same years, Nike opened up its own shoe factories in Maine and New Hampshire, hoping to develop a reliable and high-quality source to supply its growing domestic market. At the same time, the company also began to cultivate potential suppliers in South Korea, Thailand, China, and Taiwan. By the early 1980s, as costs continued to increase in both Japan and the United States, and as the Korean government created a number of incentives to develop South Korea's footwear industry,[11] Nike closed its U.S. factories and sourced almost all of its production from Asia. In 1982, 86 percent of Nike's athletic footwear came from Korea and Taiwan.[12]

Over time, as South Korea and Taiwan also began to develop, costs began to rise in these sources as well. As a result, Nike began to urge its suppliers to relocate their operations to other, lower-cost countries. The company worked with its lead suppliers to open up manufacturing plants in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. By guaranteeing a significant number of orders and by placing Nike employees at these new factories to help monitor product quality and production processes, Nike was able to help its lead vendors establish an extensive network of footwear factories throughout Southeast Asia.[13]

Today, Nike's products are manufactured in more than 700 factories, employing over 500,000 workers in 51 countries (see table 3.1.3). Nike has only 22,658 direct employees, the vast majority of them working in the United States.[14] Over the years, Nike has broadened its product range. Whereas in 1980, Nike sold 175 different styles of shoes,[15] it offered 772 different styles in its spring 1990 collection and almost 1,200 different styles in its spring 2000 collection.[16] Nike has also moved into other sectors (apparel and sports equipment) and expanded its sales beyond the United States into Europe, Latin America, and Asia. (See appendix A.) In 2001, the company made about $9.5 billion in revenues, of which 59 percent came from footwear sales and 29 percent from apparel.

Table 3.1.3: Regional and product distribution of suppliers

Country

# of factories

Apparel

Equipment

Footwear

# workers


Albania

1

1

0

0

200

Belarus

1

1

0

0

70

Argentina

4

3

0

1

436

Australia

11

9

2

0

400

Bangladesh

4

3

1

0

14,120

Brazil

9

3

1

5

5,488

Bulgaria

4

4

0

0

881

Cambodia

2

2

0

0

2,021

Canada

21

20

1

0

2,300

Chile

1

1

0

0

100

China

74

35

22

17

175,960

Dominican Rep

5

4

1

0

3,995

Ecuador

1

1

0

0

353

Egypt

3

3

0

0

600

El Salvador

8

8

0

0

4,044

Germany

2

2

0

0

30

Greece

19

19

0

0

5,300

Guatemala

2

2

0

0

816

Holland

3

3

0

0

81

Honduras

5

5

0

0

2,438

Hungary

1

1

0

0

1,650

India

23

19

1

3

16,071

Indonesia

30

16

3

11

104,514

Israel

3

1

2

0

2,157

Italy

12

8

2

2

5,000

Japan

6

2

4

0

1,500

Korea

49

31

10

8

4,000

Laos

2

2

0

0

2,452

Lithuania

1

1

0

0

45

Macau

3

3

0

0

500

Macedonia

1

1

0

0

215

Malaysia

42

41

1

0

8,044

Micronesia

2

2

0

0

672

Mexico

41

39

0

2

12,258

Morocco

2

2

0

0

1,274

New Zealand

1

1

0

0

50

Pakistan

3

2

1

0

9,880

Peru

4

4

0

0

5,286

Phillippines

22

18

4

0

9,400

Portugal

23

23

0

0

1,872

Romania

3

3

0

0

2,900

Singapore

2

2

0

0

300

South Africa

2

2

0

0

660

Sri Lanka

16

16

0

0

10,286

Taiwan

35

24

7

4

15,600

Thailand

62

42

11

9

47,962

Turkey

16

15

1

0

7,944

UK

5

5

0

0

814

USA

131

117

14

0

13,369

Vietnam

12

7

0

5

43,414

Zimbabwe

1

0

0

1

7,000

Total

736

579

89

68

556,722

Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001

Important differences exist among the sectors in which Nike competes. Although still primarily known as a footwear company, only 68[17] out of its 736 suppliers are producing shoes. Most of these suppliers are located in Asia. (See appendix B.) In contrast, Nike apparel products are manufactured in 579 factories distributed throughout the world. These differences are due both to the rules governing international trade in the two industries and to the underlying nature of these industries (footwear factories are usually large, capital-intensive facilities, whereas garment factories are usually smaller, easy to set up, and extremely labor-intensive operations). Whereas footwear quotas were eliminated by the midto late 1980s (leading to a consolidation of the industry), trade in garments is still very much shaped by the existence of quotas (e.g., the Multi-fiber Agreement).[18] In 2005, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement in Textile and Clothing, quotas in garments produced in WTO member states should also end. At present, neither Vietnam nor Cambodia are WTO members, and thus quotas will remain in place after 2005.

These industry differences have a significant impact on the kinds of relationships that Nike can develop with its various suppliers. For example, in footwear, Nike has been able to develop long-term relations with several large South Korean and Taiwanese firms. With some of these firms, Nike designers create new footwear designs and styles for upcoming seasons and then relay them via satellite to suppliers, who in turn develop the prototypes. Once these prototypes are approved, these lead suppliers fax the product specifications to their various plants throughout Southeast Asia, where production can take place almost immediately. This level of trust and coordination facilitates both production and (usually) compliance activities for Nike. In apparel, given short product cycles and volatile trends, the situation is completely different. Nike works with numerous suppliers, most of whom are also working for other (often competitor) companies. Given that different apparel suppliers specialize in particular products or market segments, shifts in consumer preferences or fashion trends could translate into very short-term contracts with and/or limited orders from Nike. This alters both the level of influence which Nike has with these suppliers as well as Nike's ability to monitor regularly the production processes and working conditions of these factories.

The Perils of Globalization: Wages, Working Conditions, and the Rise of the Anti-Nike Movement

The same factors that permitted Nike to grow at an impressive rate over the last several decades—taking advantage of global sourcing opportunities to produce lower-cost products and investing these savings into innovative designs and marketing campaigns—have also created serious problems for the company in recent years. Already in the 1980s, Nike had been criticized for sourcing its products in factories/countries where low wages, poor working conditions, and human rights problems were rampant. However, over the course of the 1990s, a series of public relations nightmares—involving underpaid workers in Indonesia, child labor in Cambodia and Pakistan, and poor working conditions in China and Vietnam—combined to tarnish Nike's image. As Phil Knight lamented in a May 1998 speech to the National Press Club, "the Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse."[19]

How Nike, a company associated with both athleticism, health and fitness, and innovative marketing and design, became the poster child for the antiglobalization movement provides an interesting window into the potential risks and problems which globalization creates for all multinational corporations. In what follows, we will not provide a comprehensive review of the various abuses of which Nike and its suppliers have been accused in recent years. Instead, we will examine three anecdotal illustrations of the kinds of problems the company has confronted.

Low Wages in Indonesia[20]

In the early 1990s, Nike products were being manufactured in six Indonesian factories, employing more than 25,000 workers. Four of these factories were owned by Nike's Korean suppliers. As Nike's presence in Indonesia increased, the factories supplying its products (about 6 million pairs of shoes per year) came under greater scrutiny. Reports by a variety of NGOs and labor activists claimed that these plants were rife with exploitation, poor working conditions, and a range of human rights and labor abuses. Many Indonesian shoe factories did not even pay the minimum daily wage (at the time, 2,100 rupiah/day or about $1). They petitioned the Indonesian government for exemptions to the legal minimum wage, claiming it would cause them "hardship" to pay. According to official Indonesian government calculations, this minimum daily wage only covered 70 percent of the basic needs of one individual—let alone a family. Nike's South Korean suppliers were seen as especially stingy with wages and abusive to local workers. One worker at Nagasakti Para Shoes, a Nike contractor, said that she and other Indonesians were "terrified" of their South Korean managers: "They yell at us when we don't make the production quotas, and if we talk back they cut our wages."[21]

The plight of workers in these factories became publicized through the skillful use of media by several NGOs. Jeff Ballinger, founder of Press for Change (but at the time employed by the Asian-American Free Labor Association, a branch of the AFL-CIO), spent nearly four years in Indonesia, exposing low wages and poor working conditions in factories producing Nike goods. In 1993, CBS aired a report featuring Ballinger, about workers' struggles at Nike's Indonesian suppliers. In 1994, harsh criticism of the company's practices appeared in an array of different publications: the New Republic, Rolling Stone, the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and the Economist.

At first, Nike managers sought to ignore or deflect these criticisms. They argued that the Indonesian factories were owned and operated by independent contractors, not by Nike. Nike's vice president for Asia at the time claimed that Nike did not "know the first thing about manufacturing. We are marketers and designers," The company's general manager in Jakarta also argued, "They are our subcontractors. It's not within our scope to investigate [allegations of labor violations]."[22] But by the mid-1990s, Nike instructed its Indonesian contractors to stop applying for exemptions to the legal minimum wage. In April 1999, after the Indonesian government raised minimum wages to 231,000 rupiah/month (then about $26), Nike announced that it would raise wages for workers employed by its suppliers above the legal minimum wage, to between $30 and $37.50 per month.

Child Labor in Pakistan[23]

The city of Sialkot, Pakistan, is home to a cluster of small- and mediumsized firms specializing in an array of labor-intensive, export-oriented goods, including hand-stitched soccer balls. About 70 percent of the world's high-quality soccer balls are produced in Sialkot—many of them for leading brands like Reebok, Nike, Mitre, and Adidas. About a dozen local firms dominate employment and production in the local sports goods cluster. In addition, a wide range of subcontractors and specialist input suppliers also work in the area. Home work is also common in this region.

In June 1996, Life magazine published an article on child labor in Pakistan that included a photo of a 12-year-old boy stitching a Nike soccer ball. This article and its accompanying photo unleashed another wave of criticism against Nike and a call by various consumer groups, trade unions, and NGOs to boycott Sialkot-produced soccer balls. According to Maria Eitel, vice president and senior advisor for corporate responsibility at Nike, this represented a "critical event" for the company in terms of its understanding of globalization, international labor standards, and corporate responsibility.

According to Dusty Kidd, vice president for compliance at Nike, Nike was already working with Saga, its supplier, to eliminate home work and produce soccer balls in more centralized stitching centers. But the impact of the Life magazine article was nonetheless devastating for Nike's brand image. Today, Nike sources soccer balls only from Saga's 12 stitching centers. In response to the wave of criticism generated by this episode, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry signed the so-called "Atlanta Agreement" with the ILO, UNICEF, and several leading sports goods associations to implement a program to eliminate child labor from the soccer ball sector. As a result of the Atlanta Agreement, the ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) arrived in Sialkot to monitor local soccer ball producers and to provide various social protections, training, and other income-generating activities for families whose children used to work in stitching plants. Nike insists that any of its contractors caught employing child workers must remove the child from the factory, continue to pay the child's wages, and pay for the child's school fees until he/she reaches legal working age. Yet, notwithstanding the arrival of IPEC and Nike's new child labor policies, the ILO reports that many local employers continue to use children in their stitching centers and that in response to increased monitoring of standards in Sialkut, some soccer ball production has moved to other nearby but less regulated areas of Pakistan.

Health and Safety Problems in Vietnam[24]

In November 1997, an Ernst and Young audit of one of Nike's South Korean subcontractors, the Tae Kwang Vina Company operating in Vietnam, was leaked to an NGO called Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC, later renamed CorpWatch). At that time, Tae Kwang Vina employed over 9,000 workers and produced more than 400,000 pairs of Nike shoes per month. The Ernst and Young audit, commissioned by Nike, reported serious health and safety problems at the Tae Kwang Vina plant. Toluene concentrations were said to exceed between 6 and 177 times acceptable standards in certain sections of the plant. (Toluene is a chemical solvent that is known to cause central nervous system depression, damage to the liver and kidney, and various skin and eye irritations.) The report also claimed that chemical releases in the plant had caused numerous cases of skin and heart disease, and that respiratory ailments, owing to excess dust, were rampant in other areas of the factory. According to the report, personal protective equipment was not provided at the factory, and working conditions and work hours at the plant were in violation of Nike's code of conduct.

News of this report, which appeared in the New York Times and other leading newspapers, ignited another wave of indignation over Nike's relations with its suppliers. This incident was particularly damaging for Nike since the report came from Ernst and Young, a leading accounting and consulting firm that Nike had hired to audit its suppliers' factories. In addition, the Tae Kwang Vina factory had been one of the factories former Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young had visited previously, as part of a study tour of Nike suppliers sponsored by the company. In his report on Nike's suppliers, Young did not mention the serious health and safety issues at the plant.[25] In short, this episode was more than simply another example of poor working conditions at one of Nike's supplier's plants; it called into question the company's honesty about and commitment to labor and environmental/health standards.

These three events, combined with the numerous others that were reported in the press, created a major public relations problem for Nike. (Appendix C traces the number of negative articles about Nike that appeared in major publications.) Increasingly, labor and environmental problems at Nike's suppliers' factories were becoming a major problem for Nike itself. These events made Nike a target for the antiglobalization and antisweatshop movements. Several NGOs decided to focus most of their attention on Nike and the various problems found among its suppliers. Web sites focusing solely on Nike and its alleged abuses appeared on the world wide web and were used by NGOs and various activist groups to share information, coordinate protests, and further embarrass the company.[26]

Consumer and labor groups organized boycotts of Nike goods and pickets at Nike shops. Under pressure from several student groups, some universities cancelled their orders with Nike to produce collegiate athletic products. As a result of these various activities, the company's hard-earned image began to tarnish.

Nike's Response: Learning to Become a Global Corporate Citizen[27]

At first Nike managers refused to accept any responsibility for the various labor and environmental/health problems found at their suppliers' plants. Workers at these factories were not Nike employees, and thus Nike had no responsibility towards them. By 1992, this hands-off approach changed as Nike formulated a Code of Conduct for its suppliers that required them to observe some basic labor and environmental/health standards. Potential suppliers for Nike were obligated to sign this Code of Conduct and post it in their factories. Critics have charged that Nike's Code of Conduct is a minimal response and not fully enforced. Posting the code in factories where most employees are functionally illiterate and/or do not possess the power to insist on its implementation is simply window dressing, critics claim. Nonetheless, the evolution of this document indicates that Nike is seeking to address several of the most serious problems found in its suppliers' plants. (See appendix E for the latest version of this code.) Since 1998, Nike has increased the minimum age of footwear factory workers to 18 and all other workers (in apparel, equipment) to 16. It has also insisted that all footwear suppliers adopt U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for indoor air quality. In fact, a quick review of some of Nike's recent efforts in the area of labor and environmental/health standards shows that the company is serious about doing the right thing.

New Staff and Training

In response to the growing criticisms, Nike created several new departments (e.g., Labor Practices [1996], Nike Environmental Action Team [NEAT] [1993]), which, by June 2000, were organized under its Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Department. In 2001, in an effort to strengthen the links between production and compliance decisions, the compliance department was moved into the apparel division. Today, Nike has 85 people specifically dedicated to labor and environmental compliance and all located in countries where Nike products are manufactured. These employees visit suppliers' footwear factories on a daily basis. In apparel, given the much larger numbers of suppliers, Nike managers conduct on-site inspections on a weekly or monthly basis, depending upon the size of the firm. In addition to its corporate responsibility and compliance managers, Nike has about 1,000 production specialists working at or with its various global suppliers. All Nike personnel responsible for either production or compliance receive training in Nike's Code of Conduct, labor practices, cross-cultural awareness, and in the company's Safety, Health, Attitudes of Management, People Investment and Environment (SHAPE) program. The company is also developing a new incentive system to evaluate and reward its managers for improvements in labor and environmental standards among its supplier base.

Increased Monitoring of Its Suppliers

In recent years, Nike has pushed its suppliers to obey standards through increased monitoring and inspection efforts. For example, all potential Nike suppliers must undergo a SHAPE inspection, conducted by Nike's own production staff. The SHAPE inspection is a preliminary, preproduction inspection of factories to see if they meet Nike's standards for a clean and healthy workplace, respectful labormanagement relations, fair wages and working conditions, and minimum working age. After this initial assessment, labor practices are more carefully audited by Nike's own labor specialists as well as by outside consultants like PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). This second audit looks more carefully at the company's wages, use of overtime, availability of benefits, and age of its employees. In addition to the SHAPE and labor practices audits, all factories are evaluated by Nike's production personnel on a range of issues such as quality, flexibility, price, delivery, technical proficiency, managerial talent, and working conditions. The goal of these various inspections and audits is to sift through Nike's vendor base and retain only those who meet not only price, quality, and delivery expectations but also labor and environmental health standards.

Nike is currently developing a grading system for all of its suppliers. It will use the system to determine future orders and thus create a strong incentive among its suppliers to improve working conditions. Nike is also exploring new incentive schemes that will reward good corporate citizenship among both its suppliers (again through increased and more value-added orders) and its own managers. Nike managers responsible for supplier factories that show improvement in labor practices and health and environmental standards will be rewarded in still-to-be-defined ways. In addition to its own internal inspections, Nike suppliers are regularly audited by external firms like Ernst and Young, PWC, and various accredited nonprofits (e.g., Verite) that specialize in this work.

Relations with International and Nonprofit Organizations

In addition to developing internal expertise and capacity in the area of standards and corporate responsibility and working with its own suppliers to improve their performance in these areas, Nike has been active in founding and/or supporting an array of different international and nonprofit organizations, all aimed at improving standards for workers in various developing countries. For example, Nike is actively involved in the United Nations Global Compact. As Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in chapter 2, the Global Compact seeks to promote corporate citizenship among multinational companies. Companies seeking to join the Global Compact adhere to a set of core standards in human rights, labor rights, and environmental sustainability. They engage in a variety of activities aimed at improving these standards in the countries where the MNCs operate. Nike is also a founding member of the Global Alliance for Workers and Communities, an alliance of private, public, and nonprofit organizations that seeks to improve workplace conditions and improve training opportunities for young workers in developing countries. Other members of the Global Alliance include The Gap, Inc., the MacArthur Foundation, and the World Bank. Finally, Nike is active in the Fair Labor Association (FLA, formerly the Apparel Industry Partnership). Initiated in 1996 by President Clinton, the FLA is an American nonprofit organization that seeks to bring together various industry stakeholders to develop a common set of standards and to monitor these standards around the world. Although the FLA has experienced controversy, including the defection of its union affiliates, it has recently begun to sponsor independent audits of the factories supplying its members.

These various activities have begun to produce some significant changes among Nike suppliers. For example, as a result of its various inspections, audits, and internal research, Nike has been able to virtually eliminate the use of petroleum-based chemicals in its footwear production. This is something even the company's critics acknowledge.[28] Nike has taken the initiative in organizing an industry-wide organic cotton consortium and is making major strides in improving working conditions among its various suppliers.[29] Of course, not all of Nike's critics are convinced. Many continue to complain about poor wages and working conditions at Nike's suppliers in Vietnam, China, and Indonesia. Others argue that Nike's initiatives are simply not enough and that the company could do much more in the areas of wages, working conditions, human rights, and local socio-economic development. Yet the continuing controversy over Nike and its various activities is not in any way particular to Nike. Rather, they reflect much broader debates about the definition of corporate citizenship and the process of globalization.

Implications for Management Education and Business Strategy

As this paper has illustrated, there is significant debate over the responsibilities of corporations. Should companies behave solely to enhance shareholder wealth, or should they act to benefit other groups (both within and outside the firm) as well? Should corporate decisionmaking be driven solely by economic considerations, or are other (social) factors equally important? How does one measure and account for these other considerations? Are corporations responsible only to their own employees and shareholders, or are they also responsible for the employees of their suppliers and subcontractors? What are the boundaries or limits of any individual company's responsibilities? Given that there are no universal standards and that not all companies are promoting labor and environmental standards as rigorously as Nike is, how does one promote greater coordination and collective action among major producers? If some companies promote and monitor for higher standards and others do not, does this erode the competitive edge of the "good" corporate citizens? These questions will shape the future of business in the years to come, and they need to be integrated into the core curriculum of business schools today. Rather than treat discussions of corporate responsibility as a side (and often "soft") issue, to be discussed in a special seminar (often not part of the core curriculum) or as an afterthought (special session) in already established courses, this topic needs to be moved to the fore of most management courses and used as a lens through which other business issues are discussed. In this way, our students, the world's future managers, will instinctively benchmark their other decisions and actions against whatever standards for corporate citizenship they embrace. The point is not to impose a particular view of corporate citizenship on our students, but rather to encourage them to engage this issue and make it part of their everyday decision-making process.

Globalization and the controversial issues it raises will also absorb management in the foreseeable future. Should multinational companies abide by so-called international labor and environmental standards, or is this simply regulatory imperialism and de facto protectionism in another guise? Will the imposition of these standards on developing countries diminish their competitive advantage and thus damage their economic development? Or will improved labor and environmental standards lead these local producers to upgrade their production processes and up-skill their workforces and thus enhance their long-term competitiveness? Who (which actors) should be responsible for developing these standards? National governments, international organizations, transnational NGOs, local trade unions and civil society groups, or even individual corporations (through their own Codes of Conduct)?

The standards (if any) which are implemented and the actors who set the standards will have dramatic effects on the future trajectory—and the relative winners and losers—of globalization Again, these issues need to be integrated into our basic international management and global strategy courses. As recent world events have dramatically illustrated, the uneven distribution of the benefits of globalization has provoked a major backlash against multinational corporations and the entire process of globalization. Only by redressing this inequality can we ensure the future success of this process and perhaps some semblance of stability in the world. This is as much a managerial challenge as anything else. Provoking our students to wrestle with these dilemmas and to think through possible strategic solutions to these problems will better equip them for their future careers in today's turbulent global economy. These questions—and how they are answered—will shape the future of business for many years to come. Thus, it is imperative that they move to the center of management education today.

Acknowledgments

This case was prepared with the active involvement and research assistance of the following Sloan MBA students: Vanessa Chammah, Brian Curtis, Elizabeth Fosnight, Archana Kalegaonkar, and Adnan Qadir. I would also like to thank Miguel Alexander, Maria Eitel, Dusty Kidd, Joseph Tomasselli, and Dara O'Rourke for their helpful comments and assistance during this project. In addition, many of the thoughts on the context of global citizenship were developed collectively with Professor Zairo Cheibub, of the Federal University Fluminense, Niteroi, Brazil, in a joint paper we wrote on the topic.

Appendix A: Nike Sales and Revenue

Table 3.1.4: Sales and net income

Sales (million US$)

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001


US footwear

69

144

245

399

581

666

640

567

650

510

758

1,058

1,369

1,680

1,744

1,969

1,869

2,309

2,772

3,754

3,499

3,245

3,351

3,209

Us apparel

1

2

8

33

70

107

122

160

165

131

143

208

266

327

369

361

339

424

831

1,407

1,556

1,293

1,154

1,260

Us atheletic equipment

2

3

1

Non-US footwear

652

868

1,049

998

1,244

1,682

2,391

2,460

1,973.8

2,210

2,414.8

Non Us footwear and

1

4

17

26

43

94

158

217

252

235

303

348

479

Non-US apparel

210

268

353

359

473

651

1,087

1,436

1,383.7

1,392.6

1,503.3

Other

96

121

135

157

199

223

312

534

548

602

881

886.6

1,101.5


Total revenue

71

150

270

458

694

867

920

946

1,070

877

1,204

1,710

2,235

3,004

3,406

3,931

3,788

4,762

6,470

9,187

9,553

8,777

8,995

9,489

Net income (million US$)

4

10

13

26

49

57

41

10

59

36

102

167

243

287

329

365

299

400

555

796

400

451

579

590

Sources: a) 1978--97: HBS Case #9-299-084 "Nike, Inc.: Entering the Millennium," March 31, 1999; b) 1998--2001: Company financial information.

click to expand
Figure 3.1.2: Total revenue—net income, 1978–2001. Sources: a) 1978–97: HBS Case #9-299-084 "Nike, Inc.: Entering the Millennium," March 31, 1999; b) 1998–2001: company financial information.

Appendix B: Regional Product Distribution of Nike Suppliers

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Figure 3.1.3: Factories per product. Total = 736. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

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Figure 3.1.4: Number of contract workers by region (2001). Total = 556,722. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

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Figure 3.1.5: Factories per region. Total = 736. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

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Figure 3.1.6: Footwear factories by region. Total = 68. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

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Figure 3.1.7: Apparel factories per region. Total = 579. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

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Figure 3.1.8: Equipment factories per region. Total = 89. Source: Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001.

Appendix C: Nike Labor Relations Media Mentions

Source: Major World Newspapers through Lexis-Nexis database

click to expand
Figure 3.1.9: Media mentions with "sweatshop." Search words: Nike and Sweatshop. Time frame: previous ten years. Number of documents containing both words: 600.

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Figure 3.1.10: Media mentions with "child labor." Search words: Nike and Child Labor. Time frame: previous ten years. Number of documents containing both words: 289.

click to expand
Figure 3.1.11: Media mentions with "exploitation." Search words: Exploitation Time frame: previous ten years. Number of documents containing both words: 232.

click to expand
Figure 3.1.12: Unfavorable media mentions. Combination of three searches. Note: Articles may be repeated and some may contain all three search words.

Major Newspapers

U.S. newspapers must be listed in the top 50 in circulation in Editor & Publisher Year Book. Newspapers published outside the United States must be in English language and listed as a national newspaper in Benn's World Media Directory or one of the top 5 percent in circulation for the country.

  • Asian Wall Street Journal

  • Atlanta Journal and Constitution

  • Australian Financial Review

  • Baltimore Sun

  • Boston Globe

  • Boston Herald

  • Buffalo News

  • Chicago Sun-Times

  • Christian Science Monitor

  • Columbus Dispatch

  • Daily News (New York)

  • Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo)

  • Daily/Sunday Telegraph (London)

  • Denver Post

  • Dominion (Wellington)

  • Evening Post (Wellington)

  • Financial Times (London)

  • Gazeta Mercantil Online

  • Gazette (Montreal)

  • Guardian (London)

  • Herald (Glasgow)

  • Houston Chronicle

  • Independent and Independent on Sunday (London)

  • Irish Times

  • Jerusalem Post

  • Journal of Commerce

  • Los Angeles Times

  • Miami Herald

  • New Straits Times (Malaysia)

  • New York Times

  • Observer

  • Omaha World Herald

  • Ottawa Citizen

  • Plain Dealer

  • San Diego Union-Tribune

  • San Francisco Chronicle

  • Scotsman & Scotland on Sunday

  • Seattle Times

  • South China Morning Post

  • Southland Times (New Zealand)

  • St. Louis Post-Dispatch

  • St. Petersburg Times

  • Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN)

  • Straits Times (Singapore)

  • Tampa Tribune

  • Times and Sunday Times (London)

  • Times-Picayune

  • Toronto Star

  • Toronto Sun

  • USA Today

  • Washington Post

Appendix D

List of Nike Interviewees

  1. Oscar Cardona, vice president, human resources, USA

  2. Marie Eitel, vice president and senior advisor, corporate responsibility

  3. Fukumi Hawser, director of compliance

  4. Jerry Hauth, director, corporate responsibility, equipment division

  5. Dusty Kidd, vice president, compliance

  6. Heidi McCloskey, global sustainability director, Nike Apparel

  7. Mary Roney, global employee involvement manager, Global Community Affairs

  8. Josh Tomaselli, vice president, apparel sourcing

  9. Patrick Werner, director, apparel compliance

  10. John Wilson, director, contact manufacturing, equipment division

Appendix E: The Nike Code of Conduct

Nike Inc. was founded on a handshake.

Implicit in that act was the determination that we would build our business with all of our partners based on trust, teamwork, honesty and mutual respect. We expect all of our business partners to operate on the same principles.

At the core of the NIKE corporate ethic is the belief that we are a company comprised of many different kinds of people, appreciating individual diversity, and dedicated to equal opportunity for each individual.

NIKE designs, manufactures, and markets products for sports and fitness consumers. At every step in that process, we are driven to do not only what is required by law, but what is expected of a leader. We expect our business partners to do the same. NIKE partners with contractors who share our commitment to best practices and continuous improvement in:

  1. Management practices that respect the rights of all employees, including the right to free association and collective bargaining

  2. Minimizing our impact on the environment

  3. Providing a safe and healthy workplace

  4. Promoting the health and well-being of all employees

Contractors must recognize the dignity of each employee, and the right to a workplace free of harassment, abuse or corporal punishment. Decisions on hiring, salary, benefits, advancement, termination or retirement must be based solely on the employee's ability to do the job. There shall be no discrimination based on race, creed, gender, marital or maternity status, religious or political beliefs, age or sexual orientation.

Wherever NIKE operates around the globe we are guided by this Code of Conduct and we bind our contractors to these principles. Contractors must post this Code in all major workspaces, translated into the language of the employee, and must train employees on their rights and obligations as defined by this Code and applicable local laws.

While these principles establish the spirit of our partnerships, we also bind our partners to specific standards of conduct. The core standards are set forth below.

  1. Forced Labor. The contractor does not use forced labor in any form—prison, indentured, bonded or otherwise.

  2. Child Labor. The contractor does not employ any person below the age of 18 to produce footwear. The contractor does not employ any person below the age of 16 to produce apparel, accessories or equipment. If at the time Nike production begins, the contractor employs people of the legal working age who are at least 15, that employment may continue, but the contractor will not hire any person going forward who is younger than the Nike or legal age limit, whichever is higher. To further ensure these age standards are complied with, the contractor does not use any form of home work for Nike production.

  3. Compensation. The contractor provides each employee at least the minimum wage, or the prevailing industry wage, whichever is higher; provides each employee a clear, written accounting for every pay period; and does not deduct from employee pay for disciplinary infractions.

  4. Benefits. The contractor provides each employee all legally mandated benefits.

  5. Hours of Work/Overtime. The contractor complies with legally mandated work hours; uses overtime only when each employee is fully compensated according to local law; informs each employee at the time of hiring if mandatory overtime is a condition of employment; and on a regularly scheduled basis provides one day off in seven, and requires no more than 60 hours of work per week on a regularly scheduled basis, or complies with local limits if they are lower.

  6. Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H). From suppliers to factories to distributors and to retailers, Nike considers every member of our supply chain as partners in our business.

    As such, we've worked with our Asian partners to achieve specific environmental, health and safety goals, beginning with a program called MESH (Management of Environment, Safety and Health).

  7. Documentation and Inspection. The contractor maintains on file all documentation needed to demonstrate compliance with this Code of Conduct and required laws; agrees to make these documents available for Nike or its designated monitor; and agrees to submit to inspections with or without prior notice.

Source: http://www.nike.com

References

Brummer, James J. 1991. Corporate Responsibility and Legitimacy: An Interdisciplinary Analysis. New York: Greenwood Press.

Cheibub, Zairo, and Richard Locke. 2000. "Valoures ou Intresses? Reflexoes sobre a responsabilidade social des empresas." Unpublished ms, Federal University Fluminense, Niteroi, Brazil.

Cone Inc. 1999. "Cone/Roper Cause-Related Trends Report: Evolution of Cause Branding." Boston: Cone Inc.

Friedman, Milton. 1970. "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits." New York Times Magazine, September 13, pp. 32–33.

Frooman, Jeff. 1997. "Socially Irresponsible and Illegal Behavior and Shareholder Wealth." Business and Society 36, no. 3: 221–249.

Paine, Lynn Sharpe. 1996. "Corporate Purpose and Responsibility." Boston: Harvard Business School. Case # 9-396-201.

Waddock, Sandra, and Samuel B. Graves. 1997. "The Corporate Social Performance—Financial Performance Link." Strategic Management Journal 18, no. 4: 303–319.

Weiser, John, and Simon Zadek. 2000. "Conversation with Disbelievers: Persuading Companies to Address Social Challenges." Report written through grant from Ford Foundation.

Zadek, Simon. 2001. The Civil Corporation: The New Economy of Corporate Citizenship. London: Earthscan.

http://www.bsr.org

http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_whatiscsr.htm

http://www.mori.com/polls/1999/millpoll.shtml

http://www.wbcsd.org

[1]See Elizabeth Murphy, "Best corporate citizens have better financial performance," Strategic Finance, January 2002.

[2]Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 51.

[3]World Bank, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty (The World Bank, 2002), p. 5.

[4]However, this same study shows that not all developing countries have benefited from increased globalization. In fact, much of the developing world trades less today than it did 20 years ago. This explains, in part, the growing poverty and income inequality manifest in much of the developing world.

[5]Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, p. 54.

[6]Richard Herring and Robert Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 26–27.

[7]Miguel Korzeniewicz, "Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global Athletic Footwear Industry," in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 248.

[8]National Sporting Goods Association, 2002; http://www.sbrnet.com

[9]As reported on Nike's web site, nikebiz.com

[10]For more on this period, see Yasusuke Murukami, "The Japanese Model of Political Economy," in The Political Economy of Japan: Volume 1, The Domestic Transformation, ed. Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (Stanford University Press, 1987).

[11]These and other government incentive programs are nicely described in Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford University Press, 1989).

[12]"International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear: Nike and Reebok," HBS Case #9-394189, pp. 2–5.

[13]For more on the evolution of Nike's strategy, see "Nike (A)," HBS Case #9-385-025; "International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear: Nike and Reebok," HBS Case #9-394-189; and J. B. Strasser and Laurie Becklund, Swoosh: The Unauthorized Story of Nike and the Men Who Played There (Harper Business 1991).

[14]Nike, Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001, p. 1.

[15]This includes different color combinations of shoes.

[16]These figures come from various Nike catalogs. We thank Jody McFarland for helping us obtain these data.

[17]Twenty of these footwear suppliers manufacture shoes for Cole Hann, a Nike subsidiary. Thus, only about 50 suppliers are manufacturing Nike brand shoes.

[18]For a fascinating discussion of the impact of quotas on the international apparel industry, see David Birnbaum, Birnbaum's Global Guide to Winning the Great Garment War (Hong Kong: Third Horizon Press, 2000).

[19]Quoted in "Hitting the Wall: Nike and International Labor Practices," HBS Case #9-700-047.

[20]This section relies heavily on "International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear: Nike and Reebok," HBS Case #9-394-189, "Hitting the Wall: Nike and International Labor Practices," HBS Case #9-700-047, and "Nike: What's It All About?" electronic memo, Global Exchange, 1999.

[21]"International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear," p. 5.

[22]"International Sourcing in Athletic Footwear," p. 6.

[23]This section draws heavily on Khalid Nadvi and Sajid Kazmi, "Global Standards and Local Responses," unpublished manuscript, Institute for Development Studies, Sussex, United Kingdom, February 2001.

[24]This section draws heavily on Dara O'Rourke, "Smoke from a Hired Gun: A Critique of Nike's Labor and Environmental Auditing in Vietnam as performed by Ernst and Young," CorpWatch, November 10, 1997.

[25]The Young Report on Nike's suppliers has been severely criticized as "limited" and "biased" by an array of different NGOs.

[26]See, for example, Oxfam's NikeWatch Campaign, the Clean Clothes Campaign's "Nike Case," Press for Change's nikewages.org, and the Global Exchange's "Nike: What's It All About?" All can be found on the various web sites of these organizations. B. J. Bullert, an anti-Nike activist, has written a fascinating paper on the anti-Nike campaign by various NGOs. See B. J. Bullert, "Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops and the Making of a Global Movement," Working paper #2000-14, Shorenstein, Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy.

[27]This section is based on interviews with several Nike managers in July 2002. See appendix D for a list of interviewees.

[28]Interview with Dara O'Rourke, formerly of CorpWatch and now an assistant professor of Planning at MIT.

[29]On the Organic Cotton Initiative, see Nike's Corporate Responsibility Report, FY 2001. For an example of improved working conditions and relations with unions among Nike suppliers, see Verite's Comprehensive Factory Evaluation Report of the Kukdong International Mexico plant in Puebla, Mexico, March 2001. This report can be found on Nike's web site, http://www.nikebiz.com




Management[c] Inventing and Delivering Its Future
Management[c] Inventing and Delivering Its Future
ISBN: 7504550191
EAN: N/A
Year: 2005
Pages: 55

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