A Brief History of Tablet Computing

A Brief History of Tablet Computing

The next few pages present profiles of some of the pioneers of tablet computing and its related technologies. The profiled technologies mark important milestones on the road to where we are today with the Tablet PC. It is important not only to remember the past, but also, by investigating it, to learn the lessons and spot the trends that will drive us toward a successful future in tablet computing. Our coverage is far from comprehensive, though it does detail the major advances over the past decade or so in the field. Figure 1-2 is a timeline of the featured tablet pioneers.

figure 1-2 a timeline of milestones in tablet computing.

Figure 1-2. A timeline of milestones in tablet computing.

GRiD GRiDPad

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In 1989, GRiD Computing released the GRiDPad, a portable computer with a tablet design. It came without a keyboard (although one could be attached) and used a pen as the default method of interaction. Boasting a 640 x 400 CGA display, the GRiDPad cost around $2,400 without the software. GRiDPad s software ran on top of MS-DOS 3.3. Applications for the GRiDPad were written in GRiDTask, a rapid-application development infrastructure designed specifically for the device.

Development of the GRiDPad and GRiDTask was led by GRiD Vice President of Research Jeff Hawkins, who would later play ever-increasing roles in the world of pen computing. GRiD Computing subsequently released several other tablet-like devices, with the GRiD Convertible being most notable as the first convertible tablet device. Despite its many innovations, GRiD Computing s sales were disappointing, and Tandy eventually bought the company. Gradually, its creativity and market clout faded away.

GO PenPoint

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The story of GO Corporation and its pen-driven operating system, GO PenPoint, is filled with drama and controversy. PenPoint was designed from the ground up to interact primarily with pens. But it was ahead of its time in many other ways as well. The PenPoint operating system supported a flat view of memory (32-bit addressed) and preemptive multitasking. It also allowed detachable networking (moving from connected to disconnected states, depending on the availability of a network). And to top it all off, PenPoint was an object-based operating system that had an entire application framework for developers.

Because of its revolutionary design, PenPoint s user model was very different from most operating systems (past and present). PenPoint had a notebook paradigm for the user s workspace. Each document was a page in the notebook that the user could flip to when necessary. Furthermore, there wasn t the concept of launching applications. Instead, to create a new document of a particular type, the user would simply create a new page using a particular stationery. Applications were implemented as stationeries, thereby completing PenPoint s notebook paradigm.

The drama with GO Corporation, however, allegedly begins with Microsoft. As former CEO and cofounder Jerry Kaplan tells it in his book, Startup: A Silicon Valley Adventure Story Startup: A Silicon Valley Adventure Story, Penguin Books, 1995 (soon to be made a movie, apparently). , representatives of Microsoft met with engineers at GO to discuss some application compatibility issues under a nondisclosure agreement or so the representatives claimed. Lo and behold, according to the story, Kaplan discovers six months later that Microsoft had, since the meeting with GO, started its own Windows for Pen Computing project. Pen Windows, writes Kaplan, was clearly a reactionary initiative launched by Microsoft to destroy GO Corporation s PenPoint operating system. Much bitterness ensued on both sides as the pen-computing market, small as it was, became fiercely competitive.

After having difficulty raising money to develop its own hardware, GO spun off EO Inc. in 1991 to develop a tablet device. The EO Personal Communicator, as it was eventually called, ran PenPoint and Aha! Software s InkWriter, an ink software processing package. In a true act of irony, in 1993 AT&T first bought EO and then GO, reuniting the two companies under the same corporate umbrella. Unfortunately, GO suffered the same fate as GRiD after it was consumed by a large corporation. Development on PenPoint ceased soon thereafter.

Microsoft Windows for Pen Computing

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Two representatives from Microsoft visited GO Corporation early in GO s history to discuss the PenPoint operating system. According to the representatives We conducted an interview with the two Microsoft representatives, who no longer work at Microsoft, in May 2002. , their mission was to convince GO to build on top of Windows instead of creating PenPoint as its own operating system. When GO was reluctant to do so, the representatives urged Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates to modify Windows to support the use of pens. This effort became Windows for Pen Computing, or Pen Windows.

The first version of Pen Windows was released as a modification to Windows 3.11 and was officially called Windows for Pen Computing version 1. It added several components into Windows, including a specialized video driver, pen device drivers, a handwriting recognizer, and a note-taking application. Users typically got Pen Windows when hardware manufacturers bundled it with their tablet devices. Pen Windows also had an API that developers could use to write pen-enabled applications.

Pen Windows tried to revolutionize computing by imbuing all parts of the Windows operating system with support for the pen. In particular, edit controls in applications were automatically replaced by enhanced edit controls that supported handwriting conversion. Similarly, a variety of gestures (specific motions of the pen) were available in applications as command shortcuts. In the end, a few factors plagued Pen Windows, which never became a successful business for Microsoft. Perhaps the most important issue is that hardware at that point in time was just not quite ready for a pen computing revolution. Memory and processing power weren t sufficient to do accurate handwriting recognition, and tablet devices were quite heavy and unwieldy. Furthermore, the many gestures included in Pen Windows were a usability nightmare, being both hard to discover and hard to remember.

By the time Windows 95 rolled around, Pen Windows was demoted from a full-blown operating system to merely an add-on. Version 2 was called Pen Services, and it was a much scaled-down effort compared to the ambitious Windows for Pen Computing version 1. In 1995, GO was already absorbed by AT&T and barely functional, while the Apple Newton (shown below) was also shown to be a commercial disaster. PalmPilot had not yet arrived. Pen computing was at an all-time low in the mid 1990s, and the reduced role of Pen Services in Windows 95 reflected the times. There was very little interest from hardware manufacturers and from consumers in the second version. After shipping Pen Services, the Pen Windows team was effectively dissolved. Some of the members went on to other pen-related Microsoft efforts, including the eventually successful Windows CE. Others, haunted by disillusionment According to interviews with former Pen Windows employees Keith Stutler and Brian Watson. , forsook the promise of pen computing altogether.

Apple Newton

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The Newton MessagePad (commonly referred to simply as the Newton) was the first (and only) handheld computer produced by Apple Corporation. It was the pet project of John Sculley, then CEO of Apple, who in 1992 coined the term Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) in reference to the Newton. There was an entire line of Newton MessagePad models released between 1993 and 1998: 100, 110, 120, 130, 2000, and 2100. All the models had PCMCIA slots for easy expansion, and most also had internal modems for connectivity.

Unfortunately, the original Newton was plagued by a series of problems. Its note-taking application, Note Pad, would gluttonously consume all system resources when running. The device was thought by some to be too wide for smaller hands, and its unprotected glass screen was easily shattered. Furthermore, the original handwriting recognition software was word-based, not character-based, containing a dictionary of a meager 10,000 words, which was not sufficient for good recognition. The Russian-created ParaGraph recognition engine also had a severe memory fragmentation bug that would degrade recognition results after prolonged use, requiring users to reset the device frequently. As if the negative press wasn t enough, the poor handwriting recognition was lampooned in a series of Garry Trudeau s Doonesbury comic strips (http://www.doonesbury.ucomics.com) The media latched onto the Newton s handwriting recognition woes, and sales of the original Newton were dismal.

By the end of the Newton line in 1998, the MessagePad 2100 was a truly spectacular PDA. It sported a zippy 162-MHz StrongARM processor, 8-MB RAM, a large grayscale backlit LCD, and much improved handwriting recognition. But the damage was done, and the Newton never recovered from its slow start. Apple, under its newly restored CEO Steve Jobs, ended the Newton in February of 1998. According to some critics, the Newton s high price and poor desktop connectivity were the true reasons for its demise. But in most people s minds, the underperforming handwriting recognition of the first Newton sealed its doom. This remains the main reason cited for its failure.

Newton was intended to be a platform for wireless communications and handwriting was a very, very small part of the product.

John Sculley, Former CEO, Apple Corporation From Why Did Apple Kill Newton? by David MacNeill. Pen Computing Magazine, June 1998.

Palm Computing PalmPilot

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After his success releasing the GRiDPad, Jeff Hawkins was looking to produce a consumer-targeted portable computer. However, GRiD Computing had by then been relegated to producing computers for the verticals market (basically niche market computers for industries). Hawkins approached Tandy Corporation, owner of GRiD, and secured some seed money to start Palm Computing.

At first, Palm Computing was purely a software producer, making the applications that shipped on a Casio device called the Zoomer. The Zoomer was released a few months after the Newton, and sales were abysmal. However, what essentially was the first version of the Graffiti character recognition system shipped on the Zoomer, as did one-button synchronization (HotSync).

Hawkins then realized that to make a truly compelling handheld platform, Palm would have to be responsible not only for the software but for the hardware as well. He took GeoWork s operating system (GEOS), combined it with Graffiti and HotSync, and asked US Robotics (then primarily a modem manufacturer) to produce the hardware.

The PalmPilot 1000 (and others in the series, such as the 5000, Personal, and Professional) was an instant success. It succeeded where many others had failed by clearly defining the PDA niche. The PalmPilot was a handheld device that could easily fit in a shirt pocket, and it supported its four main functions very well: appointments, notes, tasks, and contacts. To top it off, it was priced brilliantly to sell for under $300. Consumers were clearly ready for such a device PalmPilots sold in record units in the first year of release, and they still dominate the PDA market today.

Soon after Palm Computing s fledgling success, networking giant 3Com Corporation bought US Robotics, effectively gaining Palm in the deal. Hawkins and several other executives at Palm were concerned about their absorption into 3Com and lobbied for 3Com to spin off the Palm division as a separate company. As it became clear that 3Com was unwilling to do this, Hawkins and his executives left to start their own venture, called Handspring.

After a year s worth of hard work producing their new handheld device, Hawkins would receive shocking news. The day before the announcement of the new Handspring Visor, 3Com announced that Palm Computing would be spun off as a separate company. Hawkins s two start-ups, Palm and Handspring, would compete directly with one another in the same market.

Microsoft Pocket PC

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PalmPilot permeated the lucrative PDA market with its low price and convenient size. The Windows CE team at Microsoft had failed to grab a piece of the PDA market with the failed Windows CE version 1 family of devices, which had tiny keyboards and hard-to-use software. Version 2 made some inroads but was far from a hit. Version 3 was to be different it would redo the user interface to address usability problems and would support hardware much more like the existing PalmPilots on the market. Dubbed the Pocket PC, several major hardware manufacturers lined up to bring Windows CE version 3 to consumers hungry for a true second-generation PDA.

Palm had been creating devices in the lower end of the market. Although they still generated significant sales, consumers were starting to tire of the grayscale screens that were sometimes hard to read in daylight. There wasn t much happening in the PDA market.

More than any other manufacturer, Compaq and its Pocket PC device (the iPAQ) would create a stir of excitement in the handheld community. Windows CE version 3 sported a familiar interface borrowed from the Start Menu paradigm of the desktop Microsoft Windows products. Compaq s iPAQ showed Windows CE version 3 in its full glory. It also one-upped Palm by catering to the high end of the handheld market, with its beefy 32 MB of RAM and blazing fast 206-MHz processor. While Palm catered to the average consumer, the new Pocket PCs mainly targeted the corporate professional.

The success of the Pocket PC was largely due to spectacular hardware at an acceptable price. There was not much software on the Pocket PC platform that could be considered innovative, though it connected pen computing s past with its future. After all, Pocket PC s software handwriting recognizer was derived from ParaGraph s Calligrapher, an earlier version of which powered the Apple Newton. Furthermore, its note-taking application was derived from Aha! Software s InkWriter, which ran on EO s Personal Communicator and would also contribute indirectly to the Microsoft Windows XP Tablet PC Edition Journal. Despite the lack of innovative software, the Pocket PC was Microsoft s successful reentrance into the arena of tablet computing. Indeed, big things were to come.

In a Little While

One consistent theme in our journey through tablet computing s past is the critical role that hardware plays in the success or failure of tablet devices. A key reason often sited for the failure of GRiDPad, PenPoint, and Windows for Pen Computing is that the hardware simply was not good enough to make them compelling. It was either too heavy or too bulky, battery life was too short, readability was poor, and processing power and memory couldn t support accurate handwriting recognition.

Indeed, the future success of tablet devices, including the Microsoft Tablet PC, may continue to be heavily influenced by hardware technology. Several exciting hardware developments are visible on the horizon and should become widely available over the next few years. Each of these developments could have a direct positive impact on tablet computing, making Tablet PCs even more portable and functional than they are today. Potential technologies that could revolutionize tablet technology include:

  • Organic Light-Emitting Diode (OLED) technology

    This new type of display is made by layering thin films of organic material between conductors. The organic material illumines when electrical current is applied, in a process called electrophosphorescence. Traditional LCD screens require strong backlights that shine through the liquid crystal cells. These backlights can often consume up to half of an LCD s total power consumption. Because the organic material in OLEDs is emissive (that is, it emits its own light), OLEDs do not need backlighting. OLEDs have many other advantages over today s LCD technologies, including wider viewing angles, thinner profiles, and increased brightness.

  • Projected virtual keyboards

    A company based in Jerusalem called VKB has successfully developed a virtual keyboard. The technology works by projecting an image of a keyboard onto any flat surface. Using infrared, the virtual keyboard can detect when the user has typed on the projected image. The required hardware for both projecting the keyboard and detecting the typing is relatively compact, making many roaming usage scenarios possible. There is a good chance that future cell phones, and perhaps even Tablet PCs, can leverage this technology.

  • Better batteries

    Much research is being done in the field of batteries. Traditional batteries, such as nickel cadmium (NiCad) and nickel metal hydride (NiMH), were not as efficient as the current lithium ion type. However, the future of batteries may lie in lithium polymer and hydrogen fuel cells. Whereas current battery technologies require metal casing to hold their liquid electrolytes under pressure, lithium polymer batteries suspend their electrolytes in a solid polymer matrix. This greatly reduces their weight and size, making them a potential replacement for lithium ion. Hydrogen fuel cells, on the other hand, promise to pack a lot of power in an environmentally friendly battery by combining hydrogen and oxygen to form heat and water, creating electricity in the process. Both lithium polymer batteries and hydrogen fuel cells have yet to be made into viable commercial products.

The past has shown that hardware technologies can make or break the commercial success of a tablet device. The next few years will witness whether these and other technologies will significantly advance the state of tablet computing.



Building Tablet PC Applications
Building Tablet PC Applications (Pro-Developer)
ISBN: 0735617236
EAN: 2147483647
Year: 2001
Pages: 73

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