Certainly
No Way
"Before the company moved to the 6th Avenue building, there was
some thinking about Westchester or Connecticut or even Dallas, with
a campus and trees and lakes. A strong case was made regarding the
numbers
, the premium we paid to
remain
in New York City, etcetera.
Well, nobody loves natural beauty more than I do, but, I'm sorry,
New York is where it's at. I strongly felt that our business was
too dynamic, too ever-changing to be headquartered
anywhere
but New
York. I thought our people should draw from the city's energy, be
stimulated by the maelstrom, be in the center of it all, the
activity, the gossip, the rumors, the tension, be in the midst of
the battle. New York
is
tough. Not for nothing do you always
hear that if you can make it here, you can make it anywhere. I
think that's
good
for us, as well as our being only minutes
away from some late breaking item on Seventh Avenue."
Mil Batten (1986)
In 1986, rumors of a move from New York to Dallas
began
to seep
through the company. Such rumors were not new. They had surfaced
sporadically since Batten's days. As Batten explained, a Dallas
move would make a lot of sense from a financial and operational
perspective. The Penney tower needed costly refurbishing. Manhattan
was very expensive and space was limited, with Penney now
renting
several floors in two other
buildings
.
There were other arguments as well. Getting to work in Texas
would be remarkably easier, thereby conserving
associates
' time and
energy for the
tasks
at hand. Then there were time zone
communications, an often critical issue in national
retailing
. At 5
p.m., when many New York Office associates had to leave to catch
their commuter trains, an afternoon of action still remained in Los
Angeles. In the central time zone
especially
with everyone driving to work and able to
arrive
earlier and stay
latercommunications within the whole company
would be much easier and greatly improved.
Travel would also be easier and more efficient. Dallas had an
outstanding airport and was an airline hub
fairly
near the
geographic center of the United States. And it would be far, far
easier getting to
flights
in Dallas. Associates could fly out of
Dallas in the morning and still do at least a generous half-day's
business anywhere in the country, usually with lower fares as
well.
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And then there was the easier and much less expensive
lifestylean aspect that had grown to
paradisiacal
proportions
to those commuting to Manhattan.
Also not new were rejections of Dallas. Although never
publicized, through the
grapevine
the rank and file knew that three
Dallas proposals had been
killed
in Don Seibert's administration
alone. He had recommended against them, and the board had voted the
motions
down. Although the arguments had been the same, Seibert had
echoed
Batten in citing the serious intangible
costsas well as the loss of
experienced
personnelthat such a move would inevitably
cause.
Therefore, since Howell said he wished to be careful and
certain, late in 1986 an external
group
was contracted to evaluate
the move. The work was done in
secrecy
because of the fear of
unwanted press coverage before any decision was reached. There was
a substantial antimove faction at the top, and at this point they
assumed two things would come out of this evaluation:
-
The bare numbers would, without a doubt, be very seductive.
-
All the same, the answer would be no. As before in the Batten
and Seibert
years
, there were just too many aspects to such a move
that were antithetical to the way JCPenney operated. Seibert had
killed the move. Howell, as Seibert's man, would certainly do the
same.